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INTRODUCTION 
The following essays share a degree of unity In outlook, a degree of 
diversity in subject matter treated, and, hopefully, also a degree of 
Interconnectedness in meaning. The unity consists of the common stance 
they take toward theoretical problems. It is one underlying theme of 
each of these papers that theoretical insight into contemporary problems 
in economic theory Is at least partially illuminated by scholarship in 
the history of economic thought. Accordingly, each paper involves an 
element of historical research. And what is more, the purpose of the 
historical work is not to establish historical primacy, or even always 
(though sometimes this is the case) to describe the actual evolution of 
doctrines. Instead, we at times take liberty with the grand historical 
march of ideas in order to rearrange thought by scrambling dates. Thus, 
for example, a comparison of the most modern views of the mathematical 
general equilibrium theorists and the more antiquated long-period 
equilibrium approach is essayed in Essay III. 
Such an obvious violence to historical context is justified by the 
very nature of the discipline of economics. For it is peculiarly the 
case in economics, that while it continually lays claim to the status of 
science, with all of the procedural rules and social standing such a 
claim implies, it is also continually subject to internal disputes of a 
more philosophical, or even theological, nature. By this claim is meant 
something more than just the influence of precognltlve "visions" that 
Schumpeter made so much of—although this is part of the claim. But more 
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than this (and contrary to Schumpeter's view of the history of economic 
analysis), economic*s peculiar relation with its historical record (at 
least peculiar for a science) is that new work never seems to kill off 
the old* Parts of this record may lie dormant for a time, and some may 
experience longer-term growth than others, but all of it seems to possess 
an irreducible potentiality that can spring to life In a quite sudden and 
surprising fashion. Again, Schumpeter (1942) provides us with a clear 
example. Just such a rebirth of economic doctrine is chronicled in his 
piercing study of the influence of Marx. 
Of course, this view does not replace the study of the actual 
context and meaning of the original doctrines, a pursuit that is more 
properly the domain of specialists in the history of economic thought. 
What it does, instead, is to lend contemporary relevance (and vigor) to 
this specialist work in the eyes of the profession as a whole. For 
Inevitably when an economic research program appears to be proceeding 
along in quiet pursuit of scientific truth, some incubus of 
dissatisfaction is concurrently brewing in the wings. More often than 
not, the heretical brew that purports to tear down the old and bring in 
the new will also Include an ample dose of ideas from dusty old books. 
Such is the progress of economic science. 
If this Is the theme that underlies the unity of the following 
essays, it is applied in a different manner in each. Essay I Is an 
attempt to pursue the old economic tradition of borrowing concepts of 
equilibrium from the natural sciences (notwithstanding the view that 
Darwin borrowed his vision of evolution through competition from 
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economics!). In this case, we attempt a comparison of the most developed 
views of the equilibrium of physical systems, General Systems Theory, 
with the standard Walraslan approach to economic equilibrium. If such 
physical analogies have any meaning for economics, then the view of the 
economy as an open system yields some Interesting Insights Into the 
problems of the Walraslan concept that still dominates so much of 
economic theory. In particular, drawing on Hayek's work on the 
foundations of economic equilibrium theory, we conclude that the crucial 
failing of the Walraslan approach Is the lack of a good homeostatlc 
explanation of equiflnal equilibriums. 
Essay II switches gears from general equilibrium theory to 
macroeconomics. In particular, this essay shows the usefulness of 
Keynes' own-rate theory of interest in giving analytical focus to his 
complex views on "the essential properties of Interest and money." By 
tracing the development of this own-rates doctrine from a review of Hayek 
by Plero Sraffa In 1932 to Keynes' use of it in Chapter 17 of the General 
Theory, we pursue two puzzles. First, the own-rates framework offers a 
rehabilitation of the traditional neglect of Keynes' emphasis on monetary 
matters in the standard versions of Keyneslan Macroeconomics. Secondly, 
the attention to the development of the own-rates framework sheds a 
shadow of suspicion over more modern attempts to Interpret Keynes as a 
Wlckselllan monetary theorist. Instead of considering monetary concerns 
as the source of disequilibrium disturbances to an otherwise smoothly 
operating "real" system (as in the Wlckselllan tradition), we show Keynes 
to be an equilibrium theorist of a different color. 
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Finally, In the last essay we follow out the meaning of the notion 
of equilibrium Involved In three views of prices, money and Interest, in 
reviewing the Sraffa-Hayek debate, we get a clear glimpse of the 
traditional long-period approach to monetary theory as a disturbing 
cause. Then, by tracing Hayek's defense of this position to a confusion 
over the role of money and Interest In value theory, we find a whole new 
conception of monetary equilibrium. This third conception (after the 
traditional long-period conception and Keynes' own-rates equilibrium) of 
monetary equilibrium, the "Intertemporal equilibrium" method, turns out 
to be a variant of the Walraslan conception we started with In Essay I. 
Since each of these conceptions can be cast In terms of the own-rates of 
Interest, it is illuminating to compare each on this basis. Our final 
conclusion is that Keynes' conception, lying somewhere intermediate 
between the other two, offers one method of providing the social level 
homeostatlc mechanism that the Walraslan system was shown to lack in 
Essay I. 
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ESSAY I. IS THE ECONOMY A CLOSED SYSTEM? GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
AND GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
6 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of social analysis In general, and economics In 
particular, exhibits a persistent fascination with attempts to make 
social theory "scientific" (Keat and Urry, 1982). Comte^ (1853) Issued 
the original call for a "Positive Philosophy" of society that would 
develop general laws of prediction and control to enable the emergent 
industrial society of the 19th century to realize the same benefits of 
rationalization at a cultural level that science was already providing at 
the technological level. After Comte, this matter of fact approach to 
society is observed as social practice from the elaborate schemes of the 
Utopian Socialists in the 19th century down to the present in the form of 
the detailed records of the social accountants more appropriate to a 
computerized age. Likewise, in the more theoretical work of such diverse 
thinkers as Mill (1897), Marx^ (1977, 1978), and Samuelson^ (1963), there 
runs the common quest for scientific status. 
It would, of course, be a mistake to see this cult of science as 
anything less than the pervasive feature of western civilization. 
Thorsteln Veblen pointed this out 80 years ago: 
On any large question which is to be disposed of for good and all 
the final appeal is by common consent taken to the scientist. The 
solution offered in the name of science is decisive so long as it is 
not set aside by more searching scientific inquiry. . . . There are 
other, older grounds of finality that may conceivably be better, 
nobler, worthier, more profound, more beautiful. . . . But whatever 
the common-sense of earlier generations may have held in this 
respect, modern common-sense holds that the scientist's answer is 
the only ultimately true one (Veblen, 1906/1919, pp. 3-4). 
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It was part of Veblen's genius to work out some of tha sociological 
implications of this exalted "place of science in modern civilization." 
He also had distinct views on the further question of exactly what 
standard of scientificity we are to subscribe to in this quest for 
respectability. Veblen was the unchallenged master of bringing the 
latest advances in biology, psychology, and anthropology to bear upon his 
unique analysis of society. Yet, as the unflinching analyst of the 
outmoded (pre-Darwinian) scientific preconceptions of economics, he would 
be the first to admit that science advances unceasingly in scope and 
conception. For although both Marx and Samuelson have called for 
scientific analysis in economics, their conceptions of science may in the 
end make them more different than alike. 
It is in the spirit of Veblen's unorthodox range of scholarship that 
this essay will attempt to show how one of the latest mutations of 
scientific outlook, the work of the general systems theorists, might shed 
some light on the problems of orthodox economic equilibrium theory. 
The plan of the essay is as follows. In Part II, I will survey the 
development of a new scientific outlook, general systems theory, that has 
arisen in the life sciences (like Veblen's "evolutionary point of view") 
in the last 30 years. Part III will be devoted to a brief review of the 
theory of general economic equilibrium, which seems to be the perfect 
example of an economic system in the sense of the general system 
theorists. In Part IV, I will point out that the fundamental anomaly 
general equilibrium theory presents from the general systems viewpoint, 
that of being both a closed and an open system, is a result of defects in 
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the framing of the general equilibrium problem from Walras on. In 
particular, I will argue that explicit recognition of the lack of any 
theory of the process by which Walras' equilibrium might actually come 
about and be maintained explains some well-known puzzles of the general 
economic equilibrium. Drawing on the work of F. A. Hayek, I will suggest 
that the problem essentially bolls down to one of social-level facts 
concerning the processes by which knowledge and information are acquired 
in a social setting. Recognition of these shortcomings of equilibrium 
theory is forced upon us by the insights of general systems theory. With 
this recognition, though, comes a rationale for breaking out of the 
scholastic confines that the modern state of mathematical equilibrium 
analysis presents to the economic theorist without having to abandon its 
useful insights. 
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II. THE METHODOLOGY OF SYSTEMS THEORY 
A simple example conveys the essence of the system theorist's view 
of scientific Investigation. If asked to explain the operation of an 
Internal combustion engine, there are two methods open to you. First, 
you could proceed to disassemble the engine and Investigate separately 
the operation of the carburetor, pistons, valves, and camshaft. You 
would then reassemble the parts and reference your explanation of the 
engine by your Investigations of the Individual components. This method 
Is called the analytic method. It Is opposed to the holistic systems 
method where explanation of the engine would Involve observation of the 
complete engine. In this approach, explanation of Its operation would 
follow the path of the gasoline. From the tank, fuel Is mixed with air 
by the carburetor and forced Into the cylinders by the first valve, where 
It Is Ignited to drive the pistons which turn the drive shaft and 
ultimately the camshaft, so that the next valve Is opened; and the 
process repeats Itself (Mulr, 1969, Ch. 2). Here, the engine Is 
analogous to the system theoretic concept of an open system operating via 
negative entropy (the Injection of fuel) with a simple feedback mechanism 
(the camshaft). It Is the contention of the systems theorists that there 
are certain "complex Interrelated wholes" which can be understood by the 
second procedure, but not by the first. 
The case which gave rise to the modern version of systems theory Is 
attributed to von Bertalanffy's use of the system concept to settle a 
long-standing dispute in the life sciences (von Bertalanffy, 1968, pp. 
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10-17). Stemming from certain developments in cellular biology 
(Phillips, 1976, Ch. 2) that appeared to contradict the mechanical 
application of physical laws to living beings, the organistic school of 
biology argued that the study of life was a "sui generis" phenomenon. 
This ran counter to the analytic approach whereby physical/chemical 
explanations were sought for biological phenomena. In claiming that the 
"emergent" properties of life were not reducible to physical lawir,,-the 
organicists were rejecting the dominant reductionist research program of 
Enlightenment science. For the "vitalist" biologists, the attempt to 
reduce all science to the level of the ideal rational science, physics, 
was a misguided one. 
von Bertalanffy attempted to solve this apparent methodological 
contradiction while retaining the validity of physical laws by using them 
to explain the uniqueness of living beings. His explanation centered 
around the distinction between closed and open systems. He began by 
defining a system at the most general level as "complexes of elements 
standing in interaction" (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p 33). Closed systems 
are those which are isolated from their environment. For this reason, 
given initial conditions and the laws governing the interaction of the 
system elements, a final equilibrium will be reached which is completely 
specified by the initial givens. This is the paradigm of physical and 
chemical experiments which operate in vacuums or closed containers. 
Physically, such systems seek the most probable state of maximum disorder 
through entropy since a more ordered state would imply the incomplete 
expression of the second law of thermodynamics and thus be improbable. 
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But von Bertalanffy noted that we observe systems in biology "which by 
their very nature and definition are not closed systems" (p. 39)• Such 
living organisms are characterized by highly improbable states of 
organization from a physical standpoint. This seems to contradict those 
very physical laws that defined closed systems. It was von Bertalanffy's 
(1968, p. 39) insight to show that this contradiction disappears when it 
is realized that 
every living organism is essentially an open system. It maintains 
itself in a continuous inflow and outflow, a building up and 
breaking down of components, never being, so long as it is alive, in 
a state of chemical and thermodynamic equilibrium but maintained in 
a so-called steady state which is different from the latter. 
Since this vital distinction was not made in the vitalist debate, 
says von Bertalanffy, it seemed that physical laws did not apply to 
living systems since conventional physics was designed to explain closed 
systems. He claims two major general conclusions are to be learned here. 
First, that the characteristics of an open system lead to the "principle 
of equifinality." By this is meant the fact that an open system can 
reach its particular steady state "from different initial conditions and 
in different ways." This is in contrast to a closed system where "the 
final state is unequivocally determined by the initial conditions" (p. 
40). Mathematically, this distinction between equifinal steady states 
and unequivocally reached equilibriums can be shown to depend on the 
definition of a system as open or closed (von Bertalanffy, 1968, pp. 75-
80). 
The second general property he derives from this distinction is that 
it offers an explanation of "the apparent contrast between inanimate and 
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animate nature," whereby the physical law of dissipation to the most 
unorganized state of matter conflicts sharply with the biological 
evidence of evolution toward more complex forms. Again, appealing to the 
distinction of closed versus open systems, von Bertalanffy claims that 
closed systems obey this law of dissipation since there can only be 
positive entropy In such Irreversible processes as closed systems 
represent. Open systems, though, can forestall this tendency to decay by 
Imparting energy In the form of negative entropy and "may even develop 
toward states of Increased order and organization" (p. 41). 
From this amazingly simple and powerful distinction blossomed a 
revolution In biology that eventually grew Into a scientific outlook that 
cut across disciplines (Rapoport, 1968). The rapid spread of the appeal 
of systems theory was the result of a coincidence of diverse developments 
of which I can only sketch the barest outline. Simultaneously with the 
growth of the systems view In biology, Norbert Wiener was extending his 
wartime work In mathematical self-guidance systems for armaments Into a 
new science of Information and control that he dubbed "cybernetics" 
(Wiener, 1948). A child prodigy with an early education that seems to 
4 have surpassed even that of John Stuart Mill In bizarre precoclousness, 
Wiener thought that his basic Insight Into "feedback loops" as the model 
of self-control had radical Implications for thinking about such 
complicated "systems" as computers, language, sociology, and psychology.^ 
In the more extreme flights of philosophical rhapsody of some of Its 
proponents, cybernetics served as the symbolic manifestation of the 
complex Information-oriented social control that was then beginning to 
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' characterize so much of modern llfe.^ It captured the spirit of the 
earliest enchantment with the hope of solving all social ills through the 
collection and management of vast data bases to be used for social 
engineering purposes.^ In practice, its major impact seems to have been 
on the design and use of complex computer and technological systems 
(Maron, 1968, p. 547).® 
For the growth of systems theory as a policy approach, this 
information-theory work pioneered by the cyberneticists was combined with 
operations research tools such as linear programming to set large-scale 
9 data collections into action. Also a product of the war effort, linear 
programming found Its perfect operational use in the applications of the 
prewar work of Leontief (1951) in data organization and Tinbergen (1956) 
in design of policy models. Leontiefs organization of economic data 
into "input-output tables" was successfully married to Tinbergen's policy 
planning models utilizing the optimization techniques of linear 
programming. Despite Lord Keynes* early dismissal of Tinbergen's work as 
"black magic"^^ (Keynes, 1973b, p. 320), it was the political acceptance 
of Keynes' demand management policy recommendations that provided the 
fertile ground for the spawning of the "quiet revolution" in 
mathematical-statistical economics that we now know as econometrics (Fox, 
1969). 
Furthermore, as these initially economic-based system analyses 
gained recognition and (perhaps more importantly) public funding, they 
became the paradigm of applied social sciences to which other disciplines 
aspired. Consequently, attempts were made at data collection and 
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statistical analysis of a wide range of "social indicators" that were to 
parallel the impact of the purely economic accounts (Bauer, 1966). 
Combined with the postwar concern with "development," these "systems" of 
data collection and analysis spread geographically as well. Especially 
in the area of development aid to the Third World, the attempt to 
operacionalize a system-wide view of society led social scientists 
throughout the sixties and seventies to construction and analysis of ever 
more complex data systems. Uses ranged from long-term macroeconomic 
policy planning to development of social accounting frameworks for 
analyzing development across cultures and over time. While most of these 
extensive pragmatic uses of systems concepts are not directly related to 
the abstract systems theory of von Bertalanffy and Wiener, they share a 
common outlook of complex interrelatedness with the former, conscious 
attempts at control with the latter, and appeals to span traditional 
categories of knowledge with both. 
The interface where the abstract theorists of systems met with the 
social engineers is symbolically represented by the founding of the 
Society for General Systems Theory in 1954.^^ Growing out of the 
multidisciplinary milieu of the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences, this society was the brainchild of the 
biomathematician Ânatol Rapoport, the physiologist Ralph Gerard, the 
economist Kenneth Boulding, and L. von Bertalanffy, a biologist. The 
latter recalls that system theory at the time "responded to a secret 
trend In various disciplines." This secret trend was toward "attempting 
scientific Interpretation and theory where there was none and higher 
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generality than that in the special sciences" (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 
14). 
The original program of the society reveals the manner In which this 
secret trend was to be nurtured: 
The Society for General Systems Research was organized in 1954 to 
further the development of theoretical systems which are applicable 
to more than one of the traditional departments of knowledge. Major 
functions are to: (1) Investigate the Isomorphy of concepts, laws, 
and models in various fields, and to help in useful transfers from 
one field to another; (2) encourage the development of adequate 
theoretical models in fields which lack them; (3) minimize the 
duplication of theoretical effort in different fields; (4) promote 
the unity of science through Improving communication among 
specialists (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 15). 
The work of the Society has been carried out in the General System 
Yearbook and the journal Mathematical Systems Theory, In general, the 
literature on systems theory has remained true to the society's original 
program. Work alternates from further developments of abstract, 
metasclentlfic models of general interaction to trying to use these 
models to clear up difficulties in special fields or span traditional 
categories through applications of homologous models in each. Despite 
early hopes of widespread impact, though, the traditional barriers to 
cross-disciplinary research have proved more formidable than might have 
been predicted. This seems to be especially so in the more rarifled 
pure-theory work of the various disciplines. Faced with more practical 
exigencies, the social engineers outpaced their theoretical counterparts 
in opening their eyes to other sources of knowledge. 
This last distinction, between policy practitioners and professional 
theorists, has been especially marked in the field of economics. As we 
\ 
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have seen, the econometrlclans were pioneers in the systems approach to 
policy planning and this has led many of them to reach out toward other 
12 disciplines more recently. Despite the practical economists' growing 
Catholicism, though, the mainstream economic theorists of the last 50 
years have taken little notice of outside influences. Instead, at the 
hands of the mathematicians that turned to economics from the 1930s on, 
economics has, if anything, narrowed its focus, at least so far as the 
problem addressed by the most abstract theorists, the problem of general 
economic equilibrium, is concerned. 
I would argue that there were two reasons for this theoretical 
narrowness. First, as in the case of many scientific advances in 
history, the transformation of economic theory into a mathematical-based 
discipline that has taken place in the last 50 years has involved a large 
measure of work to translate old theory into a new language, here a 
mathematical one. Consequently, much of the work of general equilibrium 
theorists, for example, has been to prove the logical possibility of the 
existence of a state of equilibrium under ever more general assumptions. 
At its greatest degrees of abstraction, such a search became an end in 
itself. In fact, so abstract was the language of these topological 
investigations that the proofs often took years to be translated back to 
a more pedestrian level that would make them available even to trained 
economists. Thus, secondly, the mathematical economic theorists became 
isolated by their own success. Working with their given problem led to 
more and more complicated self-generated puzzles. So numerous were these 
self-generated puzzles that they had little need to look beyond their 
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system, much less at the economy Itself, for further topics of research. 
The next section will be devoted to looking at this enthralling system In 
more detail. 
18 
III. THE WÂLRASIAN SYSTEM 
In 1974, writing in the International Journal of General Systems, 
Kenneth Boulding expressed his dismay that economics had hardly noticed 
the development of general systems theory: 
Just why the economics profession has viewed general systems theory 
with such a massive indifference I really do not know. Like the 
physicists, the economists are so bound up within the elegant 
framework of their own system that they find it hard to break out 
into broader interests. Economists, indeed, may be a good example 
of a principle I have sometimes enunciated that "nothing falls like 
success" (p. 67). 
Over 10 years later, it must be admitted that the situation is much the 
same. 
In order to redress that massive indifference somewhat, the next two 
sections will be devoted to analyzing the relationship of general systems 
theory concepts to what Boulding thought was its most analogous field of 
13 
study in economics, general equilibrium theory. Along the way, we may 
gain some insight into what the terms of that dubious success that 
Boulding refers to really are and of what use the systems theorists can 
be to guide the further development of general equilibrium theory. 
The now highly complex literature on general equilibrium theory in 
economics seems at first glance to represent a textbook case of a 
"system". The general formulation of the problem is as follows. The 
"economy" consists of large numbers of atomistic producers (with given 
techniques of production) and consumers (with given preference orderings 
of goods and endowments of resources). Each reacts parametrically to 
prices and attempts to maximize its constrained objectives of profit and 
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utility in a mutually consistent way (Bliss, 1975, Ch. 2). Since 
producers' profits depend on sale of their production, sales depend on 
demand, demand depends upon incomes, and incomes depend on the sale of 
resource endowments to producers, the individual agents' behaviors are 
complexly interrelated. 
Historically, the first problem addressed by Walras in 1873^^ was 
"does there exist, in principle, a set of prices, one price for each 
good, that will simultaneously allow producers to maximize profits and 
consumers to maximize utility given the constraining interrelatedness 
between the actors?" 
Combining his father's passion for the economics of exchange with 
training in mathematics and physics, Walras naturally saw this complex 
issue as a mathematical one.^^ Imbued with the spirit of the 
Enlightenment (Walsh and Gram, 1980, pp. 144-145), he saw his task as 
grounding the science of economics in the same bedrock upon which the 
Newtonian physics he knew so well was founded, the concept of 
equilibrium.In so doing, he formulated the basic conceptual framework 
in which the theory of general economic equilibrium is still organized 
today, despite a century of improvement in the mathematical tools applied 
to it. Basically, this conception is that equilibrium In each market 
implies the equality of supply and demand. When supply and demand 
functions are defined with sufficient generality to include as arguments 
the resource endowments and the prices of all goods simultaneously, the 
complex Interrelationships of production and consumption can be conceived 
of as a system of simultaneous equations. 
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Walras' feat was to formulate this system and derive such insights 
from It as his mathematical training would permit (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, 
p. 4). Having determined that the system contained a sufficient number 
of equations to determine the unknowns, Walras took "existence" for 
granted. Assuming a state of equilibrium, he could then go on to 
characterize an elegantly synchronized system: 
Equilibrium in production, which implies equilibrium in exchange, 
can now be easily defined. First, it is a state in which the 
effective demand and offer of productive services are equal and 
there is a stationary current price in the market for these 
services. Secondly, it is a state in which the effective demand and 
supply of products are also equal and there is a stationary current 
price in the products market. Finally, it is a state in which the 
selling prices of products equal to the costs of the productive 
services that enter into them. The first two conditions relate to 
equilibrium In exchange; the third to equilibrium in production 
(Walras, 1954, p. 224). 
This integrative view of the economy as a complex system of 
interdependent markets and the insights that are to be had from such a 
"vision" have only been Incrementally Improved by the rarifled analysis 
Walras* system has received at the hands of the pure mathematicians for 
the last 50 years. 
The history of Walras' system from 1874 down to our own time has 
been a curious combination of ups and downs on the tide of theoretical 
favor. Several lines of influence can be traced. In his own day, the 
vision that Walras formulated in his Elements was to inspire many diverse 
thinkers. Schumpeter (1954, p. 968), who considered him to be the 
greatest economist in the history of the discipline, would claim that his 
treatise represented the "Magna Carta of exact economics." One line of 
influence that would run through Wlcksell, H. L. Moore, Schumpeter, 
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Leontlef, and J. R. Hicks down to much of present welfare economics, 
international trade, monetary theory, and growth theory is concerned with 
elaborating the economic content of this Magna Carta. This path to 
modern economics, though, was not a direct and unwavering growth of 
influence. 
In the English-speaking countries, Walras' Elements remained a 
little-read book for decades and was not even translated into English 
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until 1954. The path of its influence in English-speaking circles took 
a circuitous route. Having been eclipsed by the dominance of Marshall 
for 60 years, the reentry of discussion of general equilibrium theory was 
most influenced by the publication of J. R. Hicks' Value and Capital in 
20 1939. Interestingly enough, Hicks' introduction to Walras was through 
Pareto, whose Manual he was assigned to teach by Lionel Robbins in his 
first year at the London School of Economics (Hicks, 1982, Ch. 1). This 
lapse of 65 years of attention within the Anglo-American world was not 
helped as it might have been by a knowledge of Wicksell since his work, 
as well, remained neglected until Kahn translated it in the thirties. 
Instead, it was through the enormous influence of Value and Capital that 
what Hicks called "the method of General Equilibrium" has become a 
pervasive Influence on modern economic theory. In both its microeconomlc 
specification of the Individual actors via indifference curve analysis 
and its system-wide "temporary equilibrium" model. Value and Capital set 
down the foundation for most of what is taught in a modern principles of 
economics class: consumer theory, production theory, and (Hickslan) 
Keyneslan macroeconomics. E. Roy Welntraub argues that "from this 
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perspective, It can be suggested that the decade of the 1930s saw the 
degenerative Marshalllan program replaced with two competing programs, 
the macroeconomlc and mlcroeconomlc, or the Keyneslan and Hlckslan" 
(Welntraub, 1979, p. 16). 
But at the same time that Keynes and Hicks were brewing theoretical 
revolutions In England, another group of disciples was extending Walras' 
work on more explicitly formal grounds. This second line of Influence 
stemming from the Elements was to catch that wave of Interest in 
mathematical formulations of economic theory that the English tradition 
21 had been opposed to at least since Marshall, but which swamped 
economics beginning in the 1940s. The Intellectual object of this second 
line was a concern not so much with the economics of Walras' system, but 
the analytics. In particular, the concern of a generation of 
mathematically trained theorists, culminating in Arrow and Debreu's 
(1954) proof of existence of a general equilibrium price vector, was to 
rigorously dress Walras' crude existence argument in more elegant 
mathematical garb (Welntraub, 1983). Since it is the work of these 
mathematical theorists that provides the modern version of Walras' 
formulation of an economic system, the results of their work must be 
mentioned to bring our specification of the general economic equilibrium 
up to date. 
Using more sophisticated mathematics, modern general equilibrium 
theorists have set out more precisely just what conditions are sufficient 
for the simple static case to hold. Generally, it has been found that 
Walras' Insights hold but his mathematics were not very elegant. With 
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the sparest assumptions of nonlncreaslng returns to scale In production, 
convex preference orderlngs, and continuity In actors' reactions to 
, prices (Bliss, 1975, Ch. 2), modern theorists have shown that the 
existence proof holds, but significantly for us, In general the solution 
22 Is not a unique one. This means that given the same primitive 
assumptions, more than one set of prices can satisfy the general 
equilibrium solution. In i ts traditional form, the theory cannot specify 
which will occur. 
Additionally, as a result of recent debates between neo-Walraslan 
theorists and the Cambridge school devotees of Sraffa's (1960) system, 
the sensitivity of the solution vector to the given endowments of the 
system has been more explicitly recognized. Frank Hahn's attempt to show 
that the Sraffa system is nothing but a special case of the more general 
neo-Walraslan model led him to the conclusion that any specific solution 
to the general system depends on a "unique history" of the system (Hahn, 
1982). By history, he refers to the fact that endowments or income 
distribution (which are explicitly "givens" to the problem) affect the 
whole equilibrium price vector through their influence on demand 
patterns. Hahn's contentious style in a highly charged debate obscures 
this fact with his argument. C. J. Bliss, though, is less coy on the 
subject than Hahn. He forthrlghtly admits the fact that in general the 
solution vector is nonunlque and critically depends on what he calls "the 
primitive postulates of the system" (basically, those assumptions given 
as data from without the economic system) (Bliss, 1975, pp. 25-37). 
Finally, it is Bliss, again, who has no delusions about the neglect in 
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even the most modern formulations of the system of any dynamic behavior 
of the economy. Â rather extensive quote from him at this juncture will 
serve to Introduce the very themes to which a systems-theoretical account 
of general equilibrium compels us. 
Bliss urges the following strategy for the theoretical use of the 
neo-Walraslan's proof that existence of a general equilibrium Is 
logically possible: 
It may seem more sensible to simply assume that equilibrium will 
prevail and to thus confine our investigations to the equilibrium 
state. We could regard the object of our investigations not as "the 
economy" but as "economic equilibrium" and we could attempt to 
justify this procedure as a useful starting point to what one might 
eventually hope to see realized in a complete account of the 
behavior of the economy, including a full specification of its 
disequilibrium dynamics. . . . The awkwardness of proceeding in 
this manner is that we are introducing assumptions of a rather 
special, perhaps even dubious, character (Bliss, 1975, p. 28). 
From the standpoint of general systems theory, the attempt to formulate 
the economic equilibrium without reference to the underlying dynamics 
would seem dubious indeed if we conceive of the economy as an open 
system. 
IV. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AS GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
What Is the relationship of the economists' general equilibrium 
theory and general systems theory? In its traditional form given above, 
the existence of a general economic equilibrium seems to contradict the 
Insights of von Bertalanffy. First, it is simultaneously conceived of as 
an open system that takes Inputs from the environment (both physical and 
social) and transforms them into outputs to the larger social system, as 
well as a closed system whose final equilibrium (a vector of relative 
prices) is completely determined by its initial conditions (endowments, 
technology, and preferences). Second, it seems to contradict the systems 
theory view that the elements of a complex interrelated whole cannot be 
understood in isolation from the whole system. For it is the hallmark of 
this approach that the theory is "built up" from the analysis of 
individual behavior of the maximizing agents in isolation from the whole. 
This is the meaning of making prices parametric to the agents. The 
whole, then. Is conceived of as some complex sum of the parts with the 
parts clearly dominating the analysis. In other words, partial 
equilibrium modeling of consumers and agents seems to apply the analytic 
method with particular force. Yet, the usual argument for the extra 
insight gained in going from this partial approach to the general 
equilibrium is usually seen to be more in the spirit of systems theory in 
23 that it purports to show how everything depends upon everything else. 
How can general equilibrium theorists have it both ways? 
This contradiction is explained by two Interdependent fallings of 
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the general equilibrium theory of economics which when recognized make 
Bouldlng's claim for the applicability of general systems theory to 
economics more understandable. These fallings are the lack of an 
adequate dynamic underpinning to explain the process by which such 
general equilibrium prices will be arrived at and maintained, and the 
general neglect of the knowledge assumptions necessary for such an 
equilibrium. We will take up each In turn and then try to show how they 
are related to each other and to the work of the systems theorists. 
As should now be clear, the main focus of the development of general 
equilibrium theory has been on the specification of equilibrium states. 
The question of the conditions necessary for the equilibrium prices so 
defined to come about from any set of initial conditions has progressed 
little since Walras' own formulation. Walras resorted to a fanciful 
story about a "tâtonnement" process whereby some fictional "auctioneer" 
would call out prices to the economic actors. The auctioneer then 
compares supply and demand for each good given to him by the agents in 
the form of tickets ("sur bons") and raises the price in markets with 
excess demand and lowers it in markets with excess supply. Only when he 
has stumbled upon a set that would allow the simultaneous equilibrium of 
supply and demand on all markets to occur, would he allow actual trades 
to take place (Walras, 1954, p. 172). 
In the modern literature, the investigation of the conditions for 
"getting into equilibrium" has been subsumed under the mathematical 
rubric of "stability" of the system.Again, although the mathematical 
techniques for defining the conditions of stability have advanced, the 
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schema still belongs to Walras. Bliss is candid on this topic as well. 
The investigations that have been undertaken into the stability of 
general equilibrium have admittedly been largely confined to 
investigating the stability of the Walrasian tâtonnement—the 
adjustment process under which no actual trades take place until the 
equilibrium prices have been attained (Bliss, 1975, p. 28). 
Thus, while all of the elements of the proof for existence of equilibrium 
prices depend analytically on the character of the individual actors in 
the system, the method by which the prices are assumed to occur has been 
seen as involving something over and above these individual actors. 
Bliss (1975, p. 16) quotes Koopmans (1957, p. 179) on this; "If, for 
instance, the net rate of increase in price is assumed to be proportional 
to the excess of demand over supply, whose behavior is thereby expressed? 
And how is that behavior motivated?" It is here that the system more 
faithfully resembles the system's theoretic claim of the whole of a 
complex system adding up to more than the sum of its parts. Stability 
concerns render the apparently most rationalistic and reductionist of all 
social scientific models dependent in the end upon an inexplicably 
social- or structural-level concept. But here that concept is 
anthropomorphically transformed into a being of such fantastic 
omniscience that it resembles Hegel's ideal spirit more than rational 
economic manI 
Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that the general 
equilibrium theorists themselves have not been aware of this failure of 
general equilibrium theory. In the tradition of general equilibrium 
economists. Hicks noted this problem explicitly. In Value and Capital, 
Hicks states that the problem of "trading at false prices" could lead to 
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an unstable equilibrium of the system (Hicks, 1946, pp. 127-129, 245-272, 
333-337). But Instead of retaining Walras* tâtonnement process, he opted 
for a scheme whereby equilibrium analysis Is confined to an elementary 
time period, the Hlckslan "week," during which stocks of production are 
given and demand determines prices "temporarily." This "temporary 
equilibrium" was a bow to his Interpretation of Keynes' (1936) view of a 
monetary economy as a system In which the tâtonnement process would be so 
time consuming that conditions would change before equilibrium could be 
established. During a Hlckslan week, prices are not allowed to change 
within the week but only at the start (Monday) of the next week when 
expectations and plans are revised and new conditions prevail In the 
market (Hicks, 1946, pp. 131-140). His analytical argument, though, was 
deficient In rigor, essentially assuming that since "we may reasonably 
suppose that the transactions which take place at 'very false' prices are 
25 limited In volume" (Hicks, 1946, p. 129), we can assume prices don't 
change within a week. 
It was this analytical looseness that set the stage for the modern 
mathematical treatment of tâtonnement In the work of Samuelson (1947b). 
Essentially, Samuelson's work Involved specification of the underlying 
dynamic properties that were necessary to ensure that small movements 
away from an equilibrium would result In reestabllshment of the 
equilibrium. From Samuelson's work stems the whole modern treatment of 
stability. Firmly within the analytic tradition, the problem Is 
conceived as trying to use differential equations to more rigorously 
specify the mathematical properties of the auctioneer process that will 
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ensure stability (Welntraub, 1979, Ch. 2). The only new economic Insight 
that seems to have come out of this work is that even utilizing the 
fictional tâtonnement process the requirements for stability are very 
restrictive. Welntraub (1979, p. 33) sums up the results of this highly 
technical literature with a theorem: 
For the linear tâtonnement system . . . the equilibrium is 
asymptotically stable, if the excess demand functions are 
continuously differentiable, are homogeneous of degree zero In 
prices, satisfy Walras' Law, and exhibit gross substltutabllity. 
It is noteworthy that these conditions are much more stringent than 
the sparse assumptions necessary for existence. Since it is hard to 
Imagine an economy which exhibits gross substltutabllity in all 
commodities (no shoelaces allowed), the implication is that "Instability 
seems to be a universal phenomenon in competitive economies, rather than 
an exceptional one" (Nlkaldo, 1969, p. 337). So what do we throw out: 
equilibrium theory (if equilibrium is not stable, what sense is there in 
pursuing It?) or the fictionalized process by which this alleged 
instability has been pointed out? Both Welntraub and Bliss seem to think 
the safest bet is to throw out the auctioneer. To Welntraub, this 
traditional approach to stability was "singularly maladapted to the sort 
of decentralized decision-making that lay at the center of the static ADM 
(Arrow-Debreu-McKenzle) concept (and) . . . could potentially distract 
general equilibrium theorists from more comprehensive investigation" 
26 (Welntraub, 1979, p. 35). For Bliss, the stability issue involves 
"work which may turn out to be singularly unrewarding to a scholar who 
would like to arrive at the conclusion that his model is a stable one 
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which the economy will tend to approach" (Bliss, 1975, p. 28). 
As we have seen. Bliss thinks the proper alternative strategy 
involves simply assuming equilibrium exists and concentrating analysis on 
"economic equilibrium" rather than "the economy." Weintraub remains less 
insulated within his own "elegant framework," but retains his faith in 
the general equilibrium approach, which he considers to be the "hard 
core" (in the sense of Lakatos) of orthodox economics (1979, p. 37). In 
the spirit of the Lakatosian view of a rationally progressing science, 
Weintraub argues that the future of economics involves subsuming "the 
elements of post-war monetary theory and macroeconomics" (1979, p. 37), 
into the protective belt of the neo-Walrasian paradigm. By so doing, he 
claims that the traditional division of macroeconomics and microeconomics 
will not be bridged; they will both become part of one coextensive 
research program (1979, p. 71). Interestingly enough, he makes an 
analogy at this juncture between von Bertalanffy's GST and general 
equilibrium theory; 
A general systems theory, like the neo-Walrasian ADM model in 
economics, is more than a particular structure to model a particular 
situation . . . neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory is not a 
theory in the same sense as, say, 'the theory of the second-best' or 
the 'theory of demand'. ... Instead, we are suggesting that 
general equilibrium theory, the kind of general systems theory that 
economists have developed, is the appropriate logic to investigate 
the compatibility between microeconomics and macroeconomics (1979, 
p. 73). 
A "kind of general systems theory," yes, but not a consistent, well-
posed one if von Bertalanffy's work has any relevance for economic 
systems. Ultimately, the fiction of the auctioneer and the tâtonnement 
process of getting into equilibrium obscures the very dynamic elements 
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which confirm the Insight that Bouldlng sensed systems theory held out to 
general equilibrium theory, but was being Ignored. Further, this Insight 
helps to explain not only the paradox of reductlonism and holism 
coexisting in the general equilibrium setting, but also a further anomaly 
from the systems theory standpoint. How can a supposedly closed system 
admit multiple equilibria? Like the vltallst debate before it, these 
anomalies also disappear when it is realized that the economic system is 
not, indeed, a closed system, but an open one. As a subsystem within a 
total social system, it Imports data from the larger society in the form 
of raw materials, technology. Income distribution, and tastes. With 
these, it produces goods defined in quantities and prices which in turn 
enter into that larger social system but in a nonunique manner. Given 
the extreme generality and lack of institutional structure in the general 
specification of economic equilibrium, it is not surprising that it 
should be amenable to a number of solutions once it is filled with a bit 
more reality. 
Unfortunately, it is at this point that both general equilibrium 
theory and the general systems view of society generally break down. In 
the case of the theory of general economic equilibrium, the specific 
context for this breakdown can be described as an insufficient theory of 
economic knowledge. All of the elements of the functions of a capitalist 
economy are critically dependent on the knowledge available to the 
individual acting agents. Even the most static analysis of firm supply 
and consumer demand depends critically on the presumption that producers 
and consumers have knowledge of market conditions in the form of prices 
32 
of inputs, relevant techniques of production, competitors' prices, and 
prices of substitutes. In the more explicitly dynamic contexts of 
Investment and capital theory, it is the treatment of knowledge in the 
form of expectations that distinguishes all modern approaches from one 
another. In the yet more complicated setting of a general economic 
equilibrium, then, the knowledge available to individuals becomes all the 
more important for any adequate description of how such a system-wide 
equilibrium will come about. Yet, it is precisely this domain into which 
orthodox economic theorists have been reluctant to tread until very 
recently. And when they have, the results have been dramatic departures 
27 from the main stream neoclassical vision. 
But although this problem is just now being treated by the formal 
mathematical general equilibrium theorists, its implications for standard 
equilibrium theory were pointed out half a century ago by F. A. Hayek. 
An examination of his "Economics and Knowledge" (Hayek, 1937) provides an 
interesting glimpse into the depth of the knowledge problem for orthodox 
equilibrium theory. 
Hayek's paper is concerned with "the role which assumptions and 
propositions about the knowledge possessed by different members of 
28 
society play in economic analysis." He points out that the usual 
descriptions of formal equilibriums are essentially "tautologies" and 
"can be turned into propositions which tell us anything about the real 
world only insofar as we are able to fill those formal propositions with 
definite statements about how knowledge is acquired and communicated." 
As evidence of this view, he points out that attempts to push economics 
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beyond these normal tautologies toward causal explanations of such 
behavior as business cycles, Interest rates, or oligopoly behavior 
29 typically Involve assumptions about "foresight and expectations." 
For Hayek, this Is due to the fact that the analyses of equilibriums 
which are defined for given data are properly applicable only to single 
30 Individuals as a consistent explanation of behavior. "Actions of an 
Individual can be said to be In equilibrium Insofar as they can be 
understood as part of one plan." Only If the actions are based on one 
set of data and assumptions about knowledge and preferences of the person 
can they relate to the same equilibrium. But Hayek, In good Austrian 
tradition, emphasizes that these "so-called 'data'" are subjectively 
given to the actor and "not in any sense objective facts." Only in the 
subjective sense is there a logical a priori consistency of the 
tautologies we derive from these data. 
It is this distinction between objective and subjective givens that 
forms the crucial link in Hayek's argument that the method of equilibrium 
of the individual "does not immediately admit of applications to the 
relations between actions of different people." The difference lies in 
the nature of the "givens" In a social setting as opposed to a personal 
one. If a general equilibrium is to be considered, it must Involve two 
types of mutual compatibility of actions. First, there must be a 
compatibility of the different actions of the different actors in the 
system since "the plans of the one contain exactly those actions which 
form the data for the plans of the other." But there must also be a 
compatibility of these subjective plans with the objective data of the 
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environment. Hayek claims that It Is confusion over these different 
conceptions of glvens that Is "at the bottom of so many of our 
difficulties." For In the equilibrium of the Individual, we could 
unequivocally define the glvens as any conception that the subject 
(subjectively) held when he made his plan of action. For Hayek, "only 
this subjective Interpretation of the true datum made these propositions 
(of individual equilibrium) necessary truths." However, in the more 
general equilibrium setting, this concept of datum becomes a much more 
problematic assumption. Since the data for one actor consist partly of 
the plans of other actors and, moreover, all of these individual plans 
must in some sense correspond to a given physical/social reality, the 
concept of what the data are in defining a general economic equilibrium 
becomes much more problematic. "The data which now are supposed to be 
objective facts and the same for all people are evidently no longer the 
same thing as the data which formed the starting point for the 
tautological transformations of the pure logic of choice." For Hayek, 
there is an "insidious change of meaning" in the concept of datum between 
these respective situations that forms the basis of the difficulty in 
giving general equilibrium theory any meaning. 
Basically, the data problem consists of the confusion in stating for 
the glvens of our "system" to whom these data are given and whether 
everyone in society is given the same or different data. The question of 
to whom the data of our analysis are given Involves the distinction of 
objective and subjective data already mentioned. When we define a 
general economic equilibrium, we take the physical, technological, and 
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taste data as given to the economist making the analysis. But, surely, 
this is different than the data given to the actors in the system. Hayek 
claims it is essential to clearly distinguish the two types of data since 
they lead to two different conceptions of equilibrium. 
First, we might define equilibrium as the mutual compatibility of 
"the subjective data, given to the different persons, and the individual 
plans which necessarily follow from them." This mutual consistency of 
individual plans is separate from, and prior to, the further requirement 
that these mutually compatible plans are in agreement with the objective 
data which are given to the society. Hayek claims that, as opposed to 
the forward-looking, expectation-based equilibrium of the first type, for 
correspondence with objective data, "it would never be possible to decide 
otherwise than ex-post at the end of the period for which people have 
planned, whether at the beginning the society has been in equilibrium." 
One implication of this distinction is that the only "changes in data" 
relevant to the definition of a general equilibrium are those which 
change the expectations of the individual actors in some way such that 
they alter their plans. In this light, the famous assumption of "full 
31 knowledge" on the part of some past and present theorists becomes a 
crude attempt to cover up this problem by assuming everyone knows 
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everything. 
Hayek goes on to point out that the important element left out of 
traditional equilibrium theory is the crucial link between these two 
types of data. In short, how do economic actors acquire knowledge of 
both the objective and subjective data that cause them to change their 
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plans? This link between the subjective and objective data of the system 
brings us full circle to our original problem with defining a general 
economic equilibrium and its relation to systems theory. 
In the context of the auctioneer problem, we can now see that this 
crucial theory of economic knowledge was subsumed there under an 
analytical contrivance out of touch with the individualist statement of 
the original problem. Since the Walrasian equilibrium of equality of 
supplies and demands must come about through the dynamic Interaction of 
individual actors adjusting their own plans, both to the rest of the 
actors' plans and to some external data, we see that it is not possible 
to define the parts in isolation from the whole. This anomaly, from a 
systems theory perspective, falls away when we realize that it is a 
classic case of missing variables that cause the general form of general 
equilibrium models to yield nonunique solutions. Moreover, it seems 
necessary to assume that these extra variables that would enable us to 
tie down the solution must in general be social-level facts such as Comte 
thought social science should proceed from. It cannot be another 
dimension of subjective minds but some social mechanism that structures 
the process by which this knowledge acquisition comes about. 
Hayek hints at this conclusion when he points out that the lack of 
attention paid to this knowledge problem by economists "would go far to 
account for the fact that pure analysis seems to have so extraordinarily 
little to say about institutions, such as the press, the purpose of which 
is to communicate knowledge. And it might even explain why the 
preoccupation with pure analysis should so frequently create a peculiar 
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blindness to the role played In real life by such Institutions as 
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advertising" (Hayek, 1937, p. 67). In full accordance with the systems 
theorists' emphasis on the value of homologies to span the work of 
different disciplines, a complete system specification of a general 
economic equilibrium, one that included a social-specific role for 
knowledge acquisition (or control), could possibly clear the theoretical 
ground for that union of economists and other social theorists that has 
been called for so many times since Comte first proposed a science of 
society. This Is one way of viewing Fox's (1983) work on a theoretical 
framework for social data and Bouldlng's (1945, 1981) attempts to 
formulate systems of knowledge transfers through grants economics and 
conflict resolution theory. 
In a wider sense, the questions this analysis has revealed can be 
seen as an organizing node for the Increasing dissatisfaction with 
orthodox equilibrium analysis that has cropped up in the economics 
profession in the last 20 years. Analysts attracted by the system theory 
approach are but one sect of a variety of heterodox thinkers active 
today. Although their motivation, politics, and methodology exist in a 
multivectored space, one predominating influence on the original impetus 
for these schools was a rejection of pure equilibrium analysis as sterile 
and useless. Nevertheless, when it came time to formulate new work, a 
complete divorce from equilibrium theory has not seemed possible. 
Without some kind of structure or centering, such necessarily vague views 
as "process analysis" or "social economics" seem to degenerate into 
storylike descriptions at best, or obscurantism at worst. I think this 
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loss of an "analytical engine" involved In the rejection of orthodox 
equilibrium analysis, the same engine which had given economics Its 
however dubious claim to analytical superiority within the social 
sciences, explains the recent attempts by nonorthodox theorists to 
embrace some variant of equilibrium in their analysis. 
Â prominent example of this trend would be the latter-day Cambridge 
school. These theorists start their analysis, just like a good 
neoclassical economist, from an equilibrium framework. In fact, in a 
manner reminiscent of Hayek's critique of orthodox theory, this framework 
has been criticized as consisting of little more than ex-post accounting 
identities. But the growing number of adherents to the Cambridge 
approach conceive of this Sraffa price system as a superior system of 
equilibrium "tautologies." In terms of our analysis, one distinctive 
feature of this system that could make it more appealing than the 
orthodox variety of equilibrium theory is that it explicitly makes note 
of the necessity of specifying some extraeconomic social process to close 
the system. But this is not distinctive in itself since, as we have 
seen, the same interaction with the social environment is Implied by a 
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complete closure of the neo-Walrasian system. What ultimately 
distinguishes the two approaches on this matter is the Cambridge 
theorists' insistence that the manner in which this admitted openness is 
to be closed must come through specification of the income distribution 
between profits and wages. Moreover, the fact that they conceive of this 
distribution as an antagonistic social process that is logically prior to 
price determination makes it totally opposed to the noncoercive image of 
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distribution as an extension of free exchange that forms the basis of the 
Walraslan tradition (Dobb, 1973, pp. 247-266). 
For our purposes, the very fact that the Cambridge approach takes 
explicit cognizance of the social environment provides an example of a 
more thoroughgoing systems theoretic view of economics. That such a view 
calls for extraeconomlc investigation points out that the ultimate 
significance of general systems for economics may be just exactly what 
its founders had in mind when they called for a bridging of disciplines. 
To break out of the vice-grip of pure equilibrium analysis involves 
explicit attention to the institutional details of the case. This is 
something that applied economists have always recognized. An explanation 
of the demand for oranges in California would be deficient Indeed If it 
merely reproduced a supply and demand graph. The implication of the 
systems view of economics is that the abstract theorists of economics, 
also, have a responsibility to formulate models which acknowledge 
institutions in a nontrivial manner. 
Essentially, what is required of economic theorists is an attempt to 
recognize their environment, not Ignore it. It is useful to note in this 
context that the essence of von Bertalanffy's insight lies in a precise 
recognition of a system's boundaries and its interaction with the 
environment. The very distinction of a closed versus an open system 
depends on this recognition. In fact, one of the most influential 
system-sociologists in recent years, Niklas Luhman (1982), builds his 
analysis on the intricate boundary relations, both Intersubjective and 
subjective-objective, that form the social environment. But since this 
40 
is an essay in system "economics," not "sociology," I propose to round 
out our critique of equilibrium theory with a final speculative look at 
the methodological Implications of the view of equilibrium proposed above 
for economics. We do so by concluding with a brief look at the work of 
two of the 20th century's most original minds: Ludwlg Wittgenstein and 
Plero Sraffa. 
In his youth, Ludwlg Wittgenstein spent his considerable 
intellectual powers in trying to fulfill to its ultimate end the 
positivist program of grounding language to empirical reality in strict 
logical terms. His Tractatus Logico-Phllosophlcus (1922), written in the 
trenches of World War I, was considered by the then towering figures of 
Western philosophy to have fulfilled this goal. Yet, later in life, 
Wittgenstein came to consider the whole idea of a logical relationship of 
language (and hence thought) with reality as a peculiar form of 
"philosophical disease" of which modern thought needed to be cured (Janik 
and Toulmin, 1973, pp. 202-238). In his later work, Wittgenstein argued 
that all of the most interesting aspects of language and thought were the 
ones which could not be so logically treated. Instead of trying to force 
the actual functioning of language into a narrowly preconceived 
positlvistlc framework, Wittgenstein argued that all of the most 
Interesting aspects of language and thought were the ones which could not 
be so logically treated. Instead of trying to force the actual 
functioning of language into a narrowly preconceived positlvistlc 
framework, Wittgenstein came to believe that we should recognize it for 
the richly complex social enterprise that it is. Thus, his later work 
41 
attempts to show, through the analysis of "word games," how socially 
relative and contextual language actually is as a form of human activity 
rather than as "the petrified fallacies of reason" that analytic 
philosophy made of it (Heller, 1965, p. 228).^^ 
I think it would be possible and informative, although beyond the 
scope of this paper, to draw a parallel between the transition 
Wittgenstein's thought took over his life with the transition that is now 
and has for the last century been taking place in economists' conceptions 
of the relationship between pure economic (equilibrium) theory and the 
economy it provides a picture of. A key figure in this story could turn 
out to be a Piero Sraffa. For, his interesting Influence on 
Wittgenstein's reversal (Roncaglia, 1978, pp. 121-124) aside, Sraffa's 
work in economic theory provides an object lesson in how such a 
transition might take place. 
Sraffa, like Wittgenstein, started his theoretical career in an 
attempt to show the consequences of making the dominant orthodoxy 
logically consistent with itself (Sraffa, 1926). He then came to reject 
that orthodoxy completely, at least by the time of his arrival in 
Cambridge in the late twenties. This is evident in his terse comments in 
the "Symposium on the Representative Firm" in the Economic Journal 
(Sraffa, 1930, p. 93) where, in reply to D. N. Robertson's criticism of 
his view of Marshallian economics, Sraffa states his position most 
clearly: 
We seem to be agreed that the theory cannot be Interpreted in a way 
which makes it logically self-consistent and, at the same time, 
reconciles it with the facts it sets out to explain. Mr. 
42 
Robertson's remedy Is to discard mathematics, and he suggests that 
my remedy Is to discard the facts; perhaps 1 ought to have explained 
that, In the circumstances, I think It Is Marshall's theory that 
should be discarded. 
If It Is possible to make the metaphorical leap to "Marshall's 
Theory" as a symbol of the tension between equilibrium theory and 
reality, I think It Is possible to make the case that Sraffa's later life 
work (Sraffa, 1960) represents an attempt to show how vacuous a pure, 
logically consistent, equilibrium system really Is. For, like Hayek's 
characterization of the orthodox general equilibrium theory, the major 
calumny that has been heaped upon Sraffa's equilibrium system Is that It 
Is little more than a set of "ex-post accounting Identities" and explains 
no real behavior of agents. "Well If so, so be It," Sraffa might say. 
"Now go look for the real social processes and Institutions by which 
agents learn and are controlled in society to flesh out this bare 
positlvlstlc system that is only one of many 'life forms' of society." 
36 If this speculation has any basis, Sraffa, in a much more subtle and 
involuted manner, can be attributed with the same prescriptive Intention 
that Hayek (1937, p. 68) claimed as the aim of his work: 
All I have tried to do has been to find the way back to the common-
sense meaning of our analysis, of which, I am afraid, we are apt to 
lose sight as our analysis becomes more elaborate. You may even 
feel that most of what 1 have said has been commonplace. But from 
time to time, it is probably necessary to detach oneself from the 
technicalities of the argument and to ask quite naively what it is 
all about. If I have only shown that in some respects the answer to 
this question is not only not obvious, but that occasionally we do 
not even quite know what it is, I have succeeded in my purpose. 
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V. ENDNOTES 
1. See Kolakowskl (1968) for a modern treatment of Comte's thought 
and its Influence. 
2. The Issue of Marxism and "science" has grown into an immensely 
complicated literature. All that can be safely said is that on any 
interpretation, Marx (early or late) was very concerned that his analysis 
be perceived as science. His well-known polemics on the distinctions of 
Utopian socialism versus scientific socialism and "vulgar" economics 
versus scientific political economy turn on just this point. While 
numerous citations could be made in this context, two that illustrate his 
life-long concern with scientific analysis are the discussion of 
political economy in the 1844 manuscripts (Marx, 1978, pp. 90-93), and 
the "Preface to the First Edition" of Capital (Marx, 1977, pp. 88-93). 
3. This short paper evoked a comment from Fritz Machlup (1964) and 
a reply by Samuelson (1964), which make interesting reading and might be 
given as a prime example of the difficulties of methodological 
discussions. All of these are reprinted in Caldwell (1984) who has this 
to say about Samuelson's methodological position: "How could such a 
renowned theorist be such an awful methodologist? Was his problem that 
he paid too much attention to the writings of philosophers, or not 
enough? Is there no interface between the scribbling of methodologlsts 
and the practice of economics?" (1984, p. 137). 
4. Wiener, like Mill, was the subject of experiments by a father 
with singular views on education. Perhaps instead of this resulting in a 
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nervous breakdown, as in Mill's case, Wiener dreamt up cybernetics. For 
an account of Wiener's training, see Wiener (1953). 
5. von Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 17, 21-22) claims that cybernetics is 
just a special case of general systems theory. 
6. As an example of this view, we can quote R. Theobald: 
Man will no longer need to toil: he must find a new role in the 
cybernetics era which must emerge from a new goal of self-
fulfillment. He can no longer view himself as a superanimal at the 
center of the physical universe, nor as a super-efficient taker of 
decisions self-fashioned in the model of the computer. He must now 
view himself as a truly creative being in the image of a creative 
God (in Dechert, 1966, p. 69). 
7. This spirit is captured in the very etymological roots of 
Wiener's choice of appellation for his new outlook. "The term 
'cybernetics' derives from the Greek word kybernetes, which means 
steersman. Plato used it to describe the prudential aspect of the art of 
government" (Dechert, 1966, p. 11). 
8. Paradoxically, this seems to have been Wiener's greatest fear. 
9. See Dorfman et al. (1958, pp. 1-5) for a short historical sketch 
of the development of linear programming from a Western perspective. We 
now know that the same technique was discovered independently, at a much 
earlier date, by the Russian mathematician Leonid Kantorovich. For a 
historical account of Kantorovich's work, see Katsenelinboigen (1980, pp. 
33-35). 
10. The correspondence in Keynes (1973b, pp. 385-406) and his well-
known exchange with Tinbergen, in the Economic Journal of 1939-1940 
(Keynes' side is reprinted in Keynes, 1973b, pp. 306-320), reveal Keynes' 
trepidation at endorsing statistical operationalizations of his work. 
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The relevant passage I refer to in the paper is from the latter exchange: 
No one could be more frank, more painstaking, more free from 
subjective bias or parti pris than Professor Tinbergen. There is no 
one, therefore, so far as human qualities go, whom it would be safer 
to trust with black magic. That there is anyone I would trust with 
it at the present stage or that this brand of statistical alchemy is 
ripe to become a branch of science, I am not yet persuaded. But 
Newton, Boyle, and Locke all played with alchemy. So let him 
continue (Keynes, 1973b, p. 320). 
This is Keynes* polemical skill at its most biting. For a more 
straightforward account of his views, and a defense of Tinbergen by Roy 
Harrod, see the correspondence referred to above. 
11. See von Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 14-15) for his recollections of 
the founding of this society and Boulding (1974, p. 67) for his. 
12. Leamer (1983) provides a critical view of the usefulness of 
econometrics from within the ranks. See Fox and Kaul (1980, pp. 4-33) 
for a review of the multidisciplinary influences on modern econometric 
work. 
13. On this point, Boulding stated that: 
Many and perhaps all of the theoretical systems of economics would 
qualify as general systems, for they are certainly relevant to other 
disciplines. The theory of the general equilibrium of prices and 
outputs of commodities, for instance, as originally developed by 
Walras, and made operational by Leontief in his input-output 
analysis in the 1930s, is clearly a special case of a general system 
of the utmost importance, for it is a special case of the general 
equations of ecological equilibrium (Boulding, 1974, pp. 67-68). 
14. While Walras' classic Elements d'economic politique pure was 
finally published in 1874, the original debut of his system seems to have 
taken place a year earlier in a paper presented to the Âcademie des 
Sciences Morales et Politiques entitled "Principles of a Mathematical 
Theory of Exchange." It was completely ignored. See further Walsh and 
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Gram (1980, pp. 146-147). 
15. "We should never forget, however, that Walras' formal schooling 
had been mainly In the natural sciences and mathematics, and this was 
available to him when, later, he needed It" (Walsh and Gram, 1980, p. 
144). 
16. "Walras Is Interested In the attainment of equilibrium In the 
market—In the pure theory of exchange" (Walsh and Gram, 1980, p. 147). 
17. Consider the following passage form the locus classlcus of the 
modern neo-Walraslan literature: 
To be precise, an economy is defined by m consumers (characterized 
by their consumption sets and their preferences), by n producers 
(characterized by their production sets), and the total resources. 
A state of the economy Is a specification of the action of each 
agent, and a state Is said to be attainable If the action of each 
agent Is possible for him and If the action of each agent Is 
possible for him and if their (m+n) actions are compatible with the 
total resources. The set of attainable states plays an essential 
role; its properties are therefore studied, k special class of 
economies is then considered, namely the private ownership economies 
where consumers own the resources and control the producers. Given 
a price system, each producer maximizes his profit, which is 
distributed to consumers-shareholders. The wealths of the latter 
are thus determined, and they satisfy their preferences under their 
wealth constraints. As a result of this process, each agent chooses 
an action. These (m+n) actions are not necessarily compatible with 
the total resources. Can one find a price system which makes them 
compatible? An answer is given in section 5.7 in the form of an 
existence theorem (for which way Is prepared by the result of 
section 5.6). This fundamental theorem of the theory of value 
explains the prices of all commodities and the actions of all agents 
in a private ownership economy (Debreu, 1959, p. 74). 
While there may be some reason to doubt the sweeping contention of the 
last sentence, it cannot but be noticed that, as far as the economics 
goes, Debreu is merely decanting Walras into a more recondite vessel. 
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18. "However, so far as pure theory is concerned, Walras Is in my 
opinion the greatest of all economists. His system of economic 
equilibrium, uniting as it does, the quality of 'revolutionary' 
creativeness with the quality of classic synthesis, is the only work by 
an economist that will stand comparison with the achievements of 
theoretical physics. ... It is the outstanding landmark on the road 
that economics travels toward the status of a rigorous or exact science 
and, though outmoded by now, still stands at the back of much of the best 
theoretical work of our time" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 822). 
19. The remarks of Warlas' translator William Jaffe on pp. 7-9 of 
the preface to Walras (1954) shed some light on the neglect of the 
Elements for so long in the English-speaking world. 
20. Mark Blaug (1978, p. 617) claims that Value and Capital is "a 
book which was largely responsible for the revival of Walras in modern 
economics." 
21. "The great economists of earlier generations—Alfred Marshall, 
A. C. Pigou, and Lord Keynes—thought that mathematical economics had a 
slim past and no future at all. Time makes fools even of great men. In 
the middle third of the 20th century, mathematics has everywhere swept 
through economics like an epidemic of measles sweeping through a new 
continent" (P. Samuelson in the foreword to Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). 
22. "It is Important to note that the existence proof shows that at 
least one equilibrium exists. It does not, and could not, show that only 
one equilibrium exists. The possibility that there will be multiple 
equilibrium cannot be excluded" (Bliss, 1975, p. 30). 
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23. "Someone who demands of a model as complicated as the atemporal 
equilibrium model what causes a particular value to be what it is should 
normally expect to be told that everything, meaning all the primitive 
specifications of the model, have played a part in causing the variable 
concerned to take whatever value has arisen" (Bliss, 1975, p. 36). 
24. For a nontechnical review of the stability literature, see 
Weintraub (1979), Chapter 7. Arrow and Hahn (1971), Chapters 11-13, 
provide a complete technical account. 
25. When Hicks returned to the stability issue, in his "additional 
notes" of the 2nd edition of Value and Capital, he bowed to Samuelson's 
superior mathematical treatment of the stability problem, but retained an 
interesting skepticism: 
By my hypothesis of essentially instantaneous adjustment, I reduced 
the purely mechanical part of my dynamic theory to the simplest 
terms—it is now quite evident that I over-simplified it. But in so 
doing, 1 did leave myself free to make some progress with the less 
mechanical parts—expectations and so on. I still feel that this 
procedure has its uses, and I should be sorry to abandon it 
altogether in favor of a pure concentration on mechanism . . . for 
the understanding of the economic system we need something more, 
something which does refer back, in the last resort, to the behavior 
of people and the motives of their conduct (p. 337). 
26. "ADM" is the generally accepted adjective for neo-Walrasian 
theory. 
27. Two extreme examples of the powerful role knowledge assumptions 
play can be seen in the work of the rational expectations theorists, on 
the side of complete omniscience, and the work of G. L. S. Shackle 
(1972), on the side of crippling Ignorance. 
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28. He continues: "But this is by no means unconnected with the 
other question which might be discussed under the same title, the 
question to what extent formal economic analysis conveys any knowledge 
about what happens in the real world." 
29. To a modern economist this is a surprisingly up-to-date list to 
which we might want to add macroeconomics and forecasting of all types. 
30. "I have long felt that the concept of equilibrium itself and 
the methods which we employ in pure analysis, have a clear meaning only 
when confined to the analysis of the action of a single person." 
31. Hayek cites Kaldor (1934) in thid context, but the description 
would equally well apply to the rational expectations school. 
32. See Burmeister (1980) and Frydman (1982) for some conceptual 
problems such full knowledge assumptions can create. 
33. For an attempt by two modern "Hayekians" to elaborate on the 
economic role such knowledge institutions play, see O'Driscoll and Rizzo 
(1985). 
34. Bliss (1975, p. 32) makes note of this openness of the 
neoclassical system: 
Economic theories that attempt to explain prices or 
distribution from the postulate of a general equilibrium of supply 
and demand have sometimes been criticized for neglecting the 
influence of sociological and historical factors as though the "laws 
of supply and demand" embodied only the working out of purely 
economic forces. Plainly this is a misunderstanding. If there is a 
valid explanation of prices and distribution in terms of an 
equilibrium of supply and demand (always remembering that this may 
or may not be the correct theory—it is not a matter of logical 
necessity) then the influence of sociological and historical factors 
will be chaneled through the excess supply functions of the various 
actors and in that sense the operation of these influences will be 
direct. To say that many factors will operate indirectly is not to 
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devaluate their importance. It is, of course, largely "non-
economic" factors that will give to any particular case its 
particular character. 
35. Pears (1970) provides a comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's 
thought. 
36. Support for this view can be found, among other places in an 
elliptical reading of Sraffa's review of F. A. Hayek's Prices and 
Production (Sraffa, 1932a). The content of most of the review consists 
of Sraffa's attempt to demonstrate logical inconsistency in Hayek's 
theoretical polemic for a "neutral" monetary policy. But after having 
spent considerable energy in this pursuit, Sraffa implies that the whole 
exercise is a misguided one in that the model's premises exclude all of 
the truly interesting features of a monetary economy from the start. 
This compares interestingly with Wittgenstein's attitude that his 
Tractatus work was not wrong, but just misguided in its aim; i.e., that, 
in fact, the most interesting elements of language were those that his 
positivistic system was forced to be silent about. 
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ESSAY II. IN SEARCH OF A MONETARY THEORY OF VALUE: SRAFFA, 
KEYNES AND THE OWN-RATES THEORY OF INTEREST 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1947, Keynes' biographer, pre-publication critic, and 
collaborator R. F. Harrod, summed up the General Theory as follows: 
The theory of interest is, I think, the central point in his 
scheme. He departs from old orthodoxy In holding that the failure 
of the system to move to a position of full activity is not 
primarily due to friction, rigidity. Immobility or to phenomena 
essentially connected with the trade cycle. If a certain level of 
interest is established which is Inconsistent with full activity, no 
flexibility or mobility in the other parts of the system will get 
the system to move to full activity. But this wrong rate of 
Interest, as we may call it, is not Itself £ rigidity or 
inflexibility. It is natural, durable, and in a certain sense, in 
the free system inevitable. That is why he lays what may seem an 
undue emphasis on the doctrine that interest is essentially the 
reward not for saving but for parting with liquidity. Given the 
complex forces affecting liquidity preference, such and such is the 
rate of Interest that will naturally and necessarily and, so long as 
underlying forces remain unchanged, permanently obtain. Yet that 
rate of interest may be inconsistent with the full activity of the 
system (1947, pp. 69-70, italics added). 
Such an extensive quotation is justified by two remarkable qualities 
of the statement. First, Harrod's statement, when fully digested, can be 
seen to embody a viewpoint at odds with almost all major conceptions of 
the meaning of Keynes' theory of employment. As a moment's reflection 
over the quotation will reveal to the modern economist, this "central 
point in his scheme" is not compatible with any standard "Keyneslan" 
exposition of underemployment equilibriums. In the "Keyneslan" case, the 
definition of unemployment Is its correspondence with some sort of 
"rigidity" in an otherwise smoothly operating general equilibrium system. 
Among some old Keynesians, the rigidity was explained as the Interest 
rate becoming stuck in the "liquidity trap" by a pessimism so severe that 
no amount of Inducement could satisfy the public's craving for liquid 
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balances. When this case was recognized as both theoretically and 
empirically Implausible (see Keynes' own view in Keynes, 1936, p. 207), 
attention shifted to inflexibility in the labor market. By the logic of 
the neoclassical synthesis, deviations from full employment had to be due 
to some non-clearing rigidity in the labor market. It was the final 
recognition of this point that led to both the breakdown of the Keyneslan 
consensus and the attempt to formulate mlcrofoundation explanations for 
"rationally" explaining why the labor market might not clear. 
More recently, even the most sophisticated attempts to formulate a 
"Keyneslan" theory of unemployment, the French school's "non-price 
rationing" models (Mallnvaud, 1977) and the UCLA school's "non-clearing-
market" states (Glower, 1965; Leljonhufvud, 1981), have depended on 
rigidities to cause the system to deviate from the benchmark case of full 
Walrasian equilibrium. With the UCLA school, the rigidity is cast in 
terms of Austrian-styled concerns over incomplete information and a 
subsequent breakdown of price signals to bring agents' plans into 
compatibility. For the French school, the point is more technical, but 
conceptually similar. They want to follow out (in extreme detail) the 
macroeconomlc implications of the lack of market-clearing for a variety 
of reasons ranging from quantity adjustments (non-price rationing) to 
fixed nominal prices (fix-price models). Again, the unifying theme in 
all these cases is that the analytical definition of unemployment states 
is identified with a deviation from a putative full equilibrium. Thus, 
only by restricting the system with an exogenously defined rigidity can 
we theoretically account for unemployment. 
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Notwithstanding these analyses, Harrod tells us Keynes concluded 
that "no flexibility or mobility in the other parts of the system will 
get the system to move to full activity." What might Harrod be driving 
at with his assertion that Keynes' central point is a "wrong rate of 
interest," that this rate "is not Itself a rigidity or Inflexibility," 
but is "natural, durable and in a certain sense • . . inevitable?" That 
question is answered by recourse to the second remarkable quality of 
Harrod's statement, which is that In a concise, shorthand way, he 
expresses the central concerns of Keynes' own post-General Theory 
restatements of his revolutionary new theory. In these papers 
(1937a,b,c), Keynes addresses himself almost entirely to monetary 
concerns, trying to elaborate his theory of employment via his theory of 
the interest rate. A variety of different approaches and points are 
raised in these papers, including Keynes' views on uncertainty, 
expectations and the role of money and interest in his theoretical 
explanation of unemployment equilibriums. Taken as a whole, Keynes' 
post-General Theory defense of his position reveals his feeling that his 
monetary theory of the interest rate clearly distinguishes him from his 
predecessors and contemporaries, and was generally being misunderstood by 
his Interpreters. The implication of both Harrod's statement and Keynes' 
own emphasis on monetary matters in defending his theory, is that a^ 
complete understanding of Keynes* theoretical attempt to explain 
unemployment is fundamentally related to his views on money and Interest. 
It is the purpose of this essay to try to elucidate that part of 
Keynes' monetary theory that is implicit in Harrod's statement and 
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explicit in Keynes' 1937 defense by analyzing a neglected view of Keynes' 
monetary views, "the own-rates theory of interest." 
In keeping with the enduring nature of Keynes as a theoretical dead 
hand from the past that continues to dominate macroeconomic concerns, 
this historical pursuit will involve us to some extent in the discussion 
of Keynes' work implied by modern positions on unemployment theory 
(Including those already mentioned). Specifically, we will offer a 
simultaneous solution to an historical puzzle and a modern one. The 
historical question arises from the Interpretation of Keynes that forms 
the basis of the UCLA school mentioned above. It will be the position of 
this essay that Leljonhufvud's influential view of Keynes as an Austrian-
style economist, concerned with the breakdown of the price-signalling 
functions of Interest rates, is in substantial error. A clear 
contradiction to this view can be found in the very origins of the 
analysis of Keynes' interest rate theory, the own-rates theory of 
interest, set forth in Chapter 17 of the General Theory. For the 
historical origin of the "own-rates" approach to Interest rates can be 
traced to an explicit critique of the Austrian approach to business 
cycles and monetary theory by Piero Sraffa. Keynes' elaboration of 
Sraffa's critique into a framework for his analysis of asset holding and 
money will present a clear alternative view of Keynes' liquidity 
preference theory from that implied by the Austrian interpretation. 
In a more constructive vein, the analysis of the own-rates theory of 
Interest can also be used to elaborate the monetary concerns Implied by 
Harrod's statement and by Keynes' own post-General Theory writings. 
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Again, there is a counterpart of the historical record in the 
contemporary literature since the one major school of Keynesian 
scholarship left out of our discussion so far, the Post Keynesian school 
(Davidson, 1972; Shackle; 1972; 1974; Kregel, 1973), explicitly ground 
both their interpretation of Keynes and their future research agenda in 
the monetary concerns that Keynes raised in 1937. Consequently, our 
second goal will be to try to show that a substantial agreement with the 
Post Keynesian view of the importance of Keynes' monetary innovations can 
be given analytical focus by the "own-rates" approach. The hope is that 
this view offers an alternative to the sometimes nihilistic attitude 
towards equilibrium theory implied by the Post Keynesian position on 
modern developments. 
Keynes scholarship is a complicated miasma of Incidental historical 
accounts and controversial analytic debates. This has been the case from 
the very first "Keynes and the Classics" debate, and it remains so fifty 
years later. At least partly, this is a legacy of Keynes himself, with 
his strong appetite for sharp distinctions and keen controversy (1936, p. 
v). Harrod must have had premonitions of this problem, for after reading 
drafts of the General Theory, he cautioned Keynes about his theoretical 
polemics: 
What is important for the initial understanding, which is so 
much to be desired, is that their minds should be strongly directed 
on to your essential points. . . . The mind likes to take refuge 
from the un-famlliar (your views which you want to put across) with 
the familiar (what exactly did Marshall mean In such and such a 
passage). And I don't think you lead them pleasantly from the 
familiar to the unfamiliar (Keynes, 1973a, p. 556). 
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From the standpoint of the evolution of both Keynes scholarship 
proper, and macroeconomlc theory generally, perhaps Keynes was not clear 
enough in his distinctions between his own and the "classical" theory of 
the rate of interest. Milgate (1982) has recently put forward this view 
and laid much of the blame at the feet of Harrod for urging caution on 
Keynes. But perhaps Harrod understood better than Keynes the extent to 
which dialogue in economic theory depends on a shared framework of 
language (equilibrium). What both Harrod and Keynes underestimated, 
though, was the difficulty involved in altering the orthodox vocabulary. 
If Harrod is correct that Keynes' view of the central place of the 
interest rate in his scheme involved a conception of unemployment as 
"natural, durable and, in a certain sense, in the free system 
inevitable," then what is required is a reversal of the usual procedure 
of defining unemployment equilibriums. Thus, for Keynes, as we will try 
to show, the "natural" rate of interest is not a benchmark case against 
which the "market rate" is analyzed. And the conception of equilibrium 
as consistent in its fullest meaning (full equilibrium, full long-period 
equilibrium, etc.) with full employment is replaced by Keynes with a 
natural state of unemployment equilibrium of which the state where 
unemployment is zero is the special case. This is one way of viewing 
both the Harrod-Keynes correspondence and Keynes' own famous prefatory 
remarks to the General Theory. 
The Ideas which are here expressed so laborously are extremely 
simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new 
ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those 
brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our 
minds. 
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Before we can get to Keynes' simple and obvious Ideas on monetary theory, 
It Is necessary to highlight some of the ideas that ramify into every 
corner of a modern economist's mind when he thinks of Keynes. 
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II. THE KEYNES LEGACY; MUDDY WATERS 
There can be no doubt, I think, that Keynes is generally 
recognized as the predominant figure among economists of this 
century. Yet I submit that there is still, more than two decades 
after his death and more than three decades after his General 
Theory, considerable uncertainty about exactly why he occupies this 
position (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p. 40). 
Almost two more decades have passed since Leijonhufvud and others 
set out to correct the paradox of the "Keynesian" economists who hardly 
knew the lineage of their title. Just as he penned these lines, there 
was beginning an explosion of interest in Keynes scholarship that 
remains unabated to this day. If nothing else, this mountain of work 
attests to the endurance of Keynes' paradoxical position as a figure of 
generally recognized predominance, whose actual ideas are a continuing 
source of perplexity to the economics profession. In a manner 
reminiscent of Keynes' own views on expectations of the future, Keynes' 
important place in economics is secure, but uncertain. Was Keynes a 
theoretical innovator of the first rank, or just a shrewd polemicist and 
statesman? Keynes scholarship has still not answered Leijonhufvud's 
question. 
As is often the case with genealogical research, the motivations and 
results of Keynes scholarship are grounded in a complex combination of 
idle (professional) interest in the history of ideas, invidious grasping 
for honorary pedigree, and a committed search for self-knowledge in a 
past record that may be of current and future use. And, just like the 
man whose coat of arms must change to accommodate his bank balance, the 
evolving fortunes of economic theories have Influenced the evolving 
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interpretation of Keynes* work. 
Synergism between historical interpretation and theoretical advance 
is nothing new in economics or peculiar to Keynes scholarship. In fact, 
it could be argued that this relationship is the most important 
justification for making a separate discipline of the history of economic 
thought. Leland Yeager (1973, p. 63) clearly expresses this opinion; 
Cultivation of the history of thought is more necessary in economics 
than in the natural sciences because earlier discoveries in 
economics are more in danger of being forgotten; maintaining a 
cumulative growth of knowledge is more difficult. In the natural 
sciences, discoveries get embodied not only in further advances in 
pure knowledge, but also into technology, many of whose users have a 
profit-and-loss incentive to get things straight. The practitioners 
of economic technology are largely politicians with rather different 
motives. . k . In economics, consequently, we need scholars who 
specialize in keeping us aware of earlier contributions and so 
enable us to recognize earlier successes—and earlier mistakes—when 
they surface as supposedly new ideas. By exerting a needed 
discipline, specialists in the history of thought can contribute to 
the cumulative character of economics (quoted in O'Drlscoll, 1977, 
p. 1). 
Yet, the contemporary state of Keynes' scholarship presents an even 
more important opportunity than just expressing the "cumulative 
character" of theoretical development. Since today whole schools of 
economic theory explicitly base their current work on an historical 
interpretation of Keynes, Keynes scholarship has exciting (and 
controversial) contemporary relevance. For this reason, much of the 
motivation of the recent outpouring of work on Keynes is centered on a 
dissatisfaction with the current state of economic theory, especially the 
dominant schools of macroeconomics. 
In the period since Leljonhufvud caught (and partly created) this 
wave of Interest in the ideas of Keynes, the fortunes of Keynes' 
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theoretical legacy, macroeconomics, have been tumultuous. And with each 
new view on crucial macroeconomlc Issues comes a new view of Keynes' 
historical stature. Almost as Leljonhufvud (1968) was writing of the 
"Keyneslan" economists of the neoclassical-synthetic type, this postwar 
consensus was dissolving. The causes of this "crisis In Keyneslan 
Economics" (Hicks, 1973) are complex enough to warrant full length 
studies of its own. Some generally recognized elements Include: 1) 
Empirical contradictions of Keyneslan theoretical predictions and a 
seeming lack of policy relevance to the problems of a stagflation era; 2) 
theoretical challenges from monetarism and its hybrid variant, rational 
expectations macro theory; and 3) a lack of appeal to a new generation of 
theorists more highly trained in mathematics—a generation of theorists 
whose macroeconomlc Interests, if they had any, ran to the complications 
of consistently grounding traditional macroeconomlc effects in choice-
theoretic "microfoundatlons." 
Surely this set of objections to the Keyneslan consensus, while by 
no means complete, is formidable enough to warrant the term "crisis." 
They go a long way toward explaining the emergence in the 1970s of a 
general dissatisfaction with a Keynesianism whose only theoretical 
innovations over the classics seemed to be the empirical assertion of 
rigid wages. By 1981, the reputation of "Keynesianism" had become the 
stuff of academic humor: 
There obviously was an American Keyneslan school in the days of 
Alvln Hansen's famous Harvard seminar and for some time thereafter. 
One cannot off-hand date its demise. But it Is doubtful that anyone 
who has gained prominence in the profession and is now under the age 
of 40 would accept the label "Keyneslan" for himself. So we know 
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the school is done for (Leljonhufvud, 1981, p. 177). 
After the break-up of the Keyneslan orthodoxy, the theoretical void 
In macroeconomics was filled by the rational expectations revolution 
which seemed to meet objections (2) and (3) above. Not only did the idea 
that expectations are an economic choice like any other provide new uses 
for monetarist simplifications of the quantity theory tradition, but it 
also had the virtue of explicit reliance on maximization hypotheses 
consistent with traditional choice theory. And, in a manner reminiscent 
of Yeager's allusion to economic politicians, the policy impotence that 
was commonly deduced from rational expectations models also provided a 
solution to objection (1) by denying that employment policy was even 
possible. In an era where political dissatisfaction with high rates of 
inflation ran high, the stage was set to try to control inflation with 
monetarist measures (Peterson, 1985; Kaldor, 1982; Tobin, 1985). The 
traditional Keyneslan objection to such policy became irrelevant under 
the "Lucas critique," since real employment effects were out of the 
policy makers' hands anyway. 
Although the rational expectations injection into the arm of the 
monetarist research program has provided enough puzzles that it still 
dominates macroeconomlc research in all of the most prestigious journals, 
it has never achieved the breadth and strength of the earlier Keyneslan 
consensus. It is still too soon for the ultimate Influence of rational 
expectations theory on the development of macroeconomics to be debated. 
But the effect on the standard, non-historian's view of Keynes that this 
"revolution" engendered is clearer. By rational expectations standards, 
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the Keyneslan episode was a deviation (that Is gladly over) from the 
traditional concern of grounding economic behavior In rational choice 
theory. The rational expectatlonlsts show very little Interest in the 
history of their subject, but when they have, they trace themselves to 
the pre-Keynesian "classical theorists" who looked for the causes of 
business cycles within the orthodox theory of individual maximization 
(Lucas, 1981a). By this reckoning, "Keyneslan economics is dead" (Lucas, 
1980), and for good reason, since "the most rapid progress toward a 
coherent and useful aggregate economic theory will result from the 
acceptance of the problem statement as advanced by the business cycle 
theorists, and not from further attempts to refine the jerry-built 
structures to which Keyneslan Macroeconomics has led us" (Lucas, 1981a, 
p. 216). 
It is interesting to note that the rational expectatlonlsts' 
historical view that the whole Keyneslan episode is best forgotten, and 
that we should go back to take up business cycle theory where the pre-
Keyneslans left off, has a clear reflection in the current state of 
macroeconomics. In some ways, the present situation closely resembles 
the period prior to the Keyneslan Revolution. Then, as now, there was an 
obvious splintering of views on "business cycle theory," with many 
competing groups contesting the field (Haberler, 1937). Keynes (1936, p. 
vl) complained of "the deep divergences of opinion which have for the 
time being almost destroyed the practical influence of economic theory." 
Today, after a monetarist experiment has been tried and failed to achieve 
a costless deflation (Kaldor, 1982; Maharidge and Williamson, 1985), 
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there is no clear guide in economic theory to practical policy (Peterson, 
1985; Friedman, 1985). Consequently, many theorists are now searching 
their theoretical roots seeking answers like religious pilgrims in a time 
of spiritual crisis. Much of this journey into the desert has involved 
historical work on Keynes' own writings. 
If, by the standards of the rational expectationists, Keynes' place 
in the history of theory is both securely and certainly minor, it must be 
emphasized that theirs is a minority view. As already noted, the New 
Classical School is just one of the reactions to the break-up of the old 
Keynesianism. Of the other reactions to the disillusion with orthodoxy, 
two views of macroeconomics, both of which stem explicitly from distinct 
interpretations of Keynes' own work, are particularly relevant to a 
discussion of the importance of money and interest in Keynes' theory. 
Specifically, Leijonhufvud's (1968; 1981) influential reinterpretation of 
Keynes forms the doctrinal basis for the UCLA approach to macroeconomics 
as the economics of non-clearing market states; while the views of 
Shackle (1967; 1972; 1974) and Davidson (1972) form the interpretive 
basis of the Post Keynesian school. 
This contemporary relevance of modern Keynes scholarship can be seen 
in the seminal work of tertiary literature on Keynes (Interpretations of 
interpretations of Keynes!) by Alan Coddington (1983). Coddington 
classifies Keynes' scholarship according to the three categories of 
"Hydraulic Keynesians," "Fundamentalists," and "Reconstituted 
Reductionists." Hydraulic Keynesians is his term for those proponents of 
the neoclassical synthesis who once formed the consensus view of 
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macroeconomics. "This designation reflects the view that the natural and 
elementary way to regard elementary textbook Keynesianlsm is as 
conceiving of the economy at the aggregate level In terms of disembodied 
and homogeneous flows" (1982, p. 102)• As we have seen, believers of 
this brand of Keynesianlsm survive today only under deep cover (e.g., in 
principles courses). 
The other two schools of thought on Keynes explicitly arose out of a 
dissatisfaction with the neoclassical hydraulic Keynesianlsm. Out of the 
welter of interpretations of Keynes, Coddington's classificatory schema 
usefully summarizes two main approaches that are at odds with each other, 
not only in terms of their view of what was important in Keynes, but also 
what use should be made of his ideas to guide future research in 
macroeconomics. For this reason, it will be useful to frame our 
discussion of Keynes scholarship in terms of his categories (while not 
necessarily agreeing with Coddington's descriptions and evaluations of 
these theories). Interestingly for our paper, a major point of 
difference between the two schools centers around their views of Keynes' 
monetary theory of the rate of Interest. Since both the Fundamentalist 
and the Reductionist views on Keynes clash with each other over the 
question of Interest rate theory, we will first take a short look at 
Keynes own post-General Theory views on his Interest rate theory. Then 
we can center our discussion of the modern monetary theories around the 
issues raised there to set the stage for the own-rates approach to these 
questions. 
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III. REDUCTIONISTS, FUNDAMENTALISTS AND KEYNES ON 
INTEREST AND MONEY 
Confusion still swirls about the meaning and validity of Keynes' 
monetary theory of the Interest rate. The writers responsible for the 
Keynes versus the Classics debate, the New Economics, the Keyneslan-
Monetarlst squabble, the "Economics of Keynes," and now the Post 
Keyneslan School have all argued bitterly over this question, and yet It 
remains a central mystery. From an historical perspective, we know that 
this was Keynes' own greatest concern with the reception of his General 
Theory. Almost his entire published corpus of Immediate post-General 
Theory writings on the book are dominated by monetary concerns. In "The 
Theory of the Rate of Interest" (1937a), "Alternative Theories of the 
Rate of Interest" (1937b), and "The General Theory of Employment" 
(1937c), Keynes tried a variety of tacks to distinguish his monetary 
theory from that of his predecessors and contemporaries. From all of 
these and his private correspondence of the period, we get the impression 
that he felt that this part of his book was both particularly Important 
and particularly misunderstood. 
A brief look at these articles will set the stage for our discussion 
of both the modern views on liquidity preference theory and the 
development of the own-rates theory itself. 
It is convenient to start our discussion of Keynes' defense and 
development of his interest rate theory with an article he contributed to 
a festschrift for Irving Fisher in 1937. "The Theory of the Rate of 
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Interest" is relevant to our theme in that it is explicitly concerned 
with differentiating Keynes' interest rate theory from "orthodox theory," 
and it explicitly uses the own-rates framework towards this goal. Keynes 
begins his discussion by outlining his view of the content of this 
orthodoxy in the form of four propositions (1937a, pp. 101-103). 
(1) Interest on money is simply "the premium on current cash over 
deferred cash." People pay this premium because cash has some service 
yield. Thus, "we can conveniently say that interest on money measures 
the marginal efficiency of money measured in terms of itself as a unit." 
(2) "Money is not peculiar in having a marginal efficiency measured 
in terms of itself." So do stocks of commodities and all other assets. 
These can be either positive or negative and can be derived from the 
relationship between spot and future prices of the asset. 
(3) Arbitrage by wealth holders will lead to an equality of marginal 
efficiencies of all assets when measured in a common unit—money, for 
instance. 
(4) If the demand price of a capital asset determined on the 
secondhand asset market yields a marginal efficiency in terms of money 
that is higher than the money rate, that asset will be newly produced 
(i.e., investment will flow towards its production). The scale of this 
investment for any asset is determined by its cost of production and the 
rate at which the profitability of the investment declines as it goes 
forward. "Thus the price system resulting from the relationships between 
marginal efficiencies of different capital assets including money, 
measured in terms of a common unit, determines the aggregate rate of 
.4' .. 
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Investment." 
Keynes claims that these four propositions, which we will see are 
cast more In terms of his own system than of the orthodoxy, are 
"consistent" with orthodox theory In showing how the system of relative 
prices in conjunction with the scale of output move until the marginal 
efficiencies of all kinds of assets are equal, when measured in a common 
unit. Utilizing his own peculiar language, Keynes is really just stating 
the orthodox conception of a long period equilibrium where rates of 
return (marginal efficiencies) are equal in all sectors. He speculates 
that this conception is the source of the idea that the Interest rate is 
determined by productivity considerations, since In equilibrium the rate 
of money interest equals the marginal efficiency of capital goods. 
"But they [the 4 propositions] tell us nothing as to the forces 
which determine what this common level of marginal efficiency will tend 
to be. It is when we proceed to this further discussion that my argument 
diverges from the orthodox argument" (p. 103). According to Keynes, the 
uniqueness of his theory rests with the contention that the forces 
determining the scale of the equilibrium position are not Independent of 
money, but that in the usual case just the opposite is true: 
. . . namely that the marginal efficiency of money Is determined by 
forces partly appropriate to itself, and that prices move until the 
marginal efficiencies of other assets fall into line with the rate 
of Interest (p. 103). 
He suggests that the orthodox position implicitly requires two 
further propositions, and that these are the points on which they differ. 
In order to substantiate the orthodox emphasis on savings and Investment 
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as the ultimately determining factors of the rate of interest, It Is 
necessary to assume these further points: 
(5) "The marginal efficiency of money in terms of itself has the 
peculiarity that it Is Independent of its quantity. In this respect, it 
differs from other capital assets." Keynes attributes this proposition 
to "the quantity theory strictly stated." By this, he means that in the 
equation of exchange, any quantity of money can satisfy the demand for 
money, Implied by, say, the Cambridge k. He further claims that since 
any quantity of M is consistent with the equation, that in orthodox 
theory the rate of interest on money is Itself indeterminate. Thus 
follows the normal procedure of defining the money rate by its necessary 
equality with the marginal efficiency of capital assets. 
(6) But since, by this account, the rate of Interest is not 
determined until we know the scale of investment, "the scale of 
investment will not reach its equilibrium level until the point is 
reached at which the elasticity of supply of output as a whole has fallen 
to zero" (p. 104). This is Keynes* preferred post-General Theory 
definition of full employment where no more aggregate demand can call 
forth any new production.^ Here, Keynes is driving at the point that 
the full employment of resources is the only equilibrium level of output 
if it is the supply of productive factors (savings) and their 
productivity (the marginal efficiency of capital) that determines the 
rate of Interest. 
According to Keynes, the addition of those two propositions to (1)-
(4) is the only way that the orthodox system can be made logically 
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consistent In terms of Its Interest rate theory and monetary theory. The 
"final synthesis of this theory," then, is that 
. . . the position of equilibrium is given by that common value of 
the rate of interest and of the marginal efficiency of capital at 
which saving determined by the former is equal to the Investment 
determined by the latter (p. 104). 
Accordingly, it is by restating these implicit assumptions of the 
classical analysis that Keynes delineates his approach and parts company 
with his predecessors. For (5) and (6), he would substitute; 
(5*) "The marginal efficiency of money in terms of itself is, in 
general, a function of its quantity (though not its quantity alone), just 
as in the case of other capital assets." So money is just another 
capital-asset from this standpoint. 
(6*) "Aggregate investment may reach its equilibrium rate under 
proposition (4) above, before the elasticity of supply of output as a 
whole has fallen to zero" (p. 104). The interest rate in his theory can 
equilibrate at any level of employment. 
This article provides a nicely schematized version of Keynes' own 
position on his relation to orthodox theory. The framework chosen to 
characterize the arguments is the own-rates theory of chapter 17 that we 
treat in detail in section V. Its use here is pertinent to our theme in 
a number of ways. First, it emphasizes the generality of the own-rates 
approach (it can express the orthodox theory as well as Keynes' own). 
Also, we get a glimpse here of our Interest in the monetary terms upon 
which Keynes claimed generality for his own theory (it applies to 
Interest rates at all levels of employment, not just the full employment 
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case). We will see that In chapter 17 Keynes uses this last general 
quality to subsume the Wlckselllan "natural rate" as a special case of 
his general theory of interest. Finally, Keynes' use of the own-rates 
equilibrium framework (which we have yet to specify) to reemphaslze his 
departure from the orthodox theory of Interest adds weight to our hope 
that It will serve a useful role as a means of understanding the special 
features of liquidity preference theory. 
À further point brought out In this admittedly brief discussion (It 
was meant as a defense of the book he had already written and so assumes 
a familiarity with It) Is that the framework of analysis runs in terms of 
an Integrated view of monetary, value and production theory. As we will 
see when we get to our detailed analysis of the own-rates theory, It was 
a major preoccupation of Keynes that his monetary theory should be fully 
Integrated with the rest of his scheme. Accordingly, he analyzes 
monetary concerns as Integral to both the allocatlve flows of resources 
Into different uses (Investment above) and to the determination of the 
whole system of relative prices. 
The linkages between these theoretical domains can already be 
discerned In this brief treatment. Wealth owners and arbitragers trade 
existing assets (Including money) until expected rates of return (implied 
by spot and future prices) are equal for all existing assets. If this 
level of asset market equilibrium sets a price for a capital good 
(investment) that Is higher than its replacement cost, it will be 
profitable to newly produce that good. As this investment goes forward, 
rates of return fall as profitable production of each production process 
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reaches the limits of the market, given existing cost and demand 
conditions. Thus, relative prices, the level of resource utilization, 
and Interest rates are all determined together. Money as an asset in 
this framework competes with other forms in which to hold wealth and so 
enters as an operative factor from the beginning. The difference between 
(5) and (6), and (5*) and (6*) Illustrates this last point. Keynes 
staked his unique view of how this interrelated system moves toward 
equilibrium on the possible Influence money, held as an asset, might 
have. In the orthodox theory, money was a "neutral" factor and thus 
could not hold up the production process. For Keynes, it was an 
operative factor in the situation which had "real," not just monetary, 
effects. This will be the central conclusion of the own-rates analysis. 
In the festschrift article, Keynes ascribes the basis of his 
departure from orthodoxy, implied by (5*) and (6*) above, to the special 
features of his liquidity preference theory. In particular, he 
emphasizes his views on uncertainty, expectations and the functions of 
money (1937a, pp. 105-108). But a more complete discussion of these 
topics is gained from Keynes' second post-General Theory writing, "The 
General Theory of Employment" in the Q.J.E. for 1937. For our purposes, 
it is especially interesting to note that in this paper Keynes professes 
to be interested in trying to reexpress "the comparatively simple 
fundamental ideas which underlie my theory" (1937b, p. Ill), and that in 
the process of doing so, he spends all of his space discussing monetary 
matters. For this reason, this paper is often taken to be central to the 
modern Post Keynesian emphasis on the Importance of Keynes' views on 
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uncertainty and money in assessing his contribution (Coddlngton, 1983, p# 
94). 
In the Q.J.E. article, Keynes emphasizes these themes of uncertainty 
and the role of money to delineate his departure from orthodoxy Implied 
by the festschrift contribution. He particularly takes pains to insist 
that the world he is describing is one of "uncalculable uncertainty" 
about the future. By this term, he distinguishes his view from the 
"Benthamite" idea that we can attach probabilities to future events. 
"About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know" (1937b, p. 
114). Since we do not have any information on which to probablistlcally 
predict this uncertain future, we fall back Instead on rules of thumb 
such as our best guess of the existing state of opinion. This leads to a 
psychology of conventional judgment. 
Keynes stresses that the major Impact the recognition of this 
uncertainty has on economic theory concerns the questions of money, 
capital and how unspent Income will be held. Both in terms of the 
expectation of capital yields and the reasons for asset preferences, this 
uncertainty radically alters the view of money in economic theory. In an 
uncertain world, money takes on special significance as a liquid store of 
value, and it is to this function that monetary theory should look for 
the explanation of the Interest rate and business fluctuations. 
The measure of our doubt ("disquietude") about the future is Keynes' 
impressionistic characterization of the money rate of interest. 
"Because, partly on reasonable and partly on instinctive grounds, our 
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desire to hold money as a store of wealth Is a barometer of the degree of 
our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the 
future" (1937c, p. 116). Thus, just as the arithmetic books tell us, the 
rate of interest Is the price we require to part with our money or "the 
measure of the degree of our disquietude." We can interpret these 
concerns as the foundation for the festschrift's insistence on the unique 
characteristics of the money rate as opposed to other marginal 
efficiencies of assets. 
The tie-in with the equilibrium framework of the previous paper is 
made by the assertion that, although money has unique characteristics, it 
is also just another store of value or asset. Just like money, all other 
assets exhibit a rate of return that when measured in a common unit must 
all equal each other. It is here that Keynes reconnects the monetary and 
real forces which are so clearly separated in orthodox theory. It is the 
rate of return on capital assets, tied in equilibrium to the rate of 
return on money, which determines the aggregate rate of investment. To 
the extent that the unique characteristics of the money rate in an 
uncertain world affect the equilibrium values of all rates of return, 
money has "real" effects. "It is not surprising that the volume of 
investment, thus determined, should fluctuate widely from time to time. 
For it depends on two sets of judgments about the future, neither of 
which rests on an adequate or secure foundation—on the propensity to 
hoard and on opinions of the future yield of capital assets" (p. 118). 
The argument is completed by tying this fluctuating flow of Investment to 
the "supply and demand for output as a whole." "The theory can be summed 
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up by saying that, given the psychology of the public, the level of 
output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment" (p. 
121) .  
Finally, in the last paper cited, "Alternative Theories of the Rate 
of Interest" (1937c), Keynes takes issue with a number of interpretations 
of his book. Citing B. Ohlin, R. G. Hawtrey, D. H. Robertson, J. R. 
Hicks and others, he claims that these authors' views of his interest 
rate theory represent 
. . .  a  c o n c e a l e d  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n ,  w h i c h  i s  o f  v e r y  g r e a t  
importance, between myself and a group of economists who represent 
themselves as agreeing with me in abandoning the theory that the 
rate of interest is (in Professor Ohlin's words) "determined by the 
condition that it equalizes the supply of and demand for savings, 
or, in other words, equalizes savings and investment" (1937c, pp. 
201-202). 
The "concealed difference of opinion," it turns out, centers around 
the contention by these authors that the interest rate can be represented 
by a simultaneous solution of a general equilibrium where the supply and 
demand for money is considered the obverse of the supply and demand for 
"credit" or "loans." This seems to be the origin of the Infamous 
loanable funds versus liquidity preference controversy. As opposed to 
the solution generally accepted to that battle (Tsaing, 1966), that the 
two approaches are equal in equilibrium configurations, Keynes is adamant 
that the demand and supply of loans is not the same thing as the demand 
and supply for money. Significantly for us, he bases his claim on the 
own-rates doctrine. Keynes claims that the general equilibrium 
conception where the prices of money and credit are indistinguishable 
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. . .  I s  a l t o g e t h e r  r e m o t e  f r o m  m y  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  
Interest (as we call it for short) is, strictly speaking, a monetary 
phenomenon in the special sense that it is the own rate of interest 
of money itself, i.e. that it equalizes the advantages of holding 
actual cash and a deferred claim on cash (p. 206). 
What Keynes is again driving at in this passage is his crucial 
argument that, in an uncertain world, money is both just another asset 
like any other in that it trades in terms of a marginal efficiency in 
terms of itself, and that money has special characteristics which make it 
an independent factor in the final equilibrium situation. These will be 
the central questions of the own-rates analysis of chapter 17. 
Furthermore, to Keynes, the conception of supply and demand for credit 
used by these authors reduces in the end to saying that the rate of 
interest equilibrates savings and investment. This is the very classical 
notion that Keynes is opposed to and that these authors have said they 
differ with. In Keynes' own system, this conception can make no sense 
since saving and investment are always equal and fluctuate with the level 
of income "whatever interest level exists on the market" (p. 206). 
The rest of this article leads off into a discussion of the "finance 
motive" for holding cash which is an interesting topic in itself, but 
strays from our central concern (see Asimakopulos, 1983; Snippe, 1985). 
To conclude our review of Keynes' published reactions to the reception of 
his General Theory in 1936, it is sufficient to reiterate that his 
central concern was that his interest rate theory was being misunder­
stood; that the key to his approach lay in the role of money as a unique 
asset in an uncertain world. By Keynes' account, the role of the 
Interest rate is that of a "monetary phenomenon" with "real" effects. 
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Our analysis of the own-rates theory will more fully explain Keynes' 
unique position on monetary matters. But before we get to the own-rates, 
it will be instructive to look at the description Keynes' interest rate 
theory has received in the postwar literature. 
The above account of Keynes' views on monetary theory is clearly not 
the usual view of the meaning of the liquidity preference theory of 
interest. It is surely a far cry from the interest rate theory embodied 
in the standard "IS-LM" (Hydraulic) Keynesian model. In this static 
world, the richness of Keynes' vision is reduced to an elasticity 
property of a narrowly defined money demand function, which equilibrates 
the demand for a given stock of money with a flow of aggregate 
investment. In the IS-LM world, the money interest rate can hardly be 
"wrong"; it is just one determining factor of the composition of output 
between investment and consumption goods. Any alteration of the "supply 
of output as a whole," to use Keynes' term, is wholly dependent upon some 
rigidity in the interdependent Walrasian system. To the extent that 
Keynesians admitted the improbability of the liquidity trap, the whole 
weight of involuntary unemployment in this model came to rest upon an ad 
hoc rigid money-wage (Weintraub, 1979, pp. 66-67). 
Monetary specialists, recognizing the importance Keynes attached to 
his monetary theory, also developed a large literature trying to fit his 
views on these topics into the static framework of the neoclassical 
synthesis. As R. W. Glower Indicates, much of postwar monetary theory 
has been devoted to understanding just exactly how we are to interpret 
this vision that Keynes claimed was a revolutionary new way to look at a 
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monetary economy: 
Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money is, 
par excellence, a theory of the actual working of a money economy. 
Unfortunately, Keynes expressed his Ideas In language and relations 
that too easily lend themselves to Interpretation within the formal 
framework of neo-classical equilibrium analysis. Partly for this 
reason, partly because the actual working of a monetary economy Is 
inherently difficult to portray analytically, economic theorists are 
still arguing about the precise nature of the so-called Keyneslan 
revolution or, as some would put it, the precise difference between 
a money and a barter economy. There is a vast literature on this 
subject, most of it having some bearing on monetary theory. . . " 
(Glower, 1969, p. 213). 
In these more specialized Keyneslan explanations of the "liquidity 
preference theory of the rate of interest" (Tobin, 1958), the role of 
money is not much closer to Keynes' vision than the IS-LM framework. In 
the standard portfolio approach explanation, money demand is tied to a 
preference for a riskless asset that yields no return to balance out the 
risk associated with more profitable investments. Tobin ingeniously 
expanded this simple idea of portfolio selection behavior into an Inverse 
relationship between the rate of return on risky assets and the demand 
for riskless money to offset the total risk to the risk averse investor. 
But from the standpoint of Keynes' own concerns, an important 
element is left out of this story. Most importantly, the uncertain world 
that Keynes described (1936, p. 168) as the basis of interest on money is 
translated in Tobin's world into one of calculable risk described by a 
known probability distribution. In fact, the proper shape of the utility 
surfaces that give rise to Tobin's liquidity preference depends 
critically on some very restrictive descriptions of the asset selection 
decision. Either the utility functions must take on a very specific 
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functional form, or the outcomes of the different Investment decisions 
must be normally distributed. As Paul Davidson (1972, p. 207) points out 
in a critique of this view of liquidity preference: 
True uncertainty has an essential characteristic which violates the 
mathematical laws of probability, namely that there is doubt or 
disbelief about any possible outcome and therefore, uncertainty 
about some possible alternative outcomes cannot be reduced to a _ 
quantitative fraction whose magnitude is between zero and unity. 
Having seen Keynes' own view of his departure from orthodox interest 
rate theory, we are led to ask what became of uncertainty, expectations 
and conventional judgments in the Keyneslan version of liquidity 
preference theory. Abstracting from uncertainty as he described It, 
Keynes asked, "Why should anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use 
money as a store of wealth?" (1937b, p. 116). Perhaps he should have 
asked, "Outside of a lunatic asylum or a Benthamite world of calculable 
uncertainty." Noting the narrowness of the framework Into which Keynes' 
views were squeezed by neoclassical monetary theory, we should not be 
surprised that the protracted Keynesian-Monetarlst debate should have 
been so Inconclusive and sterile of further avenues of monetary Insights. 
If we take Keynes* own view of his differences with the classical theory 
seriously, both the Keyneslans and the Monetarists, In ignoring the 
uncertain basis that Keynes made conditional for his view of monetary 
theory, were arguing over a small elasticity property of the same 
classical model. 
As for historical work proper, it has been a major occupation of 
many Keynes scholars to try to explain his monetary and interest rate 
theory as something different from an assumed functional form of a money 
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demand equation as it came to be defined in the Keynesian-Monetarist 
debate. A number of scholars have focused on the monetary aspects of 
Keynes' work as the embodiment of its revolutionary character. Prominent 
in this branch of Keynes' scholarship are Paul Davidson, G. L. S. Shackle 
and Axel Leijonhufvud. 
In the classificatory scheme of interpretations of Keynes put 
forward by Alan Coddington in "Keynesian Economics: the Search for First 
Principles" (1983), Leijonhufvud is classified along with R. W. Glower as 
major proponents of the view he calls "Reconstituted Reductionism." By 
this label, Goddington refers to the position that Keynes' theoretical 
contribution falls outside the realm of Walrasian tâtonnement equilibrium 
states. In this view, following out the "Economics of Keynes" requires a 
reworking of the traditional choice-theoretic microfoundations of general 
equilibrium theory to explain unemployment "disequilibriums." Glowers' 
(1965) famous distinction between "notional" demands appropriate to a 
Walrasian situation and "effective" demands that can be constrained by 
the imbalances of an unemployment disequilibrium were the original 
attempt to provide these microfoundations. Following Glower (1965) and 
Barro and Grossman (1971), this conception has led to an enormous 
literature on complicated general disequilibrium models that identify 
themselves as Keynesian by virtue of their exhibiting unemployment 
states. (Though, note they are unemployment disequilibrium states, not 
unemployment equilibriums. See Weintraub (1979) and Gasson (1981) for a 
survey of these models.) 
The other strand of the reconstituted reductionist program is the 
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concern with the economic costs and uses of information, and the impact 
of differential information on individual choices, especially in the 
labor market. By the reasoning of this literature, unemployment can be 
explained by rational decisions on the part of employees to value each 
marginal loss from time spent without a job against the expected marginal 
gain of looking further for a better job. All unemployment thus becomes 
voluntary to some extent and reflects the rational behavior of agents 
optimally using the information they can acquire (Alchian, 1970). 
The central organizing theme of reconstituted reductlonism is its 
rejection of the tâtonnement process by which Walrasian equilibriums are 
established. When this admittedly Inadequate (see Essay 1) view of the 
process of "getting into equilibrium" is rejected, it becomes necessary 
to search for some other way of describing how individual economic plans 
come into macroeconomic coordination with each other. As Coddington's 
term "reductionist" implies, the major focus of the Leijonhufvud view of 
macroeconomics concerns the individual rolcroeconomlc foundations of this 
coordinating activity. Unemployment, on this view, is by definition a 
disequilibrium divergence from the full coordination Implied by the 
Walrasian tâtonnement process. In keeping with this theme, money serves 
as a link between individual plans, which by interfacing all transactions 
(Glower's famous "goods trade against money, not against other goods") 
can allow economic actors to postpone transactions—usually to gain more 
information. Thus, because of the availability of liquid holdings, there 
can arise discoordination (read disequilibrium in Walrasian terms), both 
Intersectorally and intertemporally. Thus, discoordlnation of the 
.di. 
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various individual plans that make up the system is the essence of the 
unemployment states reductionists are interested in: 
The novel theoretical idea in Keynes's work that was lost sight of 
in all of this was different* To appreciate—and to appreciate how 
difficult it is to do it justice within the framework of equilibrium 
models—one has to envisage the possibility of coordination of 
"desired" transactor activities in a system failing because 
communication between them falls to convey the needed information 
(Leljonhufvud, 1981, p. 332). 
As we mentioned earlier, there is a strong link between this 
disequilibrium outlook on modern macroeconomic concerns and a compatible 
historical Interpretation of Keynes' own work. For the UCLA School, the 
historical basis of Its modern theoretical outlook is the influential 
work of Axel Leljonhufvud (1968, 1981). In broad outlines, 
Leljonhufvud's "Economics of Keynes" follows the pattern of reconstituted 
reductlonlsm just touched upon. It frames Keynes' contribution as 
providing an alternative vision of the coordination (or discoordination) 
of economic activity. Strongly Influenced by Robert Glower, Leljonhufvud 
(1968, pp. vli-vill; 1981, p. vli) brings the preconceptions of the 
reductionist program to his historical work on Keynes. It is the 
position of this essay that these preconceptions led Leijonhuvud's 
"Economics of Keynes" away from Keynes' own concerns, especially with 
regard to his theory of the interest. In particular, we will argue that 
by starting from a basically Austrian vision of the economic process, the 
reductionist view Is led inexorably to abandon Keynes' liquidity 
preference theory of Interest, since that theory was founded upon a^ 
critique of the Austrian monetary approach. If our contention that 
Keynes' views on Interest and money are integral to understanding his 
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whole system Is correct, then this abandonment is substantially an 
abandonment of Keynes' economics. And our further and more important 
point is that these views are valuable in themselves in understanding the 
role of money and interest. 
Leijonhufvud's work goes a long way toward refocusing discussion of 
Keynes away from the mechanical "hydraulicism" of the IS-LM model and 
back toward some of the issues that Keynes actually dealt with. Yet, his 
interpretation of Keynes is led astray by its attempt to reinterpret 
Keynes within an Austrian vision of the economic process. By Austrian 
vision is meant the combination of concerns that mark the whole 
reductionist program: attention away from aggregative analysis toward 
individual decision making, the emphasis on the information aspects of 
the price system and the consequent methodological preference for 
individualist, disequilibrium process analysis over the specification of 
equilibrium states (Kirzner, 1973, ch. 1; O'Driscoll, 1977, ch. 2). 
The fact that Leijonhufvud's preconceptions about economic theory 
are substantially an Austrian view is not hard to establish, nor should 
it be controversial in and of itself. In his original study of Keynes 
(Leijonhufvud, 1968, pp. 70, 271, 376), he clearly footnotes his view of 
the coordination problem of transmitting economic information to the 
pioneering work in this area of the premier Austrian theorist of this 
century, F. A. Hayek. Moreover, he ends that study of Keynes with a 
methodological discussion of his "fresh view" of macroeconomics in which 
he intends to "indicate the theoretical direction in which I feel the 
General Theory pointed, and the promise which the Keynesian tradition has 
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not fulfilled" (p. 389). In this context, he candidly admits his 
Interest In the Austrian approach in taking the "first step" beyond (by 
his interpretation) Keynes* abandonment of the sterile equilibrium 
framework: 
But even for such a first step, the prescription cannot be to "go 
back to Keynes*" If one must retrace some steps of past 
developments in order to get on the right track—and that is 
probably advisable—my own preference is to go back to Hayek 
(Leljonhufvud, 1968, p. 401). 
Not surprisingly, then, Leljonhufvud's more recent work has led him 
to elaborate a position on interest rates and the business cycle that is 
grounded in the Austrlan-Wicksellian conception of the "natural rate" 
doctrine. In his "The Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme" 
(1981, pp. 131-202), we get a clear view of the fact that following out 
the Austrian theory of the business-cycle Inevitably leads to an 
abandonment of Keynes' views on money and interest. And, as we noted, to 
the extent that these monetary views are an essential part of Keynes' 
vision, this Involves an abandonment of Keynes' own message and so 
reveals the false moorings of the "Reconstituted Reductionist" 
interpretation of Keynes. The full working out of this tension will be 
implicit in our whole discussion of the own-rates theory of interest. 
Likewise, the more vital question of the intrinsic value of Keynes' views 
will necessarily have to wait until we have delved more deeply into them. 
At this point, I merely want to illustrate that the reductionist view 
involves the rejection of liquidity preference theory. 
Leljonhufvud makes this rejection clear in his attempt to show that 
any significant advance in macroeconomics must stem from a view of Keynes 
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within the Wlcksellian framework of business cycle theory. Starting from 
the premise that "the theory of the interest rate is the center of the 
confusion in modern macroeconomics" (1981, p. 131), he laments the loss 
of Wicksell's insights into this subject. These insights are identified 
as stemming from "the discrepancy between the market rate and the natural 
rate." The loss of this insight is attributed to none other than Keynes; 
What happened, essentially, was that Keynes so obfuscated the 
interest rate mechanism that the later Keynesian literature almost 
entirely lost track of Wicksell's theme (p. 134). 
As a method of recapturing Wicksell's insight into monetary theory, 
Leijonhufvud proposes a hybrid of Keynes and Wlcksell which he dubs the 
theory." This "analytical interpolation between the Treatise and the 
General Theory" is described "either as 'the Treatise plus quantity-
adjustments' or as 'the General Theory minus the Liquidity Preference 
theory of interest'" (p. 134). In either case, the crucial thing is to 
abandon Keynes' most developed views on interest and money: 
It is my own position that Z-theory incorporates all of Keynes' 
contribution that should be preserved and developed; that the LP 
hypothesis should have been rejected from the start; and that, 
failing this, propositions derivative from it ought systematically, 
if belatedly, to be rooted out of modern macroeconomics. 
Thus, Leijonhufvud calls for rejecting all of the themes Keynes 
himself stressed in his post-General Theory defense of his views, and he 
does so to advance Keynesian ideas! It is notable in this connection 
that the reductionist program outlined above had little to say about 
money, uncertainty, expectations or interest rate theory. In fact, since 
the reductionists start their Investigation from a benchmark "full 
3 information economy" (Leijonhufvud, 1981, pp. 136-140), against which 
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the "disequilibrium" unemployment states are defined, It can be argued 
that they are still trapped within the confines of the orthodoxy that 
Keynes was trying to break out of. There Is a necessary corollary here 
between the use of "Information" by the reductionists and "uncertainty" 
by Keynes on the one hand, and Wlcksellian Interest rate theory and the 
liquidity preference theory on the other. When the future is uncertain, 
in Keynes' sense of unknowable, no amount of Information, no matter how 
well used, can reduce the condition. This distinction becomes especially 
crucial in the context of Interest rate theory since, as we have seen, 
the foundation of Keynes' views on liquidity preference is the existence 
of such uncertainty. Sidney Welntraub (1982) makes just this point in a 
review of Leljonhufvud (1981) where he asks: 
Does AL [Leljonhufvud] mean "information" on present or current 
moment opportunities, or future "opportunities"? The present, as an 
Instant of time, can never be very important in anything but the 
most static analysis. It must be future moments, adding up to a 
stretch of future time. How then talk of "information failures" 
when the vital data are unobtainable, or impossible to ascertain, 
until the tomorrows become yesterdays? Surely there is no 
possibility of "coordinating information" on events that are 
unknowable because they have not happened. Even an omniscient 
auctioneer, who knew all the yesterdays, would have to possess the 
added quality of a seer to know the tomorrows (1982, p. 421). 
To see the importance of this distinction for the choice of 
macroeconomlc method, recall that, for the reductionists, unemployment 
reflects discoordination of individual plans (which include those of 
saving and investing especially). These maladjustments are conceived of 
as the consequence of rational optimizing by individuals in response to 
available information. Since this information may be wrong (because of 
bank authority distortions, say) or incomplete (because it is too 
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costly), such optimizing generates deviations from the putative "full 
information" equilibrium. Thus, a system where the cause of fluctuations 
in activity is looked for in intertemporal "information failures" (as in 
the Wickselllan-Austrian tradition of Mises, 1953; Hayek, 1931; 1941; and 
O'Driscoll, 1977) must rely on the interest rate to provide the (wrong) 
signals to savers and investors so that their intertemporal plans become 
discoordinated In the first place. As we saw in Keynes' discussion of 
his interpreters (1937b), he was adamant that his interest rate theory 
could not be interpreted as bringing savings and Investment into 
equilibrium, which are always equal by definition anyway and which move 
with the level of income. Consequently, it Is not surprising that an 
Austrian interpretation of Keynes would eventually run head-on into his 
views on interest and money. Such a collision is exactly what we see in 
Leljonhufvud's interpretation of Keynes. 
Whether the avenue of advance for macroeconomics is best started 
from Keynes' own monetary concerns or Hayek's natural rate tradition is 
an issue that awaits us. What is clearer is that to use Austrian glasses 
to view Keynes' theoretical contribution (especially his monetary views) 
must lead to a distorted view of his meaning. For the ultimate 
development of Keynes' broadest view of monetary theory, that 
incorporated in his chapter 17 discussion of "The Essential Properties of 
Interest and Money," stems explicitly from a dissent from the then 
conventional "natural-rate" idea that dominates the Austrian tradition. 
It will be one of our central concerns to trace the development of that 
dissenting view from Sraffa's critique In 1932 through the General 
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Theory. But before we leave the contemporary literature, it is necessary 
to emphasize that there Is another modern school of thought which traces 
itself to Keynes that is much more concerned with his views on money and 
interest, viz., the self-proclaimed Post Keynesian economists such as 
Davidson, Shackle and Minsky. 
Coddington refers to the Post Keynesians as the "Fundamentalists." 
By dubbing them so, he means to highlight their position that Keynes' 
views on uncertainty and money constitute a fundamental "frontal assault 
on the whole reductionist programme." According to this aspect of 
classification, the Post Keynesians join the reductionists in rejecting 
the usefulness of Walrasian equilibriums to address Keynes' concerns. 
But the fundamentalists see this rejection not as a call to reformulate 
the microfoundations of the Walrasian conception, but as a call to 
abandon choice theory (as traditionally defined) altogether. 
As against the clearly specified and stable objectives and 
constraints required by reductionist theorizing, Keynes emphasizes 
the basis of choice in vague, uncertain and shifting expectations of 
future events and circumstances. . . . Keynes focused on the 
conventional element in valuation: the way in which valuations may 
persist to the extent that they are shared, and are thereby rendered 
sustainable in the face of minor events and changes in 
circumstances, but also vulnerable to anything that threatens this 
conventional basis (Coddington, 1983, p. 95). 
These concerns are clearly derived from Keynes' own discussion of 
his monetary theory that we surveyed above. The Post Keynesians have 
been adamant in their belief that the Keynesian themes of uncertainty, 
expectations and the social role of money are so fundamentally opposed to 
the orthodox method of grounding economic behavior in deterministic 
individual choice that a whole new approach to theory is called for. For 
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the most part, this has led to an explicit rejection on their part of 
equilibrium analysis altogether, as being incompatible with their 
emphasis on the influences of real time (versus "logical time") and 
history in any particular economic configuration (Robinson, 1953-54; 
1981; Shackle, 1972). By this distinction, the Post Keynesians separate 
their concerns with the way time, in the sense of expectations of the 
future, is wholly different from the time of economic equilibriums where 
the long and short runs are analytically (logically) defined. Jan Kregel 
(1973, pp. 31-32), a prominent Post Keynesian scholar, clearly explains 
the Importance of the distinction: 
The specification of the equilibrium in the neoclassical framework 
is broadly similar to that found in the natural sciences. The proof 
is carried out by showing that equilibrium exists. The economic 
application then goes on to show that at any point outside of the 
equilibrium position there are forces that exist to drive the system 
back to equilibrium. This says nothing about how the system gets to 
equilibrium in the first place, but proves that such a position 
exists and that any state of existence outside equilibrium Is 
illogical. . . . Thus the neoclassical belief that the system, left 
alone for a sufficient period of time, will naturally attain the 
position of equilibrium at full employment. . . . Equilibrium is 
the only logically admissable position, historical time is not 
allowed to exist. 
It can hardly be denied that the strict formalism of naive 
equilibrium theory leads to a neglect of the historical and social 
particulars of the situation. (We discussed this in detail in essay I.) 
The problem arises when, having recognized this sterility, we look for a 
way out. In the past, such attempts have been made by the specialized 
studies of the German Historical School, the evolutionary approach of the 
American Institutionalists, and today by both the Post Keynesians and the 
neo-Austrian schools. The floundering of those past attempts, though. 
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has always Involved the lack of a ready framework of analysis by which a 
tradition and body of scholarship could be easily passed on and 
incrementally advanced. When Thorsteln Veblen turned his genius to 
Institutional studies, the results were dazzling. Yet, with slight 
exceptions, his approach has rarely been carried forward with the same 
success by his followers. One explanation that goes a long way toward 
understanding of the peculiar staying power of the basic framework of 
neoclassical analysis, Is that Its strong foundation of Individual choice 
theory Is an Infinitely applicable analytical engine. In the face of 
numerous attacks on both Its base and superstructure (for outdated 
preconceptions. Ideological apologlsm, and empirical Irrelevance), the 
economics of mlcrofounded equilibriums marches on. Now, to a lot (most?) 
of practitioners, this Is a sign that the framework holds water, even If 
It needs to be stretched In certain places . This Is surely the reasoning 
behind the remarks, quoted above, from the New Classical Economists to 
the effect that the Keyneslan detour Is a dead end best forgotten. 
Yet, some of us are left wondering. If the Implications of an 
uncertain future are plausibly enough confirmed by our experience that a 
rational expectation seems quite ridiculous; If the elements of social 
psychology and conventional judgment that we observe dally In the 
financial news are logically excluded by a reductionist framework; and, 
most Importantly, if we feel certain that the state of unemployment and 
not full employment Is the normal case, the exception to which needs to 
be demonstrated, not vice versa, then should not some alternative to the 
orthodox framework be in order? 
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It is precisely these issues which the Post Keynesians, building on 
Keynes, draw our attention to. But, as we argued earlier, the extent to 
which they have been heard or used seems to rest almost exclusively on 
the language in which the argument is made. Harrod's statement about 
Keynes' fundamental points being buried in the backlash from his critical 
polemics has been partly vindicated by events. It has only been when 
unemployment is viewed as a deviation from an otherwise smoothly 
operating classical system that theory has recognized the reality of 
unemployment. In the face of such an all-engulfing theoretical 
cooptation, Keynesians have naturally sought other less consuming 
theoretical frameworks (disequilibrium, historical, etc.). Yet, in doing 
so, they have suffered the same fate that the institutionalists, the 
economic historians and other assorted sub-disciplines have. Their 
interests have been recognized, circumscribed, and declared to fall 
outside of the realm of equilibrium theory proper. Thus, safely 
inoculated against each new attack, the core of choice theory can go on 
its own separate way. The surest sign of this lack of receptivity by the 
mainstream of the profession is the establishment of a separate journal 
to air the subdiscipline's work and view. In the case of the Post 
Keynesians, we have had this situation since 1978. 
Consequent to this theoretical isolation, it seems reasonable to try 
to recast the unique perspective Keynes held on matters of money and 
interest in a more digestible form. The task is to set up some type of 
"equilibrium" or centering device that does not, by its very nature, 
exclude the role of historical time and uncertainty on the economic 
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configuration. This very goal seems to be implied by the latest 
controversies in Cambridge economic theory (Milgate, 1982; Eatwell and 
Mllgate, 1983; Kregel, 1985) which have centered on the choice of an 
alternative framework to the Walraslan general equilibrium paradigm. In 
this literature, the views of Garegnanl (1976; 1978; 1979) and Milgate 
(1982) represent the attempt to ground economic theory in the long period 
value theory of the classical economists, along the lines of the 
classical revival laid down by Sraffa (I960). Starting from the belief 
that the capital theory controversies of the last decades (Harcourt, 
1972) have discredited neoclassical theory, the Cambridge school is 
attempting to "go back to (one view of) the Classlcals" for an untainted 
framework. An Important element of this work concerns the way that 
Keynes fits into such a picture. To Milgate and Garegnanl, the task is 
to strip Keynes of his marglnallst methods and graft the residual 
aggregate demand analysis onto the Sraffa price system (see Milgate, 
1982). Not wanting to get into the complications this literature 
involves, we wish only to use it to illustrate two points. First, this 
literature explicitly addresses the problem of an alternative equilibrium 
analysis of unemployment theory. For instance, Milgate (1982, p. 8) 
states that "The constructive core of the General Theory is seen to 
consist in the provision of an argument that holds, unlike the orthodox 
marglnallst position, that unemployment arises not through the operation 
of 'temporary phenomena', but rather that it is the outcome of the 
operation of more systematic and permanent forces at work in the system." 
Milgate and Garegnanl have their own idea about the further question of 
93 
how we should pursue this argument. Unfortunately, in purging Keynes of 
his orthodox method, they seem to have lost sight of (indeed, reject), 
his views on interest and money (Milgate, 1982, pp. 102-124). It will be 
our purpose to follow out the first concern with an alternative framework 
for understanding unemployment equilibriums, but to do so by preserving 
the insight of Keynes* monetary views. This is the role the own-rates 
structure of chapter 17 can play in understanding the contemporary 
literature and the historical record. 
We now have in full view the complex of issues which form the 
Gordian Knot that the "own-rates" theory will (hopefully) cut. From the 
strictly historical viewpoint, we have seen that much of the complexity 
and meaning of Keynes' interest rate theory was lost in the development 
of postwar monetary theory. In retrospect, Keynes' own post-General 
Theory defense of this part of his thought provided a foreshadowing of 
its eventual eclipse when his work was forced into the structure of a 
Walrasian general equilibrium setting (remember that Hicks was one of the 
authors he was complaining about in Keynes, 1937c). But the recognition 
of this loss by Keynes scholars starting (at least) with Leijonhufvud's 
famous reinterpretation has not brought these ideas back to the main­
stream of monetary thought. Our investigation of the Keynes scholarship 
literature reveals two facets of this failure. First, the "Austrian-
style" interpretation of Keynes by Leijonhufvud led inexorably to an 
abandonment of Keynes' own monetary theory of the rate of interest. 
Second, the one group of scholars who do explicitly recognize and 
cultivate Keynes' views on money, uncertainty and interest, the Post 
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Keyneslans, at the same time abandon any type of equilibrium theory at 
all, as being Inadequate to the task of capturing the manifold influences 
on the liquidity preferences of the public* This extreme stand has made 
for an uncomprehending reception of Post Keyneslan ideas by an 
analytically-minded economics profession. 
The knife that could cut such a knot must then be one that finely 
balances all of these influences. It must embody Keynes* own concerns 
that uncertainty and the special character of money are essential to 
understanding the interest rate. It must clearly provide an alternative 
to the formidable body of theory that ascribes to the interest rate the 
role of equating the supply and demand for loanable funds (i.e., saving 
and investment). And it must do all of this by appeal to a method that 
channels the complicated influences of social convention, investor 
psychology and history into the centering framework of an equilibrium 
analysis. It will be our purpose for the rest of this essay to show that 
the own-rates doctrine can simultaneously cut each of these strands in 
our very formidable knot. 
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IV. SRAFFA: OWN-RATES IN k NONMONETARY ECONOMY 
. . Mr. Piero Sraffa, from whom nothing Is hid" (Keynes, 1972 
(1933), p. 97). 
The central piece of evidence In support of the theme that the "own-
rates" theory of Interest represents both a substantial critique of the 
Wlckselllan "natural-rate" doctrine, and also the foundation of a new ap­
proach to the place of money In economic theory Is an obscure twelve-page 
review of Hayek's Prices and Production by Plero Sraffa In the Economic 
Journal for 1932. The place of this review In our theme Is but a part of 
its larger historical setting in the development of Interwar business 
cycle theory in general, and the transition of ideas in Cambridge econom­
ics from the Treatise on Money to the General Theory in particular. 
Sraffa's review represents a confluence of both of these Intellectual 
tides by bringing to bear the latest (as of 1932) thinking of the theo­
retical debates of the "Cambridge Circus" on the system of thought pro­
pounded by Keynes' greatest rival to preeminence in business cycle theory 
at the time, F. A. von Hayek. That Sraffa's role in this whole debate 
should be so obscure yet (as we shall see) so powerful is further testa­
ment to the mysterlousness of his legendary academic career as a maleutlc 
gadfly. The fascinating question of the role Sraffa might have played in 
the transition in Keynes' thinking at this crucial period and his neglect 
as a member of the Circus is a topic too far afield from our central con­
cern. Hopefully, the eventual publication of Sraffa's papers, now under­
way, will shed some light on this. Whatever these may reveal, the own-
rates theory is sure to figure largely in Sraffa's theoretical legacy. 
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More Important to the present stage of the argument is to briefly 
touch upon the bare outlines of Hayek's version of the Austrian branch of 
Wicksellian "natural-rate" doctrine that Sraffa's Insightful criticisms 
stem from. Hayek's Prices and Production (1935)^ consists of a series of 
four lectures he gave at the London School of Economics in 1930. They 
were intended to outline the "Austrian" approach to the explanation of 
business cycles associated with the theories of Wlcksell (1935) and Mises 
(1953).^ Hayek's approach was a blend of the Austrian capital theory of 
Bohm-Bawerk, the short run quantity theory effects of the early British 
monetary theorists and the relative-price and Interest rate theory of 
Wlcksell. From a general standpoint, Hayek proposed to integrate the 
theory of relative prices with that of monetary theory. To this end, he 
focused attention away from the average (price level) effects of 
"monetary" disturbances toward the relative price effects (1935, pp. 28, 
29). He was adamant in his rejection of the whole idea of an aggregate 
price level, much less its role as the focus of monetary theory; i.e., as 
in the traditional quantity theory approach. 
Correspondingly, his explanation of business cycles centered on the 
effect of monetary policy on relative prices of capital and consumption 
goods. Here is the centrality of the Wicksellian natural-rate doctrine 
to his argument. In the Wicksellian scheme, the natural rate was the 
rate which equalized "the supply and demand for real capital" and if the 
bank rate (or actual rate) differed from this, the result was a 
divergence of "voluntary" saving and investments. It was the Interest 
rate as an Intertemporal price ratio between current (consumption) 
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production and future (capitalistic) production that signaled the 
Investors to over-invest and thus create "forced savings." Crises and 
cycles, then, resulted from the inevitable destruction of capital that 
followed such a misdirection of production by bank-influenced prices. 
Where Hayek followed Wlcksell was in his focus on the natural rate 
(he used the term "equilibrium rate") as the rate which would equalize 
voluntary saving and investment as they would occur in a "nonmonetary" 
barter economy. The effect of monetary Influences, in this scheme, 
operating as an intermediary between these two voluntary Intertemporal 
decisions, was based on the banking system's ability to cause the money 
rate to diverge from this natural rate and thus misdirect production 
towards a more capital intensive mix (in Austrian parlance a "lengthening 
of the average period of production"). 
Where Hayek differed with Wlcksell was over the role which the 
"natural rate" could serve as a guide to policy in an expanding economy. 
As an early Cambridge student of these interest rate theories puts it, 
there were 
. . . four tests which Wlcksell gave for his "natural" rate: viz., 
(i) stabilization of the general price-level; (11) equalization of 
current savings and Investments; (ill) the Identity of the "natural" 
rate with the non-monetary barter rate; and (Iv) its identity, 
again, with the prospective yield on future real capital (Adarkar, 
1935, pp. 30-31). 
Of these four results of an actual rate being set equal to the 
natural rate (for Hayek by a "neutral" money policy of controlling the 
money supply), Hayek found a contradiction between (i) and the rest. In 
other words, he argued that while setting the natural rate equal to the 
^.. 
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money rate would give expression to the voluntary decisions captured In 
(11) through (Iv), it could not at the same time keep the price level 
constant In an expanding economy: 
Nevertheless, It Is perfectly clear that, In order that the 
supply and demand for real capital should be equalized, the banks 
must not lend more or less than has been deposited with them as 
savings. . . . And this means naturally that . . . they must never 
allow the effective amount of money In circulation to change* At 
the same time, It Is no less clear that, In order that the price 
level may remain unchanged, the amount of money In circulation must 
change as the volume of production Increases or decreases. The 
banks could either keep the demand for real capital within the 
limits set by the supply of savings, jor keep the price level steady; 
but they cannot perform both functions at once (Hayek, 1935, p* 27). 
Thus, Hayek stakes out his question. Since he views the goal of a 
"neutral" monetary policy (i.e., one that allows for the full expression 
of voluntary decisions over saving and Investment) as a proper one, since 
giving full vent to individual decisions requires setting the money-rate 
equal to the natural rate, and since this policy is incompatible with 
attention to the general price level; then Hayek believes we must abandon 
any such fuzzy aggregative concepts as the price level and focus our 
attention on the relative price effects of a monetary policy: 
But it seems obvious as soon as one once begins to think about it 
that almost any change in the amount of money, whether it does 
Influence the price level or not, must always Influence relative 
prices. And as there can be no doubt that It is relative prices 
which determine the amount and direction of production, almost any 
change in the amount of money must necessarily also influence 
production (Hayek, 1935, p. 28). 
In accordance with this emphasis on relative prices, Hayek saw his 
role as extending the Wickselllan framework to explain how cycles were 
the result of these relative price changes alone. Having set himself 
this goal, the rest of his book (and his other monetary work) was an 
exercise of grinding out the extensive implications of any non-neutral 
policy on the multifarious interactions of an Interrelated equilibrium 
system. Interestingly for us, he described this effort as a 
methodological shift of focus (away from the classical dichotomy) that 
was substantially similar in intent with Keynes' own concerns at the 
time: 
. . .  I  a m  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e ,  m o n e t a r y  t h e o r y  
will not only reject the explanation in terms of a direct relation 
between money and the price level, but will even throw overboard the 
concept of a general price level and substitute for it 
investigations into the causes of the changes of relative prices and 
their effects on production (Hayek, 1935, p. 29). 
Keynes was calling at the same time for an integration of value theory 
with monetary theory. In a volume to which both Hayek and Keynes made 
contributions in this period, Keynes staked out his view of the future of 
business cycle theory in the form of what he described as a "monetary 
theory of production." For him, this meant a theory "in which money 
plays a role of its own and effects motives and decisions, and is in 
short one of the operative factors in the situation" (Keynes, 1933, p. 
408). 
But the emphasis on the integration of value theory and monetary 
theory is as far as the similarity between the research programs of the 
Austrian School and the Cambridge School of the 1930s can be pushed. 
From this common juncture, they diverge over the crucial questions of 
what distinguishes a monetary economy from a barter one, what is the 
fundamental nature of interest rates, and what is the peculiar influence 
of money* The Austrian approach, represented in this period by Hayek, 
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focused on abandoning "the superfluity of the concept of a general value 
of money" In order to concentrate on the Intertemporal relationship of 
relative prices over time (Hayek, 1935, pp. 29-30). This Is the 
theoretical counterpart to Hayek's Insistent emphasis on the policy 
stance of a "neutral" money policy; 
The problem Is never to explain any "general value" of money 
but only how and when money Influences the relative values of goods 
and under what conditions It leaves these relative values 
undisturbed, or to use a happy phrase of Wlcksell, when money 
remains neutral relatively to goods (p. 31). 
The Cambridge approach, as we will try to show. Is based on an 
attempt to trace out the monetary Influences on the "real" factors of 
production through a conception of "the general value of money." In 
Keynes' work, the general value of money will become the "own-rate" on 
money and Its peculiar effects on real production will both define his 
stance toward the monetary/barter distinction and towards the essential 
properties of money and Interest. But In order to work out this 
Integrated view of monetary and value theory, the Cambridge school had 
first to break with the Wlcksellian conception of these matters. This is 
the theoretical juncture at which Sraffa's review of Hayek comes in. It 
breaks with the whole theoretical foundation on which Wlcksell's "happy 
phrase" was built and looks forward to the "monetary theory of 
production" with which Keynes would replace Wlcksell. 
Sraffa's review begins with a general methodological criticism of 
Hayek's approach to monetary theory which clearly defines both his and 
Keynes' own approach. His criticism revolves around the conception, 
common to the whole Wlcksellian tradition we have described, that in 
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order to Investigate the properties of, and policies toward, monetary 
influences on production, one should begin with a hypothetical "barter" 
state and compare this ("natural," "real" etc.) system with an actual 
money system. As Sraffa indicates, the error of this method arises from 
the tendency to take the "real" barter state as the "natural" condition 
of equilibrium and to consider any deviation from this state as 
"distortions" caused by the "artificial" interference of the banks. In 
Hayek's case, this tendency shows up as a polemic for a predetermined 
policy conclusion: 
The starting-point and the object of Dr. Hayek's inquiry is what he 
calls "neutral money"; that is to say, a kind of money which leaves 
production and the relative prices of goods, including the rate of 
interest, "undisturbed," exactly as they would be if there were no 
money at all (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 42). 
For Sraffa, Hayek falters from the start by making a state which is 
exactly as if "there were no money at all" the object of his inquiry into 
monetary theory and policy. His objections center on two heads* First, 
such a method could only serve as a policy inquiry into money if it took 
as its starting point various real monetary economies and then compared 
the results of disturbances to this system with the results in the 
nonmonetary economy. "This would bring out which are the essential 
characteristics common to every kind of money, as well as their 
differences, thus supplying the elements for the merits of alternative 
policies" (p. 43). Sraffa claims that Hayek Ignores this point in his 
single-minded pursuit of "the wholly different problem of proving that 
only one particular banking policy (that which maintains constant under 
all circumstances the quantity of money multiplied by its velocity of 
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circulation) succeeds in giving full effect to the 'voluntary decisions 
of individuals'. . (p. 43). 
But Sraffa has a further objection to the use of a barter state as 
the starting point of theoretical monetary analysis. He claims that by 
reducing a monetary system to a hypothetical barter state, the analysis 
ignores those very functions of money that define the problems of a 
monetary economy: 
The differences between a monetary and a non-monetary economy 
can only be found in those characteristics which are set forth at 
the beginning of every text-book on money. That is to say, that 
money is not only the medium of exchange, but also a store of value 
and the standard in terms of which debts, and all other legal 
obligations, habits, opinions, conventions, in short all kinds of 
relations between men, are more or less rigidly fixed (p. 43). 
Since Hayek's starting point of a hypothetical "neutral" barter 
state considers only money which is "used purely and simply as a medium 
of exchange," his inquiry can easily ignore the "most obvious" effects 
that a monetary policy will have in a real money economy, where 
when the price of one or more commodities changes, these relations 
[described above] change in terms of such commodities; while if they 
had been fixed in commodities, in some specified way, they would 
have changed differently, or not at all (pp. 43-44). 
Thus, by confining him to his hypothetical world, Hayek's method "amounts 
to assuming away the very object of the inquiry." 
In essence, the problem is that while Imagining a system in which 
there is no money deprives us of our practical foundation in knowledge of 
a money economy, the opposite method of defining a money economy which we 
understand and then removing various aspects of money to define its 
"moneyness" builds on the concrete, not the speculative. This attitude 
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Is a common thread of the Marshalllan tradition to which Keynes (and 
Sraffa?) and the later Cambridge school are heirs. It differs radically 
from the Austrian subjectivist lineage of Hayek. It was not in 
Marshall's nature to make heroic leaps from hypothetical "barter 
economies" to modern monetary policy conclusions.^ But at least for the 
Bohm-Bawerkian line of Âustrians, the starting point of economic theory 
was an intricately worked out system of subjective states of mind. In 
this sense, Keynes' whole revolution consisted of a more thorough-going 
Marshallianisro than Marshall himself, taking as his starting point the 
given state of unemployment and trying to theoretically explain it. Even 
today, the converse case of taking the state of full employment as the 
starting point of analysis and looking for deviations from this benchmark 
to explain unemployment remains the standard procedure among both 
Austrian and neoclassical economists. What Sraffa was pointing out in 
1932 was that the burden of efficacy for such a position must rest beyond 
observation, which the Cantabridgians could always fall back on. 
Given this methodological critique at the beginning of Sraffa's 
review, the rest of it can usefully be viewed as an application of what 
we have described as the "Cambridge" method to the same problems Hayek is 
interested in investigating. Two of these, in particular, will form the 
basis for Sraffa's idea of own rates of interest. They are the concept 
of intertemporal transactions in the hypothetical moneyless barter state, 
and the notion of a "natural-rate" of interest that equilibrates the flow 
of savings supplied by the public with the demand for investment funds by 
the entrepreneural sector. Explicitly at issue here is the whole 
... 
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Wlckselllan scheme of monetary analysis of which Hayek was a devoted 
follower and also the Issues that will later appear In Keynes' General 
Theory as the "essential properties" of Interest and money. The common 
thread In both treatments Is that "taste for the concrete" as the 
starting place of analysis that is the hallmark of both Sraffa's and 
Keynes' approach, here embodied In the idea of own-rates of Interest. 
Dr. Hayek's theory of the relation of money to the rate of 
interest is mainly given by way of criticism and development of the 
theory of Wlcksell. He states his own position as far as It agrees 
with Wlcksell's as follows: —"In a money economy, the actual or 
money rate of interest may differ from the equilibrium or natural 
rate, because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet 
in their natural form but In the form of money, the quantity of 
which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by 
the banks" (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 49). 
For Sraffa, the conception of the relation between the theory of 
money and the theory of prices (or conversely, the conception of the 
difference between a barter and a monetary economy) Implied by this 
Wlckselllan theme represents the heart of the problem with the "natural-
rate" doctrine: 
An essential confusion, which appears clearly from this 
statement, is the belief that the divergence of rates is a . 
characteristic of a money economy: and the confusion Is implied in 
the very terminology adopted, which identifies the "actual" with the 
"money" rate, and the "equilibrium" with the "natural" rate. If 
money did not exist, and loans were made in terms of all sorts of 
commodities, there might be at any one moment as many "natural" 
rates of interest as there are commodities, though they would not be 
"equilibrium" rates. The "arbitrary" action of the banks is by no 
means a necessary condition for the divergence; if loans were made 
in wheat and farmers (or for that matter the weather) "arbitrarily 
change" the quantity of wheat produced, the actual rate of interest 
on loans in terms of wheat would diverge from the rate on other 
commodities and there would be no single equilibrium rate (1932a, p. 
49). 
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This is a complicated passage full of issues which can only be 
gleaned from the context of the rest of Sraffa's critique. First, it is 
important to note the attention to terminology because Sraffa's use of 
terms is a crucial aspect of his difference with Hayek. Recall that the 
Hayekian analysis revolves around the specification of a barter-like 
"neutral" monetary policy where neutrality is defined as a state which 
leaves "the relative prices of goods, including the rate of interest, 
'undisturbed,' exactly as they would be if there were no money at all" 
(Sraffa, 1932a, p. 42). Further, recall that Hayek defined the rate of 
interest which would achieve this result as the natural or equilibrium 
rate. We will come back in Essay III to the very interesting question of 
whether or not Hayek and Sraffa have two different conceptions of 
"equilibrium" in mind here, but for the purposes of Sraffa's critique the 
term "equilibrium" refers to the Marshallian notion of long-period 
equilibrium where prices equal costs of production and uniform rates of 
return are realized on investments in all industries. 
Utilizing this long-period "equilibrium" conception and taking at 
face value Hayek's argument that the "natural-rate" is indeed the rate 
that would obtain in a barter-like state, Sraffa asks a very obvious 
question: what would loans and interest rates look like if money did not 
exist, and how would they be different from rates of Interest in a money 
economy? His answer: if we were really in a barter state, the only 
meaning that loans, savings, or investment could have would be defined in 
physical terms, money being nonexistent by definition. Thus, "natural" 
rates of interest would be rates defined in "real" or physical terms. 
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The ratio between the amount of a physical commodity today to the amount 
it trades for at some future date would be the physical analog to rates 
of Interest. This is the germ of the conception of own-rates of 
interest. As to how such barter-rates differ from interest rates on 
money, Sraffa only hints that the essential difference is not captured by 
the Wickselllan schema. It will be left to Keynes in 1936 to fully draw 
out the implications of this idea for a monetary economy « Sraffa's role 
is mainly critical. But in these critical "years of high theory" at 
Cambridge, it was "escaping the old ideas" that formed the major hurdle. 
Both Sraffa's question and his answer are ingenious examples of the 
subtle Intellect of the man whom Keynes referred to as "Piero, from whom 
nothing is hid" (Keynes, 1972 (1933), p. 97). It seems to have been 
Sraffa's role to ask fundamental questions about matters that other 
theorists simply took for granted (what is the meaning of a supply 
curve?, what does "quantity of capital" mean?, etc.) and to get simply 
devastating answers ("we don't really know, but let's not admit it"). 
This case is no exception, for it is fair to say that the full import of 
Sraffa's question about the Wickselllan natural rate, though hardly 
recognized then or now, pulls the moorings from beneath the one central 
point around which a generation of business-cycle theorists, each hotly 
contesting the explanation to this central enigma of the time, all seemed 
to agree upon. Leljonhufvud, in an essay that attempts to revive this 
very Wickselllan theme, identifies almost everyone with this central 
idea: 
In the generation following Wlcksell, we find suites on his basic 
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theme composed by the Swedish, by the Austrian, and by the Cambridge 
schools. Before the General Theory, it was the dominant theme in 
monetary and business cycle theory as an imposing parade of names 
will testify: Cassel, Lindahl, Ohlin, and Myrdal; Mises and Hayek; 
Hawtrey, Robertson, and Keynes were among those who put the theme 
squarely in the center of major works of theirs. After the General 
Theory, however, the theme is no longer prominent. It was abandoned 
by monetary economists and left to antiquinarians. So, what 
happened? 
According to our view, Sraffa and Keynes are "what happened." 
Having asked his simple and seemingly Innocent question of the 
Wlcksellian scheme, Sraffa, with his characteristic "taste for the 
concrete," brings us down to cases. He claims that his barter rates are 
not as hard to Imagine as we might think. "In order to realize this, we 
need not stretch our imagination and think of an organized loan market 
amongst savages bartering deer for beavers. Loans are currently made in 
the present world in terms of every commodity for which there is a 
forward market." It is at this point that Sraffa provides a practical 
illustration of the concept of the "natural" or "commodity"-rate which 
measures the intertemporal equivalents, in physical terms, between spot 
and future market transactions. 
When a cotton spinner borrows a sum of money for three months and 
uses the proceeds to purchase spot, a quantity of raw cotton which 
he simultaneously sells three months forward, he is actually 
"borrowing cotton" for that period. The rate of interest which he 
pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the number of bales that can 
be purchased with the following sum of money: the interest on the 
money required to buy spot 100 bales, plus the excess (or minus the 
deficiency) of the spot over the forward price of the 100 bales (p. 
50). 
This simple idea is Sraffa's interpretation of barter rates of 
interest. They are simply Interest rates on a loan defined in terms of 
intertemporal equivalents of the physical unit being loaned. This is 
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what Keynes means by "the marginal efficiencies of a good In terms of 
Itself" (1937a) and "own-rates of Interest" (1936 p. 223). It is Keynes' 
eventual use of the concept that is our main focus, but it will be 
instructive to follow Sraffa a bit further since his use of the concept 
is much more directly concerned with its implication for the Wickselllan 
natural-rate doctrine. 
Armed with a concrete conception of what a rate of Interest means in 
barter terms, Sraffa goes on to compare this conception with the 
Wickselllan scheme.^ In such a world, equilibrium (in Sraffa's sense) 
means that "the spot and forward price coincide, for cotton as for any 
other commodity; and all the 'natural' or commodity rates are equal to 
one another, and to the money rate." But, if supply and demand get out 
of long-period equilibrium for any reason, the spot and forward prices 
diverge, and the "natural" rate of interest on that commodity diverges 
from the "natural" rates on other commodities. In other words, 
"equilibrium" rates are not "natural" if by equilibrium we mean prices 
equal cost of production and by "natural" we mean barter-like (money­
less) Intertemporal loans. Thus, Hayek's (and Wlcksell's) attempt to 
equate the equilibrium rate with the putative natural rate represents an 
"essential confusion." For, as Sraffa comments in the exchange which 
followed the review, Hayek's policy prescription of equating the money 
rate with the natural rate can have no meaning in Hayek's own preferred 
situation of an expanding economy: "The only meaning (if it be a 
meaning) I can attach to this is that his maxim of policy now requires 
that the money rate should be equal to all these divergent natural rates" 
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(Sraffa, 1932b, p. 251). 
In a sense, Sraffa has here caught Hayek in a trap of his own making 
and no amount of squirming can release him, short of abandoning some part 
of his Wlckselllan scheme. Recall that Hayek explicitly wanted to 
address himself to an Investigation of the effect of monetary Influences 
on relative prices. He also claimed to have rejected any reliance on 
"vague" concepts of averages such as the price level. He was thus led to 
found his polemic for a neutral monetary policy on the cyclical Influence 
of money on relative Investment flows In an accumulating economy. His 
policy prescription was to eliminate these "forced savings" Influences by 
setting the money rate of Interest equal to the "natural" rate. Here, 
Sraffa has shown that If you really want to define natural rates in 
barter-like terms, that it is a necessary relative price effect that 
these rates will "naturally" diverge in an economy in which accumulation 
is going forward. The basis of Sraffa's argument is that any new 
accumulation is directed to different employments by divergencies of 
market prices from the "natural" price, a good Marshalllan argument. "It 
will be noticed that, under free competition, this divergence of rates is 
as essential to the effecting of the transition [to a more capitalistic 
economy] as is the divergence of prices from costs of production; it is, 
in fact, another aspect of the same thing" (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 51). 
Consequently, a theoretical investigation, within the framework of a 
natural rate that reflects a barter state of savings and investment, into 
the relative price effects of credit- (read bank-) induced forced savings 
must deal with the fact that "there may be as many 'natural' rates as 
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there are commodities" (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 50). Hayek must either give up 
a unique "natural" rate to use as a guide to policy, abandon the whole 
Wlckselllan conception, or fall back on one of his hated aggregates to 
deliver himself from this quandry. Sraffa points out that within the 
Wlckselllan framework, one way out would be to use as a policy guide 
"... a 'natural' rate of Interest which. If adopted as a bank-rate, 
will stabilize a price-level (I.e., the price of a composite commodity): 
It Is an average of the 'natural' rates of the commodities entering Into 
the price-level, weighted In the same way as they are In the price-level 
Itself" (p. 51). By this method, Wlcksell could salvage his own system 
(although the "natural" rate would now be non-unique, changing with every 
change In the components of the price Index) and could meet Hayek's 
criticism of the falling price-level effects. But Hayek himself cannot 
fall back on such a solution since he has already rejected the conception 
of an average price level as vague and useless. 
It Is at this point that we come full circle to the starting 
methodological position and we see that Sraffa's own view is that we 
should abandon the whole Wlckselllan scheme. Having shown the only 
logically consistent meaning that can be attached to the theoretical and 
policy conclusions of the Wlckselllan framework, Sraffa Implies that the 
whole effort is a misguided one from the start. 
It appears, therefore, that these non-monetary economies [i.e., 
those defined by his composite "natural" rates] retain the essential 
feature of money, the singleness of the standard; and we are not 
much the wiser when we have been shown that a monetary policy is 
"neutral" in the sense of being equivalent to a non-monetary economy 
which differs from it almost only by name (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 51). 
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In other words, the distinction between monetary effects and real 
effects is not illuminated by the Wickselllan approach of defining the 
"natural" state of saving and investment in hypothetical "barter" terms, 
where barter means uninfluenced by the arbitrary actions of the banks. 
As Sraffa had commented at the start, the Wicksellians are not actually 
defining a barter state, so much as a hypothetical "real" system, where 
money can only serve as a medium of exchange ("being entirely unaware 
that it may be doubted whether under a system of barter the decisions of 
individuals would have their full effects. . . ."). Thus, by ignoring 
the more important distinctions between a monetary and nonmonetary 
economy, "those characteristics which are set forth at the beginning of 
every text-book on money," the Wicksellian approach provides a misguided 
framework for a monetary theory. 
In effect, what Sraffa has done here is to repeat his standard 
procedure of accepting a theoretical framework and then pushing it to its 
furthest logical extremes to see what insights it might yield. In the 
case of the "natural rate" view of monetary theory, what he found was a 
gaping emptiness beneath & thin skin. There is no unique natural rate 
that will stabilize the price level and ensure against forced savings in 
an accumulating economy. The essential properties of interest and money 
are ignored when we use a state in which money serves none of its 
multifarious cultural, conventional roles as the starting point of 
monetary theory. And the central problems of savings, investment and 
business cycles are not approached by this artificial distinction since 
"with or without money, if investment and saving have not been planned to 
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match, an increase in saving must prove to a large extent 'abortive'" 
(Sraffa, 1932a, p. 52). This last sounds like the "Circus" speaking, in 
its echo of the General Theory» And it is to the General Theory that the 
constructive use of the idea of own-rates leads us. 
As a bridge over the uncharted, and perhaps forever unknown, 
question of what personal role was played by Sraffa in the eventual form 
of Chapter 17 of the General Theory, we can utilize the thoughts of a 
Cambridge student of the early thirties, a disciple of Keynes, Adam Smith 
Prizeman and eventually Professor of Economics at the Benares Hindu 
University, Mr. Bhalechandra P. Adarkar. Adarkar's The Theory of 
Monetary Policy (1935) provides an interesting contemporary survey of the 
major monetary theories of the thirties and constructive work on the 
usefulness of this body of theory for practical monetary management. 
Besides the fact that Adarkar provides a concise discussion of the 
complete range of interest rate theory at the time, he forms an important 
intellectual link in our study by virtue of his knowledge of Keynes' 
monetary theory in the transition period from the Treatise on Money to 
the General Theory. Keynes' influence is clearly stated in Adarkar's 
preface: 
It will not be difficult for the reader, however, to discern the 
intellectual genealogy of this effort and he will at once perceive 
how deeply indebted 1 am to J. M. Keynes, that leader of modern 
monetary thought, in much that I have to say in the following pages 
(p. viii). 
From this, we can feel confident that Adarkar's view will reflect the 
Cambridge school's view on monetary matters. For our purposes, two 
chapters are especially interesting: Chapter seven on "Mr. Sraffa's 
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Commodity Rate," and chapter eleven titled "Is Barter Theory Relevant?" 
In the latter of these two, Adarkar sets out to Investigate "the 
question as to what extent the theory of a non-monetary economy is likely 
to be useful In the understanding of monetary phenomena." He notes that 
the concept has been much used by modern writers on monetary problems, 
but that "the attitude of most writers In this matter has been altogether 
dubious, if not misleading." "Cassell, Wlcksell and Hayek" are 
explicitly mentioned as cases where "hypothetical considerations of a 
non-monetary character have been Introduced In monetary theory In 
connection with our problem [the Idea of a natural rate]." His approach 
to the question is to consider a number of different conceptions of 
barter since these "hypotheses. . . are not in pari materia but relate to 
distinct concepts of the non-monetary economy" (1935, p. 86). Adarkar 
distinguishes between two conceptions of a barter economy. The first is 
a Robinson Crusoe economy used by Bohan-Bawerk and Rosher to illustrate 
capital accumulation. This economy is not really barter so much as 
exchangeless, and here the acts of Investment and saving actually occur 
in physical terms. More interesting for our purposes is what Adarkar 
calls "an advanced social economy, in which there is exchange but no 
medium of exchange, in which goods are exchanged against goods" (p. 87). 
Hayek's Ideal barter state is identified with this money-less 
economy where "only those investments can be carried out which are 
justified by the available real savings. . .[which] avoids the disparity 
between savings and Investments, resulting from our adherence to money" 
(p. 89). But the assumption that that such a moneyless state would be 
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more stable than a monetary system, Hayek's thesis, is questioned by 
Âdarkar. He points out that "relative valuations of goods, services and 
other forms of wealth are liable to fluctuate therein as much as they do 
in a money economy." In fact, he thinks that such a nonmonetary economy 
would be less stable since all of the factors making for disruption, 
"viz., psychology, natural and physical phenomena, discoveries and so 
forth are present," but the monetary factor, "the only one that implies 
some sort of control," is "absent" (p. 88). As we will see, this closely 
reflects Keynes' own ideas about a barter state. 
Due to this instability, and because focusing on barter phenomena 
encourages us "to forget that what we are primarily concerned with is 
money Itself and its mysterious interactions on the processes of 
production, distribution and consumption," Âdarkar finds such nonmonetary 
systems of little use in either monetary theory or policy. Interestingly 
for our thesis, he connects this rejection with an abandonment of the 
whole natural-rate doctrine utilizing Sraffa's review of Hayek. He says 
that even if we accept the automatlclty of savings and Investment in the 
barter state, "it does not help us to ascertain the Ideal rate of 
interest that should be adopted under the money system." Relying on 
Sraffa's example, he points out that even in the barter state, the 
natural rate is not unique but varies with the number of commodities 
considered. "Moreover, even if we succeed in constructing such an 
average 'barter' rate, we have no reason to suppose that that rate, 
because it secured the savings-investment equalisation, under barter, 
would do so here also; ... It is for this reason, among others. 
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that we have to reject the very Ingenious concept of the 'natural rate*. 
. . (p. 90). Is barter theory relevant? To a Keynes' disciple of 
1935; 
There Is no need, however, to suppose that a return to barter would 
mean the elimination of all the economic problems arising from 
changes In relative valuations. True, money sometimes distorts the 
vision and puts false appearances on the realities of economic life 
and thus necessitates our probing deeper, viewing kaleldoscoplcally 
what is happening in the realm of realities. But this is not the 
same thing as to visualize the modern money economy as a mere 
disfigured replica of its cruder ancestor (Âdarkar, 1935, p. 91). 
V. KEYNES: OWN-RATES IN A MONETARY ECONOMY 
In chapter 17 of The General Theory, Keynes lifts Sraffa's barter 
rates (redubbed by Keynes as own-rates) out of that "disfigured replica 
of its crude ancestor" and sets them down in a modern money economy. So 
far, we have established the corrosive effect that Sraffa's commodity-
rates approach represents to the whole Wickselllan natural-rate, loanable 
funds framework. We need now to pick up the development of its more 
constructive uses in illustrating Keynes' liquidity preference theory. 
Once again, Adarkar proves a useful bridge in that In the same book in 
which he disparaged the usefulness of the natural-rate doctrine, he also 
reviewed "Mr. Sraffa's Commodity Rate" (1935, pp. 41-44). Working 
without the benefit of the General Theory and missing entirely the ironic 
critique implied by Sraffa's use of own-rates, Adarkar finds little use 
for the concept in his own concern with monetary policy. He seems to 
have thought that Sraffa was in fact proposing that his average commodity 
rates be adopted as a policy guide. Nevertheless, the very naivete of 
his criticisms, coming as they do from a student of the Keynes of the 
Treatise, provides a useful transition to Keynes' own use of the concept. 
Adarkar's chapter is mainly focused on the possible use of Sraffa's 
average commodity rate as a standard by which the banking authorities 
might set the money rate. To this task, he finds it inadequate due to 
its instability. What is particularly interesting, though, is that 
Adarkar critiques the bare concept of the commodity rates from the 
standpoint of the rich institutional detail about monetary markets of 
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Keynes Treatise on Money. Again, he foreshadows, I think 
unintentionally, many of the Issues that will appear in Keynes' own use 
of this concept. 
Adarkar points out that Sraffa's commodity rates bear a strong 
Q 
resemblance to Fisher's attempt to reckon "real" rates of Interest "for 
each separate commodity by correcting the money rate for a change In Its 
new spot price" (Adarkar, 1935, p. 42). But the difference between them, 
he notes. Is that Fisher wanted to consider the difference between two 
spot prices separated In time while Sraffa's rate Is completely 
calculated on current market evaluations as reflected In simultaneously 
existing spot and future prices. Thus, Fisher's real rate "is a de facto 
affair, on which monetary policy could only hold a post mortem"; but 
Sraffa's rate "is a living fact on which we could rely for active 
guidance in that if disequilibrium arises, the forward prices indicate 
it" (p. 42). 
It is this forward-looking aspect of Sraffa's commodity rates that 
peculiarly adapts them to Keynes' preferred mode of monetary theory: 
uncertainty about the future. And, of course, what Sraffa implied in his 
review was that precisely those functions of money which relate to 
intertemporal situations were the ones Hayek and the natural rate 
theorists were Ignoring at the peril of relevance to a "real monetary 
economy." Adarkar, although still confused about Sraffa's use of the 
concept, details the implications such psychological aspects of money 
hold for commodity rates. 
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First, he mentions that in a risky market the equilibrium position 
of spot and future prices will not exactly coincide due to the "cost of 
hedging." "As Mr. Keynes has shown (1930, vol. 2, p. 143), in 
equilibrium the spot price exceeds the forward price, the 
'backwardlzation' amounting to as much as 10 per cent in the case of 
seasonal crops" (p. 43). For Keynes, this normal backwardlzation is 
subsumed under one element of his conception of own-rates, the liquidity 
premium. Adarkar further notes that a true reckoning of such rates must 
take into account "costs of warehousing, insurance [and] deterioration" 
of the stocks held over; "the speculative element" in spot and forward 
dealings; and the "current ideas and expectations of business men as to 
the probable course of future production" (p. 44). Each of these 
Influences, we will see, also has a counterpart in the own-rates 
framework. While for Adarkar these influences made it "questionable 
whether we could depend upon such data to discover the norms and 
equilibria of Industry," in Keynes' hands these concerns will constitute 
a "monetary theory of production" based on both real and monetary 
influences. It may be that an implication of this theory is that there 
are no "norms and equilibria" by which we can regulate the economy 
through monetary policy, as was the goal of the natural rate theorists. 
But in terms of explicating Keynes' central concern with Interest and 
money in defining unemployment equilibriums theoretically, Adarkar 
foreshadows Keynes' own argument, to which we now turn. 
Chapter 17 comes 222 pages into a complicated theoretical attempt to 
define unemployment equilibria as the normal case of a capitalist 
fd' • 
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economy. As many of his pre-publication correspondents and post-
publication critics have commented, its discussion runs on a more general 
9 plane of reasoning from the more closely argued model that precedes it. 
Yet, it obviously must be understood as a part of that greater work. For 
this reason, it is prudent to preface our detailed investigation of 
chapter 17 with a brief look at Keynes* argument up to that point. 
Keynes' theory of the equilibrium positions of the economic system 
was "general" in its insistence on the possibility of a range of outputs 
and employments being consistent with the normal functioning of the 
system. Keynes felt that his essential conclusion was that a less-than-
full employment equilibrium was the normal case within this possible 
range. In arriving at this conclusion, he felt that the fundamental 
analytical breakthrough in his own thinking had been the realization of 
"the psychological law that when income increases, the gap between income 
and consumption will increase" (1973b, p. 85). It was from this simple 
idea that he derived his fundamental building blocks of the multiplier 
and the theory of effective demand. Keynes thought that the neglect of 
aggregate effective demand, or "demand for output as a whole," had made 
the classical theory irrelevant except in the special case of full 
employment. His analysis of their argument in chapter 2 attributes this 
neglect to a reliance on the second classical postulate and Say's Law. 
For Keynes, the way to exhibit such a range of equilibriums was to throw 
out the second postulate and to supply the missing equation for effective 
demand. 
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Because that part of Income that is not spent is not necessarily 
directed to productive use, the level of aggregate demand fluctuates. 
The result is uncertainty over future levels of activity. To Keynes, 
this meant his aggregate demand theory would have to deal with saving and 
investment activity in an uncertain environment. Hence, the fascinating 
discussions of expectations for which The General Theory should be 
famous. 
Keynes situated the main effect of this uncertainty in the 
investment activity of business. Having cut the strict productivity 
moorings from beneath the classical theory of interest, it was necessary 
for Keynes to provide an alternative formulation. Thus, the last element 
in his system was the liquidity preference theory of interest. This 
filled the gap in a manner consistent with his analysis of the 
psychological uncertainty of investment behavior. 
In brief, given short-period conditions, output and employment 
depend upon aggregate effective demand, which is wagged up and down by 
fluctuating investment behavior (the consumption function being stable). 
A complex of productivity, monetary and expectational conditions, all 
packed into the portmanteaux of the liquidity preference function and the 
marginal-efficiency-of-capital schedules, determines investment behavior 
and thus output and employment. According to Keynes, when it is realized 
that output and employment are not givens, but are uniquely correlated 
with the level of effective demand, the practically obvious existence of 
involuntary unemployment can be theoretically explained. It is only in 
the context of this argument that his definitions of involuntary 
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unemployment and full employment can be understood. 
Keynes left it to chapter 17 to fully draw out his theory of 
interest and money for reasons clearly set out in the first paragraph of 
that chapter: 
It seems, then, that the rate of Interest on money plays a peculiar 
part in setting a limit to the level of employment, since it sets a 
standard to which the marginal efficiency of a capital-asset must 
attain if it is to be newly produced. That this should be so, is, 
at first sight, most perplexing. It is natural to enquire wherein 
the peculiarity of money lies as distinct from other assets, whether 
it is only money which has a rate of interest, and what would happen 
in a non-monetary economy. Until we have answered these questions, 
the full significance of our theory will not be clear (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 202; my italics). 
Here, we find all of the questions which were focused on in the Hayek-
Sraffa debate: the money-barter distinction, the general property of 
Interest and the peculiar property of money interest. But now these 
questions will not be addressed within the Wicksellian framework that 
Sraffa found so unsatisfactory, but in Keynes' world. Accordingly, we 
can look to this analysis for a synthesis of Keynes' concern to deal with 
money in an uncertain environment (as detailed in part III) with the 
definition of unemployment equilibria already set out in the General 
Theory. 
In synthesizing a general theory of interest and money that is 
compatible with his general theory of employment, Keynes draws on 
Sraffa's commodity rates as an exploratory tool, now following out the 
implications of this notion for what Sraffa termed "real monetary 
economies." Methodologically, this involves Sraffa's subtle admonition 
to Hayek about starting from concrete situations as well as Âdarkar's 
i-.». 
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less subtle references to the falling of commodity rates to capture the 
full institutional detail of a monetary economy. Though we have gone far 
afield from Keynes, coming back to roost In chapter 17 will provide (at 
least) one way to understand Harrod's comments about Keynes' central 
concern with a "wrong rate of Interest" that Is "not Itself a rigidity or 
Inflexibility," but Is "natural, durable, and In a certain sense. In the 
free system Inevitable" (1947, p. 70). To use Keynes' own words, "Until 
we have answered these questions the full significance of our theory will 
not be clear." 
Keynes (1936) Immediately gets down to concrete cases, introducing 
commodity-rates as a natural definition of interest on both money and 
other types of assets: 
The money rate of interest—we may remind the reader—is nothin%T_ 
more than the percentage excess of a sum of money contracted for 
forward delivery, e.g. a year hence, over what we may call the 
"spot" or cash price of the sum thus contracted for forward 
delivery. It would seem, therefore, that for every kind of capital-
asset there must be an analogue of the rate of Interest on money. 
For there is a definite quantity of (e.g.) wheat to be delivered a 
year hence which has the same exchange value today as 100 quarters 
of wheat for "spot" delivery. If the former quantity is 105 
quarters, we may say that the wheat-rate of interest is 5 per cent, 
per annum; and if it is 95 quarters, that it is minus 5 per cent, 
per annum. Thus for every durable commodity we have a rate of 
interest in terms of Itself. . . ." (p. 222). 
Footnoting Sraffa, Keynes works through an example, similar to 
Sraffa's cotton spinner, of the wheat-rate of Interest. He defines such 
commodity rates as "own-rates" and notes that "there is no reason why 
their rates of Interest should be the same for different commodities," 
since the relations of spot and future prices for different commodities 
are "notoriously different" (p. 223). Thus, in the most general context 
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of the own-rates conception, "the money rate of Interest has no 
uniqueness compared with other rates of interest, but Is on precisely the 
same footing" (p. 225). 
Yet, although as an intertemporal market equivalent there is no 
difference between a money transaction and a wheat transaction, Keynes 
implies that the money rate is unique for two interrelated reasons. The 
money rate is the standard in which all other future values are 
contracted for and estimated, and there are peculiar reasons why the 
money rate may be less flexible downward than other rates. If we can 
show why these two properties adhere to money rather than other assets, 
we will have some Justification for using money as the standard in which 
to measure the marginal efficiency of capital, and for using the money 
rate as the marginal efficiency which "rules the roost" in the sense of 
providing a rate which other assets must attain to be newly produced. In 
other words, it is the fact that money is just another asset and that it 
is a peculiar asset that warrants attention on the money rate as the 
regulator of investment. 
In order to get to the rest of the differences and similarities 
between the range of observed assets and own-rates of interest, Keynes 
introduces a scheme of attributes which defines the relative desirability 
of different assets, essentially a demand equation for assets. This 
scheme addresses Adarkar's comments (based on the Treatise, remember) on 
the specific fallings of the commodity-rates in a monetary economy as 
well as illustrating Keynes' liquidity preference theory. It is through 
this abstraction that Keynes relocates the own-rates from the Wlckselllan 
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world to his own. 
Taking "various commodity-rates of Interest over a period of (say) a 
year" and measuring each rate "In terms of Itself" as the standard of 
Intertemporal value, Keynes finds "three attributes which different types 
of assets possess In different degrees." These are: 
(I) Some assets produce a yield or output measured In terms of 
themselves, by assisting some process of production or 
supplying services to a consumer. 
(II) Most assets, except money, suffer some wastage or Involve some 
cost through the mere passage of time (apart from any change 
In their relative value), irrespective of their being used to 
produce a yield; i.e., they Involve a carrying cost jc measured 
in terms of themselves. . . . 
(ill) Finally, the power of disposal over an asset during a period 
may offer a potential convenience or security, which is not 
equal for assets of different kinds, though the assets 
themselves are of equal initial value. There is, so to speak, 
nothing to show for this at the end of the period in the shape 
of output; yet it is something for which people are ready to 
pay something. The amount (measured in terms of itself) which 
they are willing to pay for the potential convenience or 
security given by this power of disposal (exclusive of the 
yield or carrying cost attaching to the asset), we shall call 
it liquidity—premium & (pp. 225-226). 
In Keynes' scheme, an asset's own-rate of interest will be defined 
by "its yield minus its carrying cost plus its liquidity premium." 
Recalling Adarkar's specific complaints about commodity rates, we can now 
see that in Keynes' definition, we have so far taken account of "costs of 
the stocks held over" with c^, "current ideas and expectations of business 
men as to the probable course of future production" with ^  (and to some 
extent &), and "the speculative element" with &. But Adarkar's further 
concern with the relation of pure commodity rates to the Fisher effect is 
also addressed by Keynes. It is worthwhile to look at this relationship 
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a bit more closely since it sheds light on the important and interesting 
question of the relation of interest rates and inflation in the own-rates 
framework. 
Keynes claims that so far as the relationship between spot and 
future prices on different commodities reveals a multitude of own-rates, 
that any of these commodities which are held for Investment purposes 
could conceivably be used as the standard in which to measure the 
marginal efficiency of capital assets (recalling that his concern is with 
explaining investment demand): 
For we can take any commodity we choose, e.g. wheat; calculate the 
wheat-value of the prospective yields of any capital asset; and the 
rate of discount which makes the present value of this series of 
wheat annuities equal to the present supply price of the asset in 
terms of wheat gives us the marginal efficiency of the asset in 
terms of wheat (p. 224). 
According to Keynes, the choice of standard is arbitrary so long as 
"no change is expected in the relative value of two alternative 
standards." We are very close here to the Flsherian doctrine of the 
effect of expected inflation on current interest rates. The relative 
value of two alternative standards is just Fisher's "appreciation of 
money" where we are, as Keynes says (p. 227), "taking money (which need 
only be a money of account for this purpose, and we could equally well 
take wheat) as our standard of measurement. ..." In this situation, it 
is possible to correct for differences in both different standards over 
time or in relative changes with respect to one particular standard. In 
the case of choosing a standard, the whole structure of "own-rates" moves 
up and down "when one of the alternative standards is expected to change 
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In value in terms of the other." The influence of Sraffa is echoed in 
this context by the concern over variant and invariant standards of 
value. Basically, there are two problems involved. First, there is the 
question of which good to use as the standard in which to measure all 
relative own rates (including the all important marginal efficiency of 
capital) today. As Keynes said above, this choice is arbitrary in the 
sense that we can value any expected stream and current price in terms of 
any standard we choose, e.g., wheat. "If no change is expected in the 
relative value of two alternative standards, then the marginal efficiency 
of a capital-asset will be the same in whichever of the two standards it 
is measured, since the numerator and denominator of the fraction which 
leads up to the marginal efficiency will be changed in the same 
proportion" (Keynes, 1936, p. 224). 
But if one of the standards is expected to change in value 
(appreciate), "the marginal efficiencies of capital-assets will be 
changed by the same percentage, according to which standard they are 
measured in." Keynes illustrates his conception of the effect such an 
appreciating standard will have on the structure of own-rates by a simple 
example where "wheat, one of the alternative standards, is expected to 
appreciate at a steady rate of ^  per cent, per annum in terms of money." 
According to Keynes, in this simple case a will provide an additive 
adjustment factor to the marginal efficiency of an asset to distinguish 
rates determined in one standard or another with the ranking of asset 
values remaining unaffected: 
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The marginal efficiency of an asset, which Is jc per cent. In terms 
of money, will then be jry. per cent. In terms of wheat. Since the 
marginal efficiencies of all capital-assets will be altered by the 
same amount, It follows that their order of magnitude will be the 
same Irrespective of the standard which Is selected. 
Keynes' simple example of a standard appreciating at a steady rate 
skirts a great complication here. In that the real problem will arise 
when different assets appreciate at different rates In terms of different 
standards. In other words, relative rates of appreciation are not all to 
be expected to be the same In terms of any particular standard. Fisher 
was well aware of this problem when he noted: "There are, therefore, 
theoretically Just as many rates of Interest expressed In terms of goods 
as there are kinds of goods diverging from one another In value" (1930, 
p. 42). His solution—not surprisingly, coming from the master of the 
theory of Index numbers—was to express his "real rate" of Interest by 
adjusting the money rate with ^  post changes In a cost of living Index. 
Keynes himself was no fool when It came to Index number problems 
(see Treatise, book II), and his collaboration with Sraffa along with the 
Interminable difficulties of capital theory controversies In his day, 
seem to have made him justifiably wary of aggregate indices of all kinds. 
This wariness (as well as Sraffa's Influence?) shows up in the present 
context in his comment on defining a standard: 
If there were some composite commodity which could be regarded 
strictly speaking as representative, we could regard the rate of 
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital in terms of this 
commodity as being, in a sense, uniquely the rate of interest and 
the marginal efficiency of capital. But there are, of course, the 
same obstacles in the way of this as there are to setting up a 
unique standard of value. 
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In accordance with this rejection of a composite standard, Keynes 
Includes an appreciation factor "a" in his equations for own-rates which 
take into account "what the changes In relative values during the year 
are expected to be" in order to "determine the expected returns on 
different types of assets which are consistent with equilibrium" (p. 
227). By this method, Keynes avoids the problems of a "unique standard 
of value," while retaining price expectations in his demand for asset 
scheme. The "a" terms also serve the function of converting the diverse 
commodity own-rates into a single (but not unique) standard of value. 
Thus, where 
^1 - =1 + *1 
defines the commodity own-rate in real terms for commodity 1, the same 
rate measured in money terms will yield the "money rate" of commodity 1, 
qi - Ci + £i + ai . 
A question immediately arises which can only be dimly seen at this 
stage. What has become of the Fisher effect here? Essentially, it has 
been dethroned from Âdarkar's strictly algebraic post mortem of interest 
rates that have already happened and replaced with a living, current 
expectation. In the process, Keynes has also abandoned any attempt to 
theoretically define an index measure of the different expected 
appreciation rates of different assets by different people. There will, 
nevertheless, be a market effect of these expectations in terms of 
different own-rates being brought into equality in money terms by the 
additive "a" terms. But, as we will see, since Keynes' views on 
financial markets place great weight on the diversity of opinions about 
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the future course of asset values, this effect is not well-captured by an 
index number approach. What will be important will be the "shifting" of 
these market valuations which will reflect a change at the margin of 
opinion (i.e., some of Keynes' famous "bears Joining the bull brigade"). 
From the standpoint of the Fisher effect, the main element of this 
expected appreciation will reflect uncertainty about the future ability 
of the monetary standard to fulfill its role as the most liquid asset. 
As we will see when we get to Keynes' views on the essential properties 
of money, this will involve Fisher's interest in the stability of prices 
in money terms to some extent. But the effect of Instability will not be 
a strictly additive factor in valuing Interest, but a complicated matter 
of social convention. By this view, Keynes' ultimate Fisher effect is 
more drastic than Fisher's own. For Keynes, a lack of confidence in the 
socially conventional standard is more qualitative than quantitative. If 
instability detracts from money's role as the liquidity standard, some 
substitute for liquidity will be set up by the organic methods of market 
evolution. But a full understanding of these issues requires more detail 
of the own-rates framework. 
Returning to the development of the own-rates framework of asset 
market equilibrium, it is useful to digress a bit and consolidate the 
argument so far. What we have seen is that the bare concept of a 
commodity rate introduced by Sraffa implies that, from the most general 
standpoint, a money rate of interest is not unique. Just like a money 
transaction, any intertemporal market trade implies an own-rate of 
exchange between spot and future quantities. To be absolutely clear 
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about this deceptively simple Idea, it is convenient to resort to some 
algebra. In this context, we will start from (and then elaborate on) the 
useful algebraic formulation of own-rates of interest by Joseph Conard 
(1959, pp. 119-154). Although Conard is led astray in his discussion by 
falling to account for Keynes' views on uncertainty, his formal 
discussion of the concepts of commodity rates and money rates is the 
clearest exposition in the literature. 
Conard begins his investigation by defining own-rates as a case of 
the Flsherian "rate of return over cost" (p. 120); 
In this framework, "real" or "commodity" own-rates (which we will 
designate as r^) are defined in quantities (Q) of the physical commodity 
Denominated in a standard of value, the same rate will become a money-
denominated own-rate in value terms (which we will define r ): 
c,m 
By this method, Conard shows that Keynes' "a" terms, the difference 
between real own-rates and money own-rates, are Inherently complex 
Expected future value - present value 
present value 
r 
c PiQi 
a = r 
- r 
c,m c 
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So the "a" that transforms a real own-rate into a money own-rate is the 
expected proportionate price change times the intertemporal quantity 
equivalents. 
We can use this formulation to clarify a number of issues. First, 
recall that Sraffa (1932a, p. 50) had defined the commodity rate as being 
equal to the money rate "plus the excess (or minus the deficiency) of the 
spot over the forward price." This is the definition referenced to 
Sraffa by Keynes that he used in working out his wheat example. It 
provides a clear link between the abstract concept and market phenomena. 
Using Conard's framework, we can specify this link more clearly. The 
relationship postulated by Sraffa is 
/2 - Pi, 
- 'm - < P]—) 
where: r^ = the commodity own-rate 
r = the money own-rate 
m 
Pg = the future price of the commodity 
= the spot price of the commodity 
It is noteworthy in this context that Keynes defines equilibrium in 
the asset market as the situation where all own-rates, defined in a 
common standard, are equal. "Thus in equilibrium the demand-prices of 
houses and wheat in terms of money will be such that there is nothing to 
choose in the way of advantage between the alternatives" (p. 227). Using 
money as the standard, this means that all money own-rates and the money-
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rate itself will be equal in equilibrium; or, for all commodities 1, 
1 ^ 1  
r + a = r . 
c m 
In terms of the above definitions, 
M2-M1 
i Q2-QÎ 
'c " -Ql---
by which we get a more precise version of the Sraffa formula: 
1 ^1 
This not only confirms the Sraffian lineage of Keynes' concept, but 
it also makes clear that Keynes' definition of equilibrium in this 
context is strictly a current, short-period affair. To see this, recall 
that Sraffa, using the long-period as his definition, defined 
"'equilibrium' rates as the situation where spot and forward prices 
coincide . . . and all the 'natural' or commodity rates are equal to one 
another, and to the money rate" (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 50). But here, Keynes 
has defined his "equilibrium" as an equality between all own-rates 
measured in money terms which, as the above formula makes clear, could 
easily be a disequilibrium in the long period sense. This may be one way 
of understanding Keynes' insistence that the difference between a 
monetary and a real economics entails a specification of the "line of 
division between the theory of stationary equilibrium and the theory of 
133 
shifting equilibrium—meaning by the latter the theory of a system in 
which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the 
present situation. For the Importance of money essentially flows from 
its being a link between the present and future" (p. 293). 
In this view, Keynes' "shifting equilibrium" is defined by a 
monetary equilibrium on the asset market where all own-rates consistently 
measured are equal, but spot and forward prices still diverge according 
to current expectations of productivity, carrying costs and liquidity. 
Alternatively, Sraffa's equilibrium commodity rates are part of the 
theory of "stationary equilibrium." In a formal sense, this is captured 
by Sraffa's view that equilibrium requires all own-rates measured in 
quantity terms to be equal, and all spot and future prices to coincide. 
This is why the details of Keynes' "a" terms are so important. It Is the 
movements of the prices on spot and future markets that guarantee his 
equilibrium position will exhibit a market configuration of equal 
expected money-denominated own-rates for every asset. But to see why 
Keynes' equilibrium shifts with "changing views about the future," we 
need to investigate Keynes' second question of Chapter 17. What is it 
about money as an asset that makes it unique? 
In terms of his schema of attributes of assets, Keynes distinguishes 
money by its high liquidity premium and low carrying cost: 
. . .  i t  i s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  m o n e y  a n d  a l l  ( o r  m o s t )  
other assets that in the case of money its liquidity-premium much 
exceeds its carrying cost, whereas in the case of other assets their 
carrying cost much exceeds their liquidity premium (p. 227). 
The full implications of the special character of money, though, only 
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become apparent In terms of Keynes' argument about the relationship 
between his shifting equilibrium on the asset market and the level of 
employment. His argument at its most general level follows the 
discussion of the post-General Theory writings reviewed earlier by 
focusing on the level of Interest rates as the determinant of new 
investment spending. In the own-rates context, Investment is 
disaggregated into individual capital-assets which are both newly 
produced and traded on second-hand markets. At any given time, the 
outstanding stocks of both physical and pecuniary assets will be valued 
by the market in accordance with the demand for each asset's individual 
attributes of productivity, carrying cost and liquidity. Given that the 
stocks are slowly adjusted, the price established on the second-hand 
market will determine, when compared with the "normal supply price," in 
what directions and amounts Investment flows proceed. 
The definitions of equilibrium and the movements implied between 
equilibrium positions are very poorly specified by Keynes. At some 
junctures, his argument involves defining instantaneous stock 
equilibriums and at others discussing flows of production of Investment 
goods. In fact, to make sense of his argument, it is necessary to bring 
in a number of elements that define a very complicated picture only 
hastily sketched by Keynes. An analytical Interpretation of this 
framework is possible if we center our attention on Keynes' equilibrium 
own-rates as a market phenomenon around which his complicated story 
operates. By this interpretation, a stock equilibrium configuration of 
asset returns can serve as a focus of both liquidity preference theory 
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and the discussion of money. 
To begin, we have Keynes' assertion that equilibrium In the asset 
market will be characterized by a state where all own-rates, measured in 
a single standard, will equal each other (1936, pp. 227-228). It Is In 
this context that he defines the "a" terms for each asset as the expected 
rate of appreciation of that asset In terms of the standard. Lerner 
(1952, pp. 173-179) and Conard (1959, pp. 120-134) show that when reduced 
to any common standard, the rate of Interest on all assets is necessarily 
equal since any deviations (abstracting from risk and term differences) 
would provide arbitrage opportunities that would drive the prices of the 
assets into such an equilibrium. Thus, in the context of asset market 
equilibrium, the "a" terms can be seen as the necessary positions of 
supply and demand equilibrium In spot and forward markets that ensure 
that all assets yield an equal return when consistently measured. This 
is clearly shown in the form given to the a's above where they are 
defined by the difference between spot and future prices: 
r 
It is Keynes' scheme of motives for holding different assets that 
provides the underlying economic forces which drive the demands for 
various commodities. Productivity, costs and liquidity considerations 
shift these demands between the various stocks of assets; but, on the 
market, the price configuration given by the relationships of the money 
rate and the spot and forward money prices is driven toward an 
equilibrium defined by the a's. Conard (1959) provides clear examples of 
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this In the form of a variety of assets, each of which has different 
commodity own-rates, but all of which yield an equal rate when measured 
consistently In any of the standards. Abba Lerner (1952) provides a 
similar analysis In his Insightful Interpretation of the own-rates theory 
and concludes: 
The wheat rate of Interest and the money rate of interest are not 
automatically equal by definition: they are only brought into 
approximate equality in equilibrium by arbitrage in perfectly 
competitive markets. 
To use Keynes' example where there are 3 assets—money, houses and 
wheat—we get 3 individual money-rates of own-interest all measured in 
money as the standard. The wheat rate is due to its predominant physical 
characteristic of high carrying cost and is primarily held for an 
expected rise in its price: 
Qg - Qi P" ~ ^ 1 
- *1 - =1 - Q» + P» 
The house rate Is due primarily to its productive capacity to generate 
services, q: 
"2 " "1 2^ - ''Ï 4. 
'h.n - *2 + <2 ° —Jh— + -7p-
The money rate is defined by the unique character of money that "its 
yield is nil, and its carrying cost negligible, but its liquidity premium 
substantial" (p. 226). 
M - M 
r = A, = —^ * 
m,m 3 
Using this framework, the asset market equilibrium condition is defined 
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by 
r 
m,m 
or, 
*1 - =1 = *2 + ^ 2 = S 
or, 
Many writers have commented en the stock equilibrium quality of 
Keynes' analysis, by which we mean that equilibrium is defined for a 
market evaluation of an existing quantity of capital, money bonds etc. 
Kenneth Boulding was so taken with this aspect of Keynes' approach that 
he proposed A Reconstruction of Economics (1950) based on the sole use of 
stock rather than flow equilibrium theory. G. L. S. Shackle (1967, p. 
145) has commented that this use of stock analysis is particularly 
evident in Keynes' interest rate theory; 
One more of the great changes in outlook of economic theoreticians 
stands largely to Keynes' credit, and again it is largely a case 
where an idea or practice of Marshall's was radically deepened and 
enlarged. Marshall had compared the existing with the desired total 
stock of money, and proposed to regard the latter as proportional to 
national income. This was perhaps the first turning of the tide 
against the neoclassical emphasis on flows in contrast with stocks. 
Keynes' theory of the interest-rate fused method and meaning 
inseparably in a purely "stocks" analysis. It is the essence of the 
liquidity-preference theory that stocks and not flow are in command, 
and in stating this theory Keynes showed a "stocks" analysis at 
work. 
It is interesting that Shackle mentions Marshall in this context 
since, as we have seen above, the very definition of "equilibrium" own-
rates by Sraffa and Keynes, respectively, hinges on the choice of 
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defining them in the Marshallian long period (for Sraffa) or short period 
(for Keynes). Consequently, Sraffa looked to flows of resources between 
industries to eventually equalize all own-rates and the money rate by 
equalizing the spot and future prices of every commodity in a long period 
equilibrium. But Keynes, more alive to the financial realities of a 
complex money economy, relies on the arbitraging of wealth owners and 
speculators to drive the relation of spot and future prices of the 
outstanding stocks of assets into a configuration today that reflects 
current expectations about the desirability of each in the never realized 
future. As we will see, the importance of money in this scheme will 
revolve around its use as the link between these current expectations and 
the level of own-rates on the market today. It will be through the own-
rate on money defined by its liquidity premium (along with the expected 
return on capital) that all of Keynes' fascinating discussion of long-
term expectations and non-Benthamite opinions about the future that we 
discussed in part three will enter into the framework of the asset-
holding equilibrium of chapter 17. Two more elements of the framework of 
analysis must first be dealt with. 
Although Keynes defines asset equilibrium on the market by price 
movements on spot and forward markets, this is in a sense only the 
observable surface phenomenon around which the really interesting aspects 
of his story are centered. In fact, the major virtue of the own-rates 
analysis of Keynes* interest rate theory may be that it does provide such 
a manageable focusing device for the complex considerations he wanted to 
discuss in his interest rate theory, the same complexities that we have 
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argued are ignored in the "Keynesian" vision. It is not idle to speak of 
the market equilibrium rates as a "centering" device in this context 
since the complete story involves movements that occur both beneath this 
market equilibrium, in the form of individual decisions about expected 
asset values, and above this equilibrium in the form of flows of newly 
produced assets that respond to the market-determined prices. Before 
continuing, it is necessary to briefly specify each. 
Keynes' analysis of the interest rate in chapters 13 and 15 of the 
General Theory is addressed to the determination of the rate of interest 
on money in modern financial conditions. At the root of the argument is 
the question of how an individual with a given level of savings out of 
income (the determination of which he had already distinguished from 
financial markets per se, by his aggregate demand analysis) will be held. 
In the simplest terms, Keynes formulates the decision as one between 
holding savings in the form of "immediate, liquid command" over goods and 
services versus being "prepared to part with immediate command for a 
specified or indefinite period, leaving it to future market conditions to 
determine on what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred commands 
over specific goods into immediate command over goods in general" (p. 
166). The extent to which wealth holders prefer one type of asset over 
another is the definition of their current state of liquidity preference. 
Defining this preference as a demand for money (in excess of that 
required for active circulation)^^ and the rate of interest on money as 
the price of parting with this liquidity, money interest becomes the 
"'price* which equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash 
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with the available quantity of cash." 
But a further question remains. Why is it that anyone would want to 
hold wealth in a form that yields a rate of return less than other 
financial instruments? Why does such a thing as liquidity preference 
exist? Keynes argues that the fundamental condition giving rise to a 
liquidity preference is "the existence of uncertainty as to the future of 
the rate of Interest." This, of course, is the source of the famous 
"bootstrap" critique of Keynes whereby it is uncertainty over the future 
rate that determines the current rate of interest (Robertson, 1940; 
Hicks, 1946, pp. 163-164). From the standpoint of the complexity of the 
own-rates structure, this is shown to be a specious argument in that all 
of the multifarious elements of productivity, costs and time preference 
that the bootstrap critique considers left out of Keynes' argument are 
present here. Yet, in another sense, the "bootstrap" formulation goes to 
the heart of the contextual necessity for Interest on moneys uncertainty 
over future prices. But this should not be a criticism in the world 
Keynes was Interested in describing. As Keynes repeatedly emphasizes, in 
his world actors are uncertain about the future, and the expectations 
that they hold about the future are Just what the bootstrap critique 
Implies: "hoist by their own petard." 
What we are driving at is the central theme that Keynes emphasized 
as the distinguishing feature of his General Theory in the 1937 Q.J.E. 
article (Keynes, 1937c), namely the "conventionality" of expectations in 
an uncertain environment. As Keynes emphasized in that article, this 
conventional quality of expectations enters into the economic scheme with 
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particular force through asset valuations, both financial and capital. 
In terms of the own-rates structure, both types of expectations about 
profitability of Investments and movements of financial prices will 
Influence the equilibrium configuration through various q's, a's and H, 
But expectations will be especially relevant to the discussion of the 
peculiarities of money since "... uncertainty as to the future course 
of the rate of Interest Is the sole Intelligible explanation of the type 
of liquidity preference ... which leads to the holding of cash" (p. 
201).  
Since our emphasis Is on the use of the own-rates theory as a tool 
in understanding the liquidity preference theory, it would take us too 
far afield to discuss it in detail. But two elements that are laid out 
in chapters 12, 13 and 15 of the General Theory are worth emphasizing for 
the insight they lend to our understanding of chapter 17. Keynes 
emphasized in these discussions that the interest on money, arising as it 
does out of a desire for liquidity in the face of uncertain expectations 
about the future course of capital asset values, rests on a conventional 
Judgment of what the future course of Interest will be. For this reason, 
financial markets: (1) are "made" by the simultaneous existence of a 
variety of opinions; and (2) are subject to precipitous swings when the 
fabric of the conventional judgment is weakened. A few lengthy 
quotations from Keynes (1936) demonstrate the Importance of these points: 
. . . the rate of Interest and the price of bonds have to be fixed 
at the level at which the desire on the part of certain individuals 
to hold cash (because at that level they feel "bearish" of the 
future of bonds) is exactly equal to the amount of cash available 
for the speculative motive. Thus, each Increase in the quantity of 
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money must raise the price of bonds sufficiently to exceed the 
expectations of some "bull" and so influence him to sell his bonds 
for cash and join the "bear" brigade (p. 171). 
. . .  I t  I s  I n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  a n d  I t s  
sensitiveness to changes In the quantity of money should be so 
dependent on the existence of a variety of opinion about what Is 
uncertain (p. 172). 
. . . Changes In the liquidity function itself, due to a change in 
the news which causes revision of expectations, will often be 
discontinuous, and will, therefore, give rise to a corresponding 
discontinuity of change in the rate of interest. Only, indeed, in 
so far as the change in the news is differently interpreted by 
different individuals or affects individual Interests differently 
will there be room for any Increased activity of dealing in the bond 
market (p. 198). 
Now the tie-in between these two crucial aspects of liquidity 
preference theory—the necessity of a diversity of opinions and the 
liability of réévaluations In conventional judgments to effect sea 
changes in interest rates—and the own-rates theory has two consequences. 
First, the argument about the diversity of opinions provides the link 
between the equilibrium market structure of the own-rates when measured 
in a common standard with the scheme of individual judgments as to the 
expected productivity, liquidity and appreciation of various assets. In 
other words, in order to "make a market" for the variety of Individual 
assets, it is necessary that individual estimates of the q's, a's, and * 
differ among Individual investors. This is what we meant earlier by the 
individual decisions that go on beneath the structure of the equilibrium 
market configuration of asset prices. 
Thus, by this argument the asset market equilibrium configuration 
implied by the own-rates structure is "built up" from a sophisticated 
microfoundation. The sophistication lies In the explicit recognition of 
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the social level Influences on individual behavior, in the form of the 
market opportunities available to wealth holders and the social 
conventions underlying their future expectations. Further elaboration of 
this kind of (neglected) microfoundatlons would involve the role of 
different classes or "ideal types" of transactors on the markets, each 
with different goals and constraints. Two strong-type examples of this 
are evident in the Cambridge tradition of dividing bond holders up into 
two groups: widows and orphans and freewheeling speculators. R. F. Kahn 
(1954) makes much of this In his view of liquidity preference theory and 
notes that it links up the Keynes of the General Theory with the "two 
views" of the Treatise. More recently, work on the social foundations of 
the idea of rational expectations has come back to this point (Frydman, 
1982; Frydman et al., 1982). Interestingly for us, the focus has been on 
the possible instability of a rational expectations equilibrium in Its 
resemblance to the "Holmes-Moriarlty problem," which Is formally the same 
problem as Keynes' famous beauty contest (see O'Drlscoll and Rlzzo, 1985, 
pp. 84-85). In the own-rates equations for asset demand, this underlying 
conception of individual evaluations would actually Imply a different 
equation for each different asset for each different agent. With n 
assets and m traders, we would get mn own-rate equations in the most 
general case. The market equilibrium rates would be equivalent to 
evaluations of the marginal traders only. 
The second implication of these views of Keynes' is that this 
underlying variety of opinion, making up both sides of the market for the 
total stock of existing assets, can move rapidly between various 
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evaluations of the future (Keynes' "bearlshness and bullishness" of the 
Treatise) because of alterations In the skein of conventional Judgments 
upon which such evaluations exist. Keynes goes so far as to suggest that 
If all opinions about the future course of prices were unanimous and held 
with certainty, that a complete revaluation of assets could occur without 
any change In holdings whatsoever: 
If the change In the news affects the judgment and requirements of 
everyone in precisely the same way, the rate of Interest (as 
indicated by the price of bonds and debts) will be adjusted 
forthwith to the new situation without any market transactions being 
necessary (p. 198). 
The confluence of these two points is the determination of the 
shifts in Keynes' "theory of shifting equilibrium" to which we previously 
equated the "own-rates" theory. Assets are held in expectation of gain 
based on conventional judgments of the future by different individuals. 
This precarious equilibrium is liable at any time to "shift" when the 
foundation of current opinion about the future is disturbed. The 
magnitude of the shift will depend on the extent to which It is shared 
and the length of time it takes for a new convention to be established. 
Thus, our asset market "equilibrium" is seen to be simultaneously a 
fragile balancing of individual opinions, and one firmly based in the 
economic motives of personal gain (here, though, only personally defined) 
by Investors and speculators seeking their own advantage. 
The macroeconomic importance of this asset equilibrium, now shown to 
constitute a market element with an underlying microstructure, is the 
effect that the level of the shifting stock equilibrium has on "flows" of 
investment and hence employment. It is here that the last element of 
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Keynes' "vision" of chapter 17 comes in. These flows are the other side 
of the spectrum of which the own-rates form the center. For the result 
of the "highly conventional" phenomenon of asset market equilibrium has a 
very real effect in governing the desirability of investments in labor-
employing projects. As Harrod's statement implied, it is for perfectly 
natural reasons that the rate of interest is "wrong." If in an uncertain 
world there is no reason to expect asset prices to reflect purely real 
employment opportunities, then the interest rate: 
. . . may fluctuate for decades about a level which is chronically 
too high for full employment: —particularly if it is the 
prevailing opinion that the level established by convention is 
thought to be rooted in objective grounds much stronger than 
convention, the failure of employment to attain an optimum level 
being in no way associated, in the minds either of the public or of 
authority, with the prevalence of an inappropriate range of rates of 
Interest (p. 204). 
This was the conclusion of Keynes' basic theoretical model of 
employment developed in the General Theory of which the liquidity 
preference function was an integral part. In chapter 17 with the use of 
the "own-rates" theory, Keynes shows that it may be that it is the very 
nature of money that causes this situation. In so doing, he addresses 
the further points of discussion in our Wicksellian theme: the nature of 
money, what a nonmonetary economy would look like, and whether there is 
such a thing as a "natural" rate of interest, which would avoid this 
problem altogether. 
With our notion of asset market equilibrium in mind, we can follow 
Keynes into his discussion of the uniqueness of money in Sections II and 
III of chapter 17. It is interesting to note that he addresses the 
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question to a situation that was firmly established as the starting point 
of business cycle theory in the Wicksellian literature of his time. In 
particular, recall that Hayek (and Mises before him) wanted to discuss 
the natural rate in the context of an economy in which accumulation was 
going forward. Likewise, for Wicksell the goal was to try to use the 
marginalist method to explain this situation, using the tools of a long 
period value theory where factors all earned an equal rate of return. 
Keynes' innovation was to bring the financial side into this scheme and 
let his asset market equilibrium configuration determine equal 
"financial" rates of return at any given time. This is consistent with 
his severing of the savings-investment link that formed the basis of the 
Wicksellian story, where the interest rate equated real flows of savings 
with real flows of investment at the natural rate. Starting from this 
conception, the Wicksellian and loanable funds theorists would 
investigate the consequences of an upward shift in the investment 
schedule which set off new investment at the existing market rate of 
interest. In Wicksell, Mises and Hayek, the result of such a shift 
depended on whether the market rate was allowed to move to a new higher 
"natural rate" that would equilibrate saving and investment. According 
to this story, it was because the banking system could hold the rate 
beneath the natural rate, that we get "forced savings," an Intertemporal 
misallocation of resources and an eventual crisis (see Leijonhufvud, 
1981, pp. 151-160). 
Keynes bases his analysis of the employment-generating effects of 
the own rates equilibrium on a similar situation. He asks what would be 
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the limiting factor that brings an Increased production of new capital 
goods to a standstill? In his scheme, where the secondhand markets for 
goods continually revalue the whole stock of assets, the flow of new 
capital goods Is determined by a comparison of the market-established 
rate of return on the existing stock with the expected marginal 
efficiency of new projects* In price terms, Keynes describes the 
comparison In terms of a "demand price" for capital goods which Is fixed 
by discounting expected future streams of Income from an Investment back 
to the present using the market rate of Interest (determined by the own-
rates equilibrium). This demand-price is then compared to a supply-price 
which represents the marginal cost of producing that asset. If the 
demand-price exceeds the supply-price, new capital goods will be 
produced: 
Now those assets of which the normal supply-price is less than the 
demand-price will be newly produced; and these will be those assets 
of which the marginal efficiency would be greater (on the basis of 
their normal supply-price) than the rate of interest (both being 
measured in the same standard of value whatever it Is). 
Once in this Wicksellian situation of accumulation, where does the 
process stop? For Keynes, It stops when some asset's own-rate refuses to 
decline as accumulation goes forward and so holds up the market 
equilibrium rate of Interest. The Importance of declining own-rates is 
impressed upon Keynes by his capital theory. Basically, he assumed a 
declining marginal efficiency of capital assets as production of them 
expanded in the short run. The best discussion of this process is found 
in chapter 11 where the "Marginal Efficiency of Capital" is explicitly 
addressed: 
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If there is an increased investment in any given type of capital 
during any period of time, the marginal efficiency of that type of 
capital will diminish as the investment in it is increased, partly 
because the prospective yield will fall as the supply of that type 
of capital is increased, and partly because, as a rule, pressure on 
the facilities for producing that type of capital will cause its 
supply price to increase (p. 136). 
To link this disaggregated, expectations-based view of capital with the 
asset market that the own-rates represent, Keynes further emphasizes in 
chapter 16 that the failing of technical capital theory lies in ignoring 
the fact that a capital-asset is just another potential rate of return to 
investors in a modern economy. The classical argument that it is the 
physical productivity of capital that sets the pace of investment 
. . . overlooks the fact that there is always an alternative to the 
ownership of real capital-assets, namely the ownership of money and 
debts; so that the prospective yield with which the producers of new 
investment have to be content cannot fall below the standard set by 
the current rate of interest (pp. 212-213). 
This reasoning is the basis of Keynes' contention that the source of 
the return on capital is not that it is productive, but that it is 
scarce: 
. . . the only reason why an asset offers a prospect of yielding 
during its life services having an aggregate value greater than its 
initial supply price is because it is scarce; and it is kept scarce 
because of the competition of the rate of interest on money (p. 
213). 
All of this attention to Keynes' theories of money Interest and 
capital serves not only to link up the own-rates framework with the 
larger work of which it is a part, but also prepares our way toward 
understanding Keynes' attribution of uniqueness to money as an asset. In 
a way that Keynes does not explicitly point out (but that is Implied by 
the grouping of chapters in book IV), his argument for the uniqueness of 
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money assets Is an Integral combination of his capital theory and 
liquidity preference theory. As we will see, the uniqueness of money is 
that it is only a very Imperfect capital-asset; but that its 
peculiarities from a capital theory standpoint are Just those qualities 
which make it desirable as a liquid asset. Perfectly in accordance with 
Keynes' views on money and capital, then, the own rates theory brings the 
analysis of financial and real assets under one framework. 
In the simplest terms, the marginal efficiency of each capital-
asset, d, will be defined by that rate of Interest which, when used to 
discount a future stream of expected returns from an Investment, will 
1 
just equal the current supply-price of that capital asset. If P® is the 
present supply price of capital-asset 1, then solving the following for d 
will yield the marginal efficiency of that capital asset. 
P:' = I 
j=i (1 + dy 
1 
where; P^ = the present supply price of capital asset i; 
= the expected future stream of returns for each period j; 
d = a rate of discount. 
In terms of the own-rates, this d will equal the expected own-rate for 
capital asset 1: 
d = q^ + 
Then in equilibrium, those traders at the margin of preference between 
the different assets will determine an equilibrium value of r where for 
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all assets (1 - 1, .n) 
r = ^1 - =1 + + *1 
By Keynes' simplified example, we can reduce this to our 3 assets 
(wheat, houses and money) where the equilibrium Interest rate (measured 
in money terms) becomes 
r " "l - =1 - <2 + *2 " *3 ' 
In this context, the importance of the declining own-rates as 
accumulation proceeds revolves around which rate will hold up the decline 
of the others. Since they must "necessarily equal" on the market, the 
downwardly rigid rate will provide the level to which the others fall. 
As the stock of the assets, which begin by having a marginal 
efficiency at least equal to the rate of interest, is increased, 
their marginal efficiency (for reasons, sufficiently obvious, 
already given) tends to fall. Thus, a point will come at which it 
no longer pays to produce them, unless the rate of Interest falls 
pari passu. When there is asset of which the marginal efficiency 
reaches the rate of interest, the further production of capital 
assets will come to a standstill (p. 228). 
The question is, which of the own-rates will be the stubborn one 
that holds up the decline? Keynes thought there were certain 
"peculiarities" of the money rate which made it the own-rate that Is 
reluctant to fall as output Increases. The uniqueness of money as an 
asset revolves around the employment-generating effects that we have 
ascribed to the own-rates market equilibrium, and which we have seen flow 
from Keynes' views on capital. It is because capital-assets can be 
produced that they ultimately fall in value (their own-rates decline) as 
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accumulation proceeds. The first unique characteristic of money Is that 
It cannot be so readily produced In response to changes In Its price: 
Thus, the characteristic that money cannot be readily produced by 
labour gives at once some prima facie presumption for the view that 
Its own-rate of Interest will be relatively reluctant to fall; 
whereas if money could be grown like a crop or manufactured like a 
motor car, depressions would be avoided or mitigated because, if the 
price of other assets was tending to fall in terms of money, more 
labour would be directed into the production of money (pp. 230-231). 
But since this zero elasticity of production is also satisfied by 
any other pure rent factor fixed in supply, this cannot be the sole 
uniqueness of money. "The second differentia of money is that it has an 
elasticity of substitution equal, or nearly equal, to zero; which means 
that as the exchange value of money rises, there is no tendency to 
substitute some other factor for it." Keynes' argument here is that 
since the only reason money is held is for its liquidity value, that a 
change in the relative value of money will not have an adverse effect on 
its desirability as an asset. This is because the liquidity premium of a 
unit of money is only Increased by an Increase in its relative value (a 
decrease in prices). "This follows from the peculiarity of money that 
its utility is solely derived from its exchange value, so that the two 
rise and fall pari passu, with the result that as the exchange value of 
money rises, there is no motive or tendency, as in the case of rent-
factors, to substitute some other factor for it." If, like other rent 
factors, the desirability of the money-asset fell as its price rose, then 
an Increased demand for it would "slop over into a demand for other 
things." Then the demand for money as an asset would at least indirectly 
reach a point of calling forth new employment. Since this is not the 
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case, there Is the possibility that money could become "a bottomless sink 
for purchasing power" (p. 231). 
From the standpoint of capital theory, then, the two peculiar 
qualities of money are that demand for It cannot call forth new 
production directly as In the case of capital goods proper, or even 
Indirectly through substitution of other factors as In the case of pure 
rental Items. For these two reasons, the avenues by which movement In 
capital-asset own rates Is accomplished, by new production, are closed 
off to the money asset. 
But what of other liquid goods (e.g., wheat) of which it may not be 
possible to Immediately Increase the supply In response to an Increased 
demand? Why couldn't the wheat rate of interest hold up all the other 
rates? This is where Keynes' second attribute of assets to hold, 
carrying-costs, comes in. Recall that Keynes had earlier defined money 
by its quality of possessing the highest excess of liquidity-premium over 
carrying-cost. The importance of the low carrying-cost of money is that 
it sharply distinguishes money from all other potentially liquid assets 
(as opposed now to productive ones). Here, the distinction rests not on 
the supply side but on the demand side. In the case of all other liquid 
assets, the advantages offered through holding increased stocks of them 
are sharply limited by the cost of holding them for any appreciable time. 
Thus, "although a larger stock might have some attractions as 
representing a store of wealth of stable value, this would be offset by 
its carrying-costs in the shape of storage, wastage etc." But this is 
not so in the case of money where "the readiness of the public to 
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Increase their stock of money In response to a comparatively small 
stimulus Is due to the advantages of liquidity (real or supposed) having 
no offset to contend with in the shape of carrying-costs mounting steeply 
with the lapse of time" (p. 233). 
Keynes uses this argument to explain why he thinks the effect of 
falling prices on the "effective supply" of money will not offset the 
position of money as a bottomless sink of purchasing power. In essence, 
he is anticipating what would become the "real balances" effect made so 
much of by Patinkin. He asks if it might not be the case that the 
stagnating influence of the high money-rate would be offset by an 
"effective" increase in the supply of cash? The Increased cash that 
resulted from falling prices (a reduction in the wage-unit) would operate 
via two avenues: 
a reduction in the wage unit will release cash from its other uses 
for the satisfaction of the liquidity motive; whilst, in addition to 
this, as money-values fall, the stock of money will bear a higher 
proportion to the total wealth of the community (p. 232). 
Keynes disputes the argument that these effects would satisfy the 
increased demand for liquidity and thus negate the dominant position of 
the money rate in setting the pace of investment. First, he claims that 
the important reaction to a fall in the wage unit concerns "the 
difference between these [capital assets' own-rates] and the money rate 
of Interest." It could be that the decline in wages would be even worse 
in creating an expectation of further declines and thus decreasing the 
marginal efficiency of capital. Secondly, he cites his frequent point 
that "the fact that wages tend to be sticky in terms of money, the money-
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wage being more stable than the real wage, tends to limit the readiness 
of the wage unit to fall in terms of money." And in fact, due to the 
major place of wages in the expectations of future demand that hold up 
the marginal efficiency of capital, this stickiness is beneficial on the 
whole. Thirdly, "the most fundamental consideration in this context" is 
the characteristic of money's high liquidity-premium over carrying-cost 
which makes it possible to absorb extra quantities of money without 
facing extra costs. As we will see, these qualities of wage stickiness 
and low carrying cost are Keynes' explanation for money's liquidity. 
Thus, both the capital theory aspects and the liquidity characteristics 
of money combine to give the money rate its "sting"; 
The significance of the money-rate of interest arises, therefore, 
out of the combination of the characteristics that, through the 
workings of the liquidity-motive, this rate of Interest may be 
somewhat unresponsive to a change in the proportion which the 
quantity of money bears to other forms of wealth measured in money, 
and that money has (or may have) zero (or negligible) elasticities 
both of production and of substitution (p. 234). 
The effect on employment, then, operates through the level of 
equilibrium set by the necessary equality of the money-rate and all other 
own-rates, and the pace of Investment demand this rate calls forth. When 
the money-rate is reluctant to fall, all other own-rates fall to its 
level and no further. "The money-rate of interest, by setting the pace 
for all the other commodity-rates of interest, holds back investment in 
the production of these other commodities without being capable of 
stimulating Investment in the production of money, which by hypothesis 
cannot be produced." From the asset market view, the very existence of 
the social convention of money becomes Keynes' culprit for unemployment: 
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"Thus In the absence of money . . . the rates of Interest would only 
reach equilibrium when there is full employment" (p. 235). 
This is the point at which the capital theory argument for the 
Importance of money as the asset which holds up the own-rates of all 
other assets joins the liquidity preference discussion of the essential 
properties of money. Ultimately, Keynes' attribution of importance to 
the money-rate rests on the qualities of money as an asset "which 
constitutes money as being in the estimation of the public, par 
excellence 'liquid'." In section IV, Keynes brings the argument full 
circle by considering "how far those characteristics of money as we know 
it, which make the money rate of Interest the significant rate, are bound 
up with money being the standard in which debts and wages are usually 
fixed" (p. 236). 
His consideration proceeds in two steps. "In the first place, the 
fact that contracts are fixed and wages are usually somewhat stable in 
terms of money unquestionably plays a large part in attracting to money 
so high a liquidity premium." It is because future debts and costs will 
be payable in money that money can perform Its liquidity function, by 
definition. If the future standard of payments was not expected to be 
12 
stable, then money would not be liquid. But this very stability is 
dependent upon the low elasticity of production of the money-asset which 
caused the trouble with Its rate of Interest. It is also true, Keynes 
claims, that the low carrying-cost of money is Important to its role as 
the standard of deferred payments. "For what matters is the difference 
between the liquidity-premium and the carrying costs." Even If the 
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public attached as high a liquidity premium to wheat by fixing contracts, 
In wheat terms the carrying-costs would nevertheless be so high that "the 
wheat rate of interest would still be unlikely to rise above zero" (p. 
237). 
The Importance of the low carrying cost on money Is the link between 
this consideration of money as the medium of exchange and a standard of 
deferred payments and Its function as a store of value. Consequently, 
Keynes secondly considers the "subtle" fact that 
The normal expectation that the value of output will be more stable 
In terms of money than In terms of any other commodity, depends of 
course, not on wages being arranged In terms of money, but on wages 
being relatively sticky In terms of money (p. 237). 
If this were not the case, and wages were "expected to be more 
sticky In terms of some one or other commodities other than money," then 
two requirements would have to be met by those commodities If they were 
to take our money's place as the dominant own-rate. First, they would 
have to have a constant cost relative to real-wages for any scale of 
output. Secondly, they would have to have a sufficiently low carrying-
cost to allow any "surplus over the current demand at cost-price. . . [to 
be] taken Into stock without cost." The first requirement guarantees 
that the good's relative value would remain stable over the short and the 
long run as production ebbs and flows. The second requirement ensures 
that any old stock of the commodity would not affect Its value. If such 
a commodity could be found. It "might be set up as a rival to money" in 
its role as the most stable of all stores of value (p. 238). 
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Keynes did not think it was "probable that any such commodity 
exists," but from our theoretical vantage point it is interesting to note 
that these very requirements are strictly met by a fiat standard which 
Keynes always had in mind when he spoke of money* In that case, the cost 
of production is fixed (at nearly zero) and invariant to scale, and the 
costs of holding are as close to zero as possible (in its own terms). 
Keynes saw a duality of meaning between the predominating fact that that 
money is the standard of payment and its peculiar qualities as an asset: 
I conclude, therefore, that the commodity, in terms of which wages 
are expected to be most sticky, cannot be one whose elasticity of 
production is not least, and for which the excess of carrying-costs 
over liquidity-premium is not least. In other words, the 
expectation of a relative stickiness of wages in terms of money is a 
corollary of the excess of liquidity-premium over carrying-costs 
being greater for money than for any other asset (p. 238). 
As Keynes says, "Thus we see that the various characteristics, which 
combine to make the money-rate of interest significant, interact with one 
another in a cumulative fashion." All of the qualities of money can now 
be seen as dependent on each other. Moreover, the centrality of the 
money-rate, resting as it does on the very properties which make money 
liquid, Illustrates the essential unity of Keynes' monetary, capital and 
investment theory. Even further, the fact that the liquidity function of 
money ensures that wages and payments will be most stable in money terms 
provides a theoretical justification to the traditional "Keyneslan" 
concern with the fixed money wage case. In recent years, this assumption 
has become the very symbol of ad-hoc theorizing with which economics 
should have no truck. While, in fact, Keynes' complete theory of 
13 
unemployment does not rest on rigid money-wages, his discussion of 
••4' -
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money shows why he thought it was such an Important case to treat. 
The quality of sticky money wages Is an assumption much closer to 
the reality of a money economy than the opposite assumption of Plgou-
effects and real-balance-effects where money prices freely adjust to keep 
relative prices the same. Keynes emphasized this point In chapter 17 
with reference specifically to Plgou and his "presumption In favour of 
real wages being more stable than money-wages." Keynes points out that 
with changes In employment (scale of output) and the high carrying-cost 
of wage goods, the stickiness of real wages would 
. . . cause a violent oscillation of money prices. For every small 
fluctuation In the propensity to consume and the Inducement to 
Invest would cause money-prices to rush violently between zero and 
Infinity. That money-wages should be more stable than real wages Is 
a condition of the system possessing Inherent stability (p. 239). 
In terms of our set-up of the own-rates market equilibrium, Keynes 
is emphasizing that the "a" terms would have to fluctuate wildly if 
prices were assumed to be the sole adjustment factor that equated own-
rates to a fixed liquidity premium.In other words Plgou's mistake 
("in fact experience. . . and logic") is in assuming the operation of a 
"real balance" effect that would automatically readjust the nominal stock 
of money to provide the desired liquidity without affecting interest-
rates. Such a rapid and complete adjustment to changing conditions of 
money demand would imply much less price stability than we in fact 
observe or than is compatible with the stability of the system. This 
argument clarifies Keynes' frequent assertion that even if wages and 
prices were perfectly flexible in a depression, that the effect on 
expectations of such instability (operating through expected q's of 
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capital assets in our own-rates) would make matters even worse. 
But if real relative values are not the source of stability to the 
system, we are led to ask what does the amount of observed stability (is 
there any?) in the interest rate depend upon? This question is not taken 
up by Keynes, but its fascination led one of Keynes' students, Hugh 
Townshend,^^ to call for an amendment to the theory of value based on 
Keynes' analysis of a money economy. Townshend thought that chapter 17 
represented "the most general theory" of Keynes' book (1973b, p. 258). 
"Thus, it would seem that Mr. Keynes' doctrine of liquidity-preference 
really involves a generalization of the classical (marginal) theory of 
value" (1937, p. 160). Specifically, the generalization that Townshend 
envisioned depended on extending value theory into the determination of 
"money prices" in an economy where goods are not just produced for 
immediate consumption but are also held for future security. In this 
context, the structure of relative prices will not be strictly determined 
"at the margin of production" (as in the classical theory) but will 
depend to some extent (depending on the degree of "moneyness" or 
liquidity of a good) on the psychologically determined liquidity premiums 
that attach to monetary assets. The psychological impacts of these 
liquidity premiums are explicitly referred to by Townshend as Involving 
the distinction between the "exchange of existing assets (at the margin 
of exchange) and the production of new assets (at the margin of 
production)" (p. 160). 
Emphasizing the role of expectations in this generalized theory of 
value, Townshend sees the stability of the system of money prices so 
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determined to depend on the existence of a stable convention. Here is 
the answer we are seeking to the necessary practical role of sticky money 
prices in lending stability to the system. Townshend shows us the extent 
to which Keynes followed out that subtle method of basing even his most 
highly abstract conclusions on an observed reality of the economy rather 
than a purely hypothetical system: 
Since in fact money-values do not fluctuate wildly in the short 
period (save in abnormal conditions with which we are not here 
concerned), they must be kept reasonably stable by some 
characteristic of our real world of which a realistic theory of 
prices must take account. It would seem that this characteristic 
must be either a conventionality of outlook causing stability of 
expectations as to the money-prices of durable assets of certain 
kinds, or else conventional maintenance of some degree of stability 
of the money-price of the only other exchangeable value, viz. 
labour—that is to say a conventionally stable wage-unit (pp. 161-
162). 
Townshend dismisses the contention that the quantity of money along 
with its velocity of circulation can stabilize prices since to a greater 
or lesser extent any money stock can support any price level. This is 
because there need not be much actual exchange to revalue the stock of 
existing assets if the opinions about their future value are unanimous 
enough. But since such upheavals of prices do not continuously occur 
(except in the case of pure asset markets), the stability must depend on 
a convention: 
. . . since the quantity of money does not determine "the"—or, 
rather, any—price level, no prices would be determinate at all, 
unless at least one money-value—the price of something—were 
determined by habit or convention. 
The implications for economic theory are that no prices are strictly 
determinate since nothing is "absolutely determined by convention" 
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(except perhaps In a command economy) and that economic theory can only 
provide "approximately true" propositions about relative prices "which is 
the best we can hope for in an undetermined and shifting price-world" (p. 
162). For Townshend, this casts a pall over any attempts at "dynamic 
theorising." If we can only base our value theory on the shifting sands 
of a liquidity convention, then our theory can only be specified for the 
duration of each individual convention and no longer.This notion 
provides some rationale for Keynes' simplest model where money-wages are 
fixed and only the shortest short-period equilibrium is investigated. 
Townshend's fascinating writings extend Keynes' views on Interest 
and money in novel directions. But for our purposes, they also bring us 
back to the extent to which the own-rates theory represents a challenge 
to the Wlckselllan framework for monetary theory. First, the emphasis on 
the conventional basis of Interest and prices serves to Illustrate that 
Sraffa's Injunction on the use of barter theory as the starting point of 
monetary economics was much more than Just polemical tactics. As 
Townshend makes clear, the very notion of a structure of prices in a 
world where expectations of the future Influence actions today has to 
start from some basis in the facts of the situation: 
All exchange values are relative (ratios). If all possible sets of 
values in a community are to be comparable numerically, there must 
be a money of account—a common denominator to which the ratios are 
reducible. In a capitalist community—that is to say, one in which 
some people employ hired labor for future profit—people will also 
hold durable assets for future security. Even if there is no legal 
tender money, assets so held—whether goods or paper claims—will 
possess liquidity-premiums; and some claims and/or other assets will 
come to oust other assets . « . for the purpose of liquid holdings. 
We then have, in all essentials for the purpose of a theory of 
value, a monetary economy. « . . The generally accepted claims or 
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goods will modify the values which they are used to measure and are 
already real money for the purposes of the theory of value. Thus 
the text-book conception of a barter as non-monetary economy has no 
place in a discussion of value. The theory of value in £ capitalist 
economy is the theory of money-prices (Townshend, 1937, pp. 166-167, 
italics added). 
In other words, if the essence of money involves its role as a link 
between the present and the future, a link that grows out of its 
acceptance as the social numeraire, then money can only fulfill its role 
If it is assumed that money will be worth something at that future date. 
Keynes has shown us that this sort of expectation, which the money rate 
of interest is based upon, ultimately rests on an agreed upon convention 
of the stability of money prices. In the Wicksellian framework, where 
the operative forces of the case are looked for in a strictly "real" side 
of the economy, all of this is Ignored. For Wicksell and Hayek, the 
barter-like "natural" rate of Interest is the starting point of 
investigation. But if Keynes is right about money, there is nothing at 
all natural about such a barter rate In a money economy. 
This friction between Keynes' theory and the whole natural rate, 
loanable funds framework is finally drawn out in the last two sections of 
chapter 17. In these, he explicitly addresses himself to the question of 
what a nonmonetary economy would resemble and what meaning can be given 
to the idea of a natural rate of interest. 
Recall that Sraffa had shown, and Âdarkar had recognized, that the 
nonmonetary state in which the "natural" rate was supposed to rule could 
not really be conceived of in barter terms. As Sraffa commented in his 
review of Hayek, "It may be doubted whether under a system of barter the 
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decisions of Individuals would have their full effects" (1932a, p. 43). 
What the Wlcksellians really wanted to define was a hypothetical state in 
which the social contrivance of a medium of exchange existed, but where 
none of the accompanying intertemporal allocation problems that follow 
from the use of money in an uncertain environment encumber the decisions 
of individuals. To the natural rate theorists, this could be 
accomplished by simply controlling the money supply. 
Starting from a much richer conception of the social functions of 
money, Keynes conceived of such a "so-called 'non-monetary' economy" in a 
much different way. The only meaning he could give to the idea was a 
situation in which no asset possessed that fundamental quality of 
possessing a liquidity-premium in excess of its carrying cost. 
There exists nothing, that is to say, but particular consumables and 
particular capital equipments more or less differentiated according 
to the character of the consumable which they can yield up, or 
assist to yield up, over a greater or shorter period of time: all 
of which, unlike cash, deteriorate or Involve expense, if they are 
kept in stock, to a value in excess of any liquidity premium which 
may attach to them (p. 239). 
Even in this case, Keynes' liquidity motive would enter in the 
relative evaluation of assets by wealth holders. Here, the liquidity 
would depend on the variety, stability and marketability of the goods 
which each asset is capable of assisting in the production of.^^ The 
rate of interest, then, would still be dependent upon the liquidity 
preferences of the public, illustrating the fact that money is a purely 
social-specific device. 
There is, clearly, no absolute standard of "liquidity" but merely a 
scale of liquidity—a varying premium of which account has to be 
taken. . . . The conception of what contributes to "liquidity" is a 
164 
partly vague one, changing from time to time and depending on social 
practices and Institutions (p. 240). 
But if no exclusively liquid good exists, would interest rates be 
low enough to ensure full employment growth and accumulation? Keynes 
does not specifically say, but implies that if such a money-to-hold did 
not officially exist, that one would have to be Invented1 It Is as If 
liquidity preference is a human desire so strong that it creates its own 
object. As an example, Keynes mentions "that in certain historic 
environments the possession of land has been characterised by a high 
liquidity-premium in the minds of owners of wealth." In the absence of a 
good money, land would make a suitable liquidity standard due to its low 
elasticities of production and substitution and due to the fact that its 
output is at least as stable and marketable as any other. Keynes 
speculates that this might account for the unusually high mortgage rates, 
in excess of the net productivity of yields, found in many agricultural 
economies. 
If it were the case that some readily marketable good is socially 
"set up" as the liquidity standard in a nonmonetary economy, this answers 
the question of the efficiency of such a natural state. For land in 
these situations can be every bit as Inhibiting of production and 
accumulation as money Is today: 
That the world after several millenla of steady individual saving, 
is so poor as it is in accumulated capital assets, is to be 
explained. In my opinion, neither by the improvident propensities of 
mankind, nor even by the destruction of war, but by the high 
liquidity premium formerly attaching to the ownership of land and 
now attaching to money (p. 242). 
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It was this very conception of a liquidity premium being a necessary 
social convention where wealth holding is a private matter, that Joan 
Robinson focused her attention on when she came to discuss "Own Rates of 
Interest" (1961). Already in her later classical political economy 
stage, this former Keynes student conceived of the problem of liquidity-
premiums keeping up the rate of interest as a class-distribution Issue. 
Defending Keynes against Kaldor's (1960) argument that land could not 
serve such a purpose because "the rise in the purchase price of land can 
lower its yield to any extent," and thus diminish its attractiveness, 
Robinson makes the important point that this ignores the fact that the 
liquidity premium is altogether different from a mere explicit return. 
As Keynes emphasizes, liquidity premiums are of the nature of his long-
18 term expectations in the sense that they reflect uncertainty, not risk. 
This is why he defines them as a "potential convenience or security. . ." 
for which there Is ". . . nothing to show ... at the end of the period 
in the shape of output; yet it is something for which people are ready to 
pay something" (1936, p« 226). Robinson takes up the idea of non-
pecuniary yields from land as the liquid asset and fashions it into an 
historical explanation of the transition from a feudal state, represented 
by landed wealth, to a capitalist one, represented by capital wealth. 
Her argument adds "the pleasure of gentlemanlikeness derived from owning 
land" to the argument, but essentially applies Keynes' idea that some 
asset will always be set up as the liquidity standard by social 
convention. In an interesting twist on Keynes* main premise that the 
interest rate on money holds up the pace of investment, Robinson 
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speculates that, in the transition to capitalism, the traditional 
attribution of liquidity (and social distinction) to land holding may 
serve to hold up (primitive?) accumulation. 
What she has In mind Is an "'historic environment' (such as, indeed, 
exists in many countries today) when the capitalist wealth-owners exist 
side by side with gentlemen, whom extravagance and misfortune from time 
to time forces to pledge their ancestral estates." In this example, 
which corresponds closely to Keynes' hypothetical nonmonetary economy, 
the dissavings of the gentlemen will provide the original finance for 
industrial investment; 
Now, so long as land is known to be safe and sound while all 
industrial Investment has a high risk premium, and when, as Keynes 
assumed, the return to be expected in each round of I [investment] 
is less than the last, lending to a gentleman will be a formidable 
rival to financing industry (Robinson, 1961, p. 590). 
Robinson (1961) notes that this situation will be even worse in a 
social environment in which capitalists derive a further non-pecuniary 
"pleasure of gentlemanllkeness. . . from owning land." Also echoing 
Keynes, she thinks the problem could be long lasting if "capitalist 
wealth is diverted to purchasing land at second hand which ... [if land 
yielded no non-pecuniary returns] would be more readily available to find 
an outlet in financing new Investment." Besides providing an interesting 
theoretical explanation for the classical political economists' marked 
antagonism to the profligate ways of the landed aristocracy, Robinson 
shows that Keynes' framework is malleable enough to fit many social and 
historic environments. She even speculates that the role of take-over 
bids (In 1961 and now it would seem) provide a similar example of the 
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basic phenomenon of liquidity premiums holding up productive Investment. 
In order to bring our discussion back to our original starting point 
of the antagonism of Keynes' monetary views with the Wicksellian natural 
rate tradition, It Is appropriate to point out that Keynes ends his own 
chapter on "The Essential Properties of Interest and Money" by explicitly 
dissenting from that view. Attributing the Idea to Wlcksell, Keynes 
notes that his own Treatise on Money used the Idea of a natural rate 
"which preserved equality between the rate of savings. . . and the rate 
of Investment." In doing so he had, "however, overlooked the fact that 
In any given society there Is, on this definition, a different natural 
rate of Interest for each hypothetical level of employment." In other 
words, savings always equals investment and the rate of Interest, by 
determining the level of Investment, just determines the level of 
employment for which the equality of saving and Investment is defined. 
Thus it was a mistake to speak of the natural rate of interest or to 
suggest that the above definition would yield a unique value for the 
rate of Interest irrespective of the level of employment. I had not 
then understood that, in certain conditions, the system could be in 
equilibrium with less than full employment (1936, pp. 242-243, 
italics added). 
Keynes identifies the old Wicksellian concept as "merely the rate of 
Interest which preserves the status quo," a rate which we really have no 
Interest in defending. Declaring that it is not even a useful analytic 
category, he proposes to replace it with a neutral or optimum rate of 
interest. This more general concept would identify the rate of Interest 
". . . which is consistent with full employment, given the other 
parameters of the system" (p. 243). 
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With this concept in mind, we can see that Keynes' difference with 
the Wicksellian framework is not a mere choice over analytical frameworks 
(as Hicks (1937) would have it), but it is every bit as fundamental to 
his innovations on classical theory as the theory of aggregate demand. 
Just as in that case, the ultimate significance of Keynes' interest rate 
theory is its allowance for equilibriums consistent with less than full 
employment. Rejecting the idea of a "natural" rate which would 
equilibrate the system at full employment is just a corollary to 
rejecting the full employment assumptions built into Say's Law. By his 
analysis of the social role of money as the liquidity standard, Keynes 
has shown that money as a social institution (whether a free-money or a 
state-money) has important (negative) externality effects. Harrod's 
comment about a "wrong" rate of interest that is"natural, durable, and in 
a certain sense, in the free system inevitable," can now be seen as an 
Insight stemming directly from Keynes' essential properties of interest 
and money. 
By channeling the richness of Keynes' vision of the financial 
aspects of a modern money economy into a framework which identifies these 
equilibriums, the own-rates theory provides another angle on Keynes' 
theoretical revolution. And from the standpoint of further work in 
macroeconomics, the lesson of this view is that trying to recast Keynes 
into a Wicksellian world is a graft that will not take. Keynes' monetary 
theory is not a simple afterthought, or appendage that can easily be 
thrown overboard to pursue orthodox concerns. That is, not unless we are 
willing to revert to a full-employment paradigm where unemployment can 
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only arise from a friction or rigidity. Incompatibly thrust into an 
otherwise smoothly operating system. This is the error we have seen that 
led the "Keyneslan Revolution" to the impasse it faces today. Such a 
full employment framework is just the sort of propaedeutic world that 
Keynes was warning us against when he wrote: 
Or we can pass from this simplified propaedeutic to the problems of 
the real world in which our previous expectations are liable to 
disappointment and expectations concerning the future affect what we 
do today. It is when we have made this transition that the peculiar 
properties of money as a link between the present and the future 
must enter into our calculations. But, although the theory of 
shifting equilibrium must necessarily be pursued in terms of a 
monetary economy, it remains a theory of value and distribution and 
not a separate "theory of money." Money in its significant 
attributes is, above all, a subtle device for linking the present to 
the future; and we cannot even begin to discuss the effects of 
changing expectations on current activities except in monetary 
terms. We cannot get rid of money even by abolishing gold and 
silver and legal instruments. So long as there exists any durable 
asset, it is capable of possessing monetary attributes and, 
therefore, of giving rise to the characteristic problems of a 
monetary economy (1936, pp. 293-294). 
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VI. ENDNOTES 
1. "If I were writing again, I should indeed feel disposed to 
define full employment as being reached at the same moment at which the 
supply of output in general becomes inelastic," Keynes to J. R. Hicks, 
August 1936 (Keynes, 1973b, p. 71). For a discussion of the analytical 
implications of this view of Keynes (a view that the present essay is in 
complete agreement with), see Darity and Horn (1983). 
2. Keynes himself traces his views on non-calculable uncertainty 
and the necessary element of confidence in such judgments of the future 
to his early work as a probability theorist (Keynes, 1921). See Keynes 
(1936, pp. 148-149 and p. 240) for the link with his interest rate 
theory. 
3. This Full Information/Full Employment benchmark seems to have an 
enduring place in Austrian theory. See Mises (1966, pp. 244-252) for an 
account of the "Evenly Rotating Economy" as the foundation of the 
aprioristic science of "Cattalactics." O'Driscoll (1977, pp. 68-70) 
defends Hayek's use of such a benchmark case. In Essay III, we will 
compare this concept with Keynes' "shifting equilibrium" in more detail. 
4. We will quote from the now generally used second edition of 
Prices and Production first published in 1935. Sraffa's critique, of 
course, was of the original 1931 edition. But a side-by-side perusal of 
these two editions reveals no substantive change beyond the addition of a 
few extra footnotes. It would seem that Hayek did not find Sraffa's 
criticism convincing enough to change his argument when the opportunity 
171 
arose; although see Hayek (1941, p. 35, n. 1) In this connection. 
5. "Hayek constructed his monetary theory upon the foundations laid 
by early British monetary theorists and Knut Wlcksell and Ludwlg von 
Mises" (O'Drlscoll, 1977, p. 37). 
6. According to Marshall's most faithful student and hand-picked 
successor, A. C. Plgou (1925, p. 84), Marshall's method led him away from 
formallstlc theory; 
Though a skilled mathematician, he used mathematics sparingly. He 
saw that excessive reliance on this Instrument might lead us astray 
In pursuit of Intellectual toys, imaginary problems not conforming 
to the conditions of real life; and further, might distort our sense 
of proportion by causing us to neglect factors that could not easily 
be worked up in the mathematical machine. 
7. In Essay III, where we analyze Hayek's defense against Sraffa's 
critique, we will argue that Hayek eventually does abandon the 
Wickselllan scheme. 
8. Later, Keynes would also claim a relationship between his 
Interest rate theory and Fisher's: "I find, looking back, that it was 
Professor Irving Fisher who was the great-grandparent who first 
influenced me strongly toward regarding money as a 'real' factor" (1937b, 
p. 203n). 
9. In fact, many interpreters of Keynes' Theory, both hostile and 
sympathetic, have found the argument of chapter 17 to be not only highly 
abstract—but unintelligible. For instance, the man generally credited 
with "bringing Keynes to America," Alvln Hansen, had this to say In his 
famous Guide to Keynes (1953, p. 159); 
Chapter 17, on the properties of Interest and money, ties in with 
the subject matter of money and liquidity preference. . . . But the 
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topic Is elevated to a very abstract plane. Immediately after the 
appearance of the General Theory there was a certain fascination 
about Chap. 17, due partly no doubt to Its obscurity. Digging In 
this area, however, soon ceased after It was found that the chapter 
contained no gold mines ... In general, not much would have been 
lost had It never been written. 
With expositors like this, It Is no wonder Keynes' monetary views 
suffered such eclipse. This attitude carried over to Hansen's most 
famous student, P. A. Samuelson, who also must be credited with a large 
part of the "Keyneslan" version of Keynes. In an evaluation of Keynes as 
an economist (1947b) In which Samuelson relegates the own-rates theory to 
the category of "Mares' nests or confusions" (p. 149), and In which he 
explains why "liquidity preference . . . cannot be of crucial 
significance," he draws the following remarkable conclusion about Keynes 
as an economic theorist: 
. . . Keynes seems never to have had any genuine Interest In the 
theory of value and distribution. It Is remarkable that so active a 
brain would have failed to make any contribution to economic theory 
(p. 155). 
One supposes this view of Keynes' contribution goes a long way toward 
explaining the easy cooptation of "Keyneslanlsm" by orthodox neoclassical 
theory. 
Turning to hostile reviews, one that takes a particularly venomous 
line on chapter 17 Is H. Hazlltt's (1959) "The Failure of the 'New 
Economics'." Hazlltt's volume has much to recommend Itself as a curative 
to anyone considering putting a vituperative attack Into print. It 
reserved a large quota of Its venom (and exclamation points!) for Chapter 
17: 
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Chapter 17 of the General Theory, "The Essential Properties of 
Interest and Money," is dull, Implausible, and full of obscurities, 
non sequitors, and other fallacies (p. 236). 
Of all of the confusions in the General Theory, this is one of the 
most incredible (p. 237). 
10. The role of Keynes* Intricate analysis of the circulatory route 
of cash in different uses in the economy was laid out in the Treatise 
(1930, book 1, ch. 3). Although it is suppressed in the General Theory, 
this analysis is essential to a complete understanding of liquidity 
preference theory. See Shackle (1967, ch. 15) for an insightful blending 
of the two strands of the theory of cash balances. 
11. This intricate fusion of capital theory and monetary theory is 
the core of Shackle's (1967, ch. 11) unique blending of Keynes' views on 
money and uncertainty in the General Theory with his crucial restatement 
in 1937c. Shackle makes no use of the own-rates paradigm, but I think 
our discussion to this point might clarify his argument for some readers. 
For instance, the following eloquent passage nicely complements our view 
with that grace of expression that is Shackle's hallmark: 
Writers on Keynes's theory of Investment incentive give all their 
attention to the concepts of the marginal efficiency of capital and 
the interaction of a quantity so named with the interest-rate on 
loans of money. To do so is to study the formal configuration of 
the engine without asking about its thermal source of power. The 
marginal efficiency of capital is nothing but a formal sum waiting 
for the insertion of numerical values in place of its algebraic 
symbols. The essential problem of why at any time the investment 
flow has the size it has is contained in the question what is the 
source of these numerical values, by which psychic alchemy is the 
list of incongruous ingredients chosen and fused into an answer to 
the unanswerable. Keynes's whole theory of unemployment is 
ultimately the simple statement that, rational expectation being 
unattainable, we substitute for it first one and then another kind 
of irrational expectation: and the shift from one arbitrary basis 
to another gives us from time to time a moment of truth, when our 
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artificial confidence Is for the time being dissolved, and we, as 
business men, are afraid to invest, and so fall to provide enough 
demand to match our society's desire to produce. Keynes In the 
General Theory attempted a rational theory of a field of conduct 
which by the nature of Its terms could be only seml-ratlonal. But 
sober economists gravely upholding a faith in the calculabllity of 
human affairs could not bring themselves to acknowledge that this 
could be his purpose. They sought to interpret the General Theory 
as just one more manual of political arithmetic. In so far as it 
failed this test, they found it wrong, or obscure, or perverse. The 
same fate had overtaken his Treatise on Probability (1967, p. 129). 
12. In fact, Irving Fisher found an actual example of the effect on 
interest rates that uncertainty, not just over the stability of the 
monetary unit, but uncertainty over its actual existence has. He 
analyzes an example in his The Rate of Interest (1907, pp. 258-261) where 
two types of U.S. bonds existed simultaneously that were payable in gold 
and paper notes, respectively. The variations in the spread between the 
two over the years 1870 to 1896 are attributed by Fisher to the changing 
expectations of the future form of the standard of payment caused by the 
then active public debate over the various proposals of the "money 
doctors." 
13. For a complete analysis of the irrelevance of fixed money-wages 
to Keynes' definition of unemployment equilibriums, see Darity and Horn 
(1983). 
14. Keynes seems to have thought that most of the adjustment in the 
"a" terms would be accomplished by movements in the present spot prices. 
See the discussion in chapter 17 (p. 228) of an example of the 
equilibration of own-rates. Also, in a protracted pre-publication 
correspondence with R. C. Hawtrey, Keynes defends his own-rate theory in 
the case of stocks of liquid commodities from Hawtrey's criticism (on 
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both theoretical and practical grounds). In the process, he makes the 
same point about the adjustment factor "normally" being the spot price 
(1973a, p. 629). 
15. In Keynes' collected works (1979, p. 235), Townshend is 
identified as follows: "Another discussant was Hugh Townshend (1890-
1974), who, after taking a first in mathematics in Cambridge In 1912, had 
been a pupil of Keynes while preparing for Civil Service examinations in 
1914. He had then entered the Post Office." Besides the note referred 
to in the text and a few scattered reviews in the Economic Journal in the 
late '30s, the only other work of his I have found is a co-authored book 
(Curtis and Townshend, 1938). This book is interesting in that it is an 
attempt to provide a layman's guide to the workings of a "monetary 
economy" via the views of two authors who "belong to the school of 
thought associated with the name of J. M. Keynes" (p. vi). That this 
self-identification is not idle (at least for Townshend) is attested to 
by Keynes' surviving correspondence with Townshend in which he credits 
him with even more than a complete understanding of his theory. For 
example, consider the following fragments from Keynes' letters to 
Townshend (in Keynes, 1979, pp. 235-247 and 255-259): 
It is evident that you have a perfect comprehension of the matter; 
and indeed It may prove to be the case that, whilst the book is 
chiefly meant for my academic friends, it may sometimes get easier 
reception from those outside academic circles, whose Ideas are not 
so crystallised (p. 238). 
Once more you have shown a complete comprehension of what I am 
driving at, and I am very grateful (p. 239). 
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Once again I have to thank you for an acute and understanding 
criticism, with the whole of which, I think I may say, I agree (p. 
245). 
Criticisms like yours are mainly useful in helping me to get more 
fully emancipated from what one has emerged out of (p. 247), 
This last fragment reinforces the view of Shackle that Townshend saw 
earlier and deeper than most writers into the depths of the departure 
from orthodoxy that Keynes' views on money and interest represent: 
Townshend's brilliant paper, although thirteen pages long, appeared 
only under Notes and Memoranda. It leapt too far ahead for the mass 
of Keynes's critics, still tapping the wheels of his theory to see 
whether it would clank decently round like the sort of thing they 
were used to, and Townshend attracted no attention (1967, p. 228). 
16. 
Moreover, it would seem to follow that there can be no such thing as 
long-period dynamic economic theory, failing the (most unlikely) 
discovery of a plausible long-term convention of price-stability. 
It is perhaps now being generally realised that such long-term 
dynamic theories as these are considered unplausible ones. It is 
not unnatural that those who forecast the future in algebra or 
geometry should be chastened by hard fact more slowly than those who 
have to forecast it in arithmetic. Nor is the conclusion that the 
search for laws to enable us to predict economic events far ahead, 
like eclipses, must be given up, so surprising—not to say 
nihilistic—as it may seem (to some economists) at first sight. For 
in the past, in long periods prices have in fact moved all over the 
place. The inference that there is no reason to believe in the 
probable indefinite recurrence of a regular cycle of price-
fluctuations is less generally accepted, but seems to follow from 
Mr. Keynes' conclusions (Townshend, 1937, p. 166). 
17. There Is an interesting parallel between Keynes' discussion of 
a liquidity standard in a nonmonetary economy and Menger's (1892; 1976, 
ch. 8) hypothetico-historical account of the origin of a medium of 
exchange. Both revolve around the concept of "marketability." I think a 
comparison of them would show a strong complementarity between the 
discussions. Menger explains the process and reasons for the evolution 
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of a generally accepted means of payment. Keynes shows that this 
spontaneously evolved social institution has important externality 
effects—even in the most primitive monetary systems. 
18. 
The liquidity premium, it will be observed, is partly similar to the 
risk-premium, but partly different;—the difference corresponding to 
the difference between the best estimates we can make of 
probabilities and the confidence with which we can make them 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 240). 
-A/; 
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ESSAY III. THE SRAFFA-HAYEK DEBATE IN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous essay attempts to show the extent to which Keynes' 
views on money and Interest can be given analytical focus by situating 
them In the own-rates of Interest framework developed In Chapter 17 of 
the General Theory. When analyzed In terms of the shifting equilibrium 
on the asset market suggested by Keynes' use of the own-rates theory, 
both the possibility of unemployment equilibriums and his unique approach 
to expectations, uncertainty, and money can be seen as part of the same 
theoretical picture. Having defined this approach in terms of 
unemployment equilibriums, it is natural to ask how, or if, the own-rates 
equilibrium approach differs from orthodox equilibrium approaches. In 
the present case, this is an especially compelling exercise for two 
Interrelated reasons. 
First, in terms of the historical record, the Immediate response to 
Sraffa's original conception of commodity own-rates, put forth In his 
review of Hayek (Sraffa, 1932a), took the form of Hayek claiming that his 
concept of equilibrium Included the simultaneous existence of many 
commodity rates. Since we have argued that Sraffa's commodity-rate 
concept represents a formidable attack on the whole Âustro-Wicksellian 
business cycle theory based on the conception of a "natural" rate of 
Interest, Hayek's defense of his position warrants attention. Moreover, 
this historical debate is linked explicitly with our second, and more 
modern, reason for Investigating the equilibrium conception behind the 
own-rates framework. Recently, the neo-Walraslan conception of a full 
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Intertemporal equilibrium model has been traced to Hayek's own work in 
the '208 and '308 (Mllgate, 1982, pp. 125-142). Since this modern 
general equilibrium framework also yields a complete set of commodity 
specific interest rates ancillary to the equilibrium price vector, it 
presents prima facie parallels with the own-rates framework. Once again, 
the synergism of the history of economics and modern developments is an 
Important theme. 
Following out this synergistic relationship, the present essay will 
review the Sraffa-Hayek debate from the standpoint of the light it might 
shed on the question of alternative equilibrium frameworks for discussing 
money and Interest. Our conclusion will be that there are (at least) two 
distinct approaches involved here, but that recourse to the Intertemporal 
equilibrium construct to dodge Sraffa's criticism Involves Hayek in a 
substantial abandonment of his original Wlcksellian position. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the later development of Hayek's monetary 
thought away from equilibrium concerns and toward institutional process 
analysis of the social functions of money. 
Pushing forward to the modern conception of Walraslan intertemporal 
equilibrium, we will compare this most general of frameworks with Keynes' 
own-rates theory. Here, our conclusion will be that the neo-Walraslan 
approach falls to address the basic social and institutional motivations 
upon which Keynes based his approach to a monetary theory of production. 
Essentially our argument will be that the neo-Walraslan approach 
shares with the traditional neoclassical long-period theory (e.g., as 
represented by Wlcksell) a barter stance toward value determination that 
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logically excludes the most Interesting qualities of a monetary economy, 
while throwing out the corresponding long-period vision of competition. 
This argument will be brought out by a comparison of Sraffa's long-period 
use of own-rates in his critique of the Wicksellian framework with the 
own-rates that come out of a neo-Walrasian Intertemporal equilibrium* 
Having gained this insight, we can view Keynes* own-rates equilibrium 
framework as an Intermediate case between Sraffa's and the neo-
Walrasian' s conception of equilibrium own-rates. From this standpoint, 
Keynes' shifting equilibrium maintains the long-period concern with the 
tendency of competition to equalize rates of return, while providing a 
short-period financial mechanism by which the monetary elements of 
conventional judgment, expectation, and liquidity effect the level at 
which this rate settles. A quick review of Sraffa's and Keynes' use of 
own-rates will set the stage for our discussion. 
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II. SRAFFA AND KEYNES' USE OF OWN-RATES 
We have already laid out the details of Sraffa's (1932a) critique of 
the Austro-Wicksellian natural rate framework in Essay II. Briefly, 
Sraffa's criticism can be summed up in two main points. In his analysis 
of the Wicksellian natural rate concept, Sraffa made the important point 
that in a barter-like state, 
there would be a single rate which satisfies the conditions of 
equilibrium, but there might at any moment, be as many 'natural' 
rates of interest as there are commodities, though they would not be 
'equilibrium' rates (1932a, p. 45). 
Thus, a unique "natural rate," such as the Wicksellian monetary framework 
revolves around, cannot be defined. Secondly, Sraffa finds that because 
these divergent commodity rates are common to any exchange economy, 
monetary as well as barter, where the conditions of long period 
equilibrium are not fulfilled, the Wicksellian dichotomy between a 
nonmonetary, "real" natural-rate, and a bank-influenced "money" rate is a 
flawed approach to distinguishing the monetary and real influences in 
economic theory. Instead, Sraffa suggests, the differences between a 
monetary and nonmonetary economy should be sought in 
those characteristics which are set forth at the beginning of every 
textbook on money. That is to say, that money is not only the 
medium of exchange, but also a store of value, and the standard in 
terms of which debts, and other legal obligations, habits, opinions, 
conventions, in short all kinds of relations between men, are more 
or less rigidly fixed (1932a, p. 43). 
We have also shown that it was exactly these characteristics of 
money as a public good that Keynes amplified into a complex "shifting 
equilibrium" framework of production, asset holding, and relative prices. 
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Be.'ore comparing Sraffa's views with Hayek's, it is Important to 
emphasize one additional point from our previous discussion. That is 
that the concept of equilibrium own-rates differs for Sraffa and Keynes. 
For Sraffa, recall, the equilibrium was defined by the traditional long-
period position of equal value returns in all production sectors. In 
this context, he defined equilibrium own-rates as the situation where 
spot and future prices coincide and where all the different commodity 
rates and the money rate take on the same value (1932a, pp. 50-51). 
Keynes' use of the own-rates Implied a very different conception of 
the equilibrium levels. For him, arbitrage in the asset market would 
drive the spot and future prices for existing assets into a configuration 
(not equality) where all own-rates, defined in money terms, offered equal 
financial rates of return to the marginal Investors. Thus, in his 
system, where asset markets are continuously equilibrated by arbitraglng, 
the Importance of the equilibrium is as a centering device for the 
interaction of the Influences of expectation, social convention and money 
on the one side, with the productive flows of Investment activity on the 
other. As we argued above, the difference between Sraffa's and Keynes' 
use of the own-rates can be set down as an example of the difference 
between Keynes' shifting equilibrium ("the theory of a system In which 
changing views about the future are capable of influencing the present 
situation"), and the theory of stationary equilibrium (where "we can 
consider what distribution of resources between different uses will be 
consistent with equilibrium under the Influence of normal economic 
motives in a world in which our views concerning the future are fixed and 
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reliable in all respects") (Keynes, 1936, p. 293). 
It will be noticed that such a conception as Keynes drew out of 
Sraffa's commodity rates addresses exactly those textbook characteristics 
of money and conventional wealth-relations that Sraffa hinted were being 
lost sight of in the Wicksellian framework. From this standpoint, the 
use of own-rates in the review of Hayek can be viewed as immanent 
criticism of the orthodox Marginalist approach to monetary theory (of 
which the Austro-Wicksellian variant was a prime example). 
Alternatively, Keynes' elaborate framework of Chapter 17 can be seen as a 
constructive alternative to that traditional theory. This distinction 
will aid our understanding of the tortuous twists and turns that 
following out Hayek's defense of his position will lead us to. To that 
end, it will be useful to draw this distinction out a bit more 
thoroughly. 
As we have mentioned (and as Sraffa's discussion makes clear^), 
Sraffa's use of the concept of own-rates is basically a classical long-
period conception. In this conception, each productive sector yields an 
equal rate of return, and all prices are at their long-period normal 
levels. Accordingly, his definition of equilibrium own-rates, where the 
spot and future price of each good coincide, and where each own-rate 
equals any other and the money-rate, is also a long-period conception. 
We have also shown that Keynes explicitly distinguishes his "shifting 
equilibrium," defined in Chapter 17 in own-rate terms, from any 
"stationary equilibrium" approach to value theory (such as Sraffa's 
equilibrium own-rates would imply) by the use of expectations made in 
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each. Thus in Keynes' framework, "equilibrium" own-rates do not imply 
the equality of all spot and future prices as in Sraffa's conception. 
Instead, he brings in expectations and so drives his own-rates into 
equality today, based on uncertain judgments of prices in a never-
realized future. 
It is instructive to note that Keynes makes this expectations-based 
distinction between the theory of shifting equilibrium and the theory of 
stationary equilibrium, in the context of a critique of the traditional 
separation of the theory of value and the theory of money (1936, pp. 292-
294). He complains of the approach by which relative prices are 
determined by supply and demand in discussions of the theory of value, 
but money prices are grounded in a completely different approach, usually 
some variant of the quantity theory. Keynes claims that one of his 
objects in the General Theory is 
. . .  t o  e s c a p e  t h i s  d o u b l e  l i f e  a n d  t o  b r i n g  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  
prices as a whole back to close contact with the theory of 
value (p. 293). 
Given that we have equated the own-rates framework with this attempt 
by Keynes to blend value theory and monetary theory, it is useful to ask 
how it bridges the dichotomy he found in the traditional approach. The 
uniqueness of this approach when compared to the traditional long-period 
specification of equal returns on capital in all sectors (whether this is 
a constant no growth stationary state, or just a steadily expanding long-
period as in Marshall's more dynamic conception ) concerns two points. 
First, Keynes' shifting equilibrium relies on revaluation of 
existing assets (both real and financial) on the second-hand markets to 
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continuously ensure equal "financial," or money-denominated, returns. 
This is the specification illustrated by the (arbitrage-driven) relation 
between all consistently measured own-rates of interest in equilibrium. 
What distinguishes this approach from the traditional marginalist theory 
of long-period equilibrium is that Keynes explicitly includes both 
financial and real aspects-of investment opportunities in his conception 
of the rate-of-return-equalizing function of competition. This is one 
aspect of his distinction between the theory of shifting equilibrium and 
the theory of stationary equilibrium. 
Secondly, this distinction involves the generality that Keynes 
claimed for his interest theory over that of the classicals. As he 
explicitly stated in his discussion of "The Classical Theory of The Rate 
of Interest" in Chapter 14 and its appendix, the obverse side of the 
failure to recognize less-than-full-employment equilibrium incomes is an 
incomplete theory of the rate of interest: 
Thus the functions used by the classical theory, namely the response 
of investment and the response of the amount saved out of a given 
income to change in the rate of interest, do not furnish material 
for a theory of the rate of interest; but they could be used to tell 
us what the level of income will be, (given from some other source) 
the rate of interest; and alternatively, what the rate of interest 
will have to be, if the level of income is to be maintained at a 
given figure (e.g. the level corresponding to full employment) 
(1936, pp. 181-182). 
What was missing in the classicals was the recognition of the link 
between changing income and the interest rate via the rate of investment. 
Keynes, by giving the monetary aspects of investment behavior equal 
footing with the real aspects, was able to provide this link. The own-
rates equilibrium provides the most general form of his argument on this 
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topic. When financial and capital assets are each equally attractive 
Investment opportunities, the own-rates of each sector will be driven to 
equality by wealth holders. But what is more Important is that the level 
of interest set in this asset-market equilibrium governs the flows of new 
investment goods production, and so affects aggregate demand. Thus 
follows the importance of money and liquidity preference if these 
monetary influences, for fundamental reasons of the economic environment, 
set the pace of investment activity. Unlike the classical system which 
could only define the equilibrium configuration of interest rates (i.e., 
where the Interest rate equals the marginal efficiency of capital), 
Keynes also provides a theory of the level at which this configuration 
will settle. 
In terms of the place of the own-rates theory in both Sraffa's 
imminent criticism of the orthodox approach and Keynes' constructive 
blending of monetary and value theory, the fundamental question is the 
choice of a method by which monetary influences are allowed to enter 
economic theory. Keynes clearly thought that it obscured the powerful 
role of monetary factors to relegate them to a disturbing cause that only 
enters as an afterthought to an otherwise purely "real" theory of 
relative prices. He made this point as early as 1933 in his contribution 
to the Speithoff festschrift, "A Monetary Theory of Production"; he 
repeated it in the General Theory and continued to emphasize it in his 
review of his critics in his post-General Theory defense (1937a,b,c). 
Not surprisingly, then, this same fundamental point turns out to be the 
central focus of the Sraffa-Hayek debate from which Keynes lifted the 
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own-rate approach in 1932. With a view to Keynes' place in relation to 
the tradition of treating monetary factors as a deviation from long-
period equilibrium, we now turn to Hayek's reply to Sraffa on these 
issues. 
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III. HAYEK'S DEFENSE 
Hayek clearly recognized the fundamental nature of Sraffa's 
critique. Accordingly, his reply notes that both he and Sraffa are 
Interested in the answer to the methodological question as to "where the 
essential differences between a monetary and a non-monetary economy are 
to be sought" (Hayek, 1932b, p. 238). In 1932, Hayek felt that this was 
an "obvious matter" and he states his view quite clearly: 
I have been assuming that the body of existing pure economic theory 
demonstrates, that so long as we neglect monetary factors, there is 
an inherent tendency toward an equilibrium of the economic system; 
and what I tried to do in Prices and Production, and in certain 
earlier publications, was to show that monetary factors may bring 
about a kind of disequilibrium in the economic system—which could 
not be explained without recourse to these monetary factors (p. 
232). 
Here, Hayek has succinctly summed up the traditional treatment of 
monetary factors in the value theory of the 1930s. In so doing, he 
clearly identifies his natural rate approach with the orthodoxy Keynes 
was dissenting from. We have already touched on the mechanics of the 
Austro-Wicksellian version of this tradition in our discussion of Hayek's 
business cycle theory above (Essay II, pp. 96-99). What is central to 
the present case is the idea that without bank-controlled money, which 
makes possible the altering of the market rate away from the natural 
rate, that the real economic system would tend toward a full-employment, 
long-period equilibrium (see Hayek, 1935, pp. 30-31; Wicksell, 1935, pp. 
159-168; Leijonhufvud, 1981, pp. 131-202). This much of Hayek's reply is 
not surprising and on its basis alone we could attribute to Hayek his 
earlier professed reliance (1935, pp. 22-25) on the relative price theory 
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(if not the monetary price-level theory) embodied in the Wicksellian 
framework which he described in Prices and Production; 
Put concisely, Wlcksell's theory is as follows: If it were not for 
monetary disturbances, the rate of Interest would be determined so 
as to equalize the demand for and the supply of savings. This 
equilibrium rate, as I prefer to call it, he christens the natural 
rate of interest. In a money economy, the actual or money rate of 
interest ("Geldzins") may differ from the equilibrium or natural 
rate, because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet 
in their natural form but in the form of money, the quantity of 
which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by 
the banks (p. 23). 
Note that this quote includes the passage Sraffa had picked out in 
focusing his criticism on the conception of a unique natural rate in an 
accumulating economy. His simple-minded objection was that such a 
barter-like natural rate would be impossible to define within this 
framework. Given this context of agreement with the Wicksellian theory, 
then, what surprising in Hayek's reply is that he bases his objection 
to Sraffa's strictures on the argument that he had all along been aware 
of the simultaneous existence of a multiplicity of commodity rates. 
Referring explicitly to Sraffa's contention that if money did not exist, 
"there might, at any moment, be as many 'natural' rates of interest as 
there are commodities," Hayek replies: 
I think it would be truer to say that, in this situation, there 
would be no single rate which, applied to all commodities, would 
satisfy the conditions of equilibrium rates, but there might, at any 
moment, be as many "natural" rates of Interest as there are com­
modities, all of which would be equilibrium rates (1932b, p. 245). 
Clearly what we have here is a difference of opinion over the 
precise meaning given to the term equilibrium. At least two conceptions 
can be distinguished so far. First, we have Sraffa's usage, already 
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defined as a position where each productive sector yields an equal rate 
of return, or where the money rate and all commodity rates are the same. 
As we have mentioned (and as Sraffa's discussion makes clear), this Is 
basically a classical long-period conception. Sraffa's use of the long-
period conception In an Immanent criticism of the Wlckselllan framework 
Is In full accordance with the whole tradition of post-marglnal-
revolutlon monetary theory to which we compared Keynes above. P. A. 
Samuelson (1968, pp. 170-171), In a look back to what classical and 
neoclassical monetary theory "really was" before Keynes, (or as he puts 
it, what a "jackass" neoclassical monetary theorist believed before 
1937), succinctly sums up this position: 
Essentially, we believed that in the longest run and in ideal models 
the amount of money did not matter. Money could be "neutral" and in 
many conditions the hypothesis that it was could provide a good 
first or last approximation to the facts. To be sure, Hume, Fisher 
and Hawtrey had taught us that, under dynamic conditions, an 
increase in money might lead to "money illusion" and might cause 
substantive changes. . . . But all of this was at a second level of 
approximation, representing relatively transient abberations. 
Moreover, this tended to be taught in applied courses on business 
cycles, money and finance and economic history rather than in 
courses on pure theory. In a real sense there was a dichotomy in 
our minds; we were schizophrenics. 
This schizophrenic treatment of money as an afterthought to the 
"real" determination of relative prices was the foundation upon which the 
monetary theories of Wlcksell and the other post-revolution Marglnallsts 
were built. Keynes mentions Marshall, Bohm-Bawerk, and Carver (among 
others) in this connection (1936, pp. 175-193), as examples of the 
classical Interest rate theorists. He distinguishes as "neo-classical" 
those monetary theorists who still maintained the theoretical distinction 
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between prices and money, but who "attempt to build a bridge" between the 
two. It is with this group that he places the concept of a "natural rate 
of interest" and the idea of forced savings that play so much a part in 
the Âustro-Wicksellian scheme. 
Thus, by most standards, it seems appropriate to group Hayek's 
argument in Prices and Production within the neoclassical tradition of 
investigating the short-run disturbances by which monetary influences 
cause deviations from a traditional long-period equilibrium. Surely this 
is what Hayek was referring to in his statement above about the "inherent 
tendency toward an equilibrium" of the system in the absence of monetary 
factors and his Identification of monetary theory with "a kind of 
disequilibrium in the economic system." This perception is further 
reinforced when we see Hayek rebuking Sraffa for misunderstanding the 
context of his monetary theory: 
I do not quite understand whether Mr. Sraffa thinks that, in order 
to show this [the disturbing influence of monetary factors], it 
would have been necessary first to re-state the whole of equilibrium 
economics. 1 thought this was not only impossible within the limits 
of a small book, but also quite unnecessary (Hayek, 1932b, p. 238). 
In fact, as Sraffa's critique and Keynes' development of the own-
rates theory of interest now make clear, this is exactly what Sraffa was 
advocating in 1932. But, realizing Hayek's strong identification with 
the Wicksellian tradition, this makes his further comment about the 
existence of a multiplicity of divergent, but nevertheless "equilibrium," 
rates of Interest all the more perplexing. For this second conception of 
equilibrium, the theory of intertemporal equilibrium is in direct 
opposition to the traditional long-period method by which Wicksell (and 
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Hayek in Prices and Production) determined the natural rate of interest 
to which the market rate was compared in analyzing the short-run 
influence of money. 
We will investigate the details of this modern conception of capital 
and interest in the next section. For our present purposes, it is 
sufficient to point out its use by Hayek and its contradiction of the 
natural rate framework that he seems to have simultaneously held. The 
link with our present historical investigation is provided by Murray 
Milgate's recent Capital and Employment (1982), where he identifies Hayek 
as the originator of the conception of an "intertemporal equilibrium." 
Essentially, the conception of Intertemporal equilibriums Involves a 
logical extension of the Walraslan general equilibrium model to a 
situation where goods are distinguished by dates of availability, as well 
as their other characteristics. In this context, the same good at 
different dates might have different prices. The relationship between 
the same good's price at different dates forms the implicit interest rate 
on each good, none of which logically need be equal (see Bliss, 1975, Ch. 
3). 
The crucial difference between this conception and the traditional 
long-period equilibrium method is that since all prices, current and 
future, are determined at once, and only yield ancillary interest rates 
that are implicit in the equilibrium price vector, no equalized rates of 
return in different productive sectors is called for. Indeed, this 
foundation-stone of the traditional approach to value theory by which a 
uniform general rate of return (profit) (e.g. Wlcksell's natural rate) is 
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Che object of analysis, is completely lost in the intertemporal 
equilibrium framework. Milgate (1982, p. 136) notes this radical change 
in the notion of equilibrium. 
To arrive at the notion of intertemporal equilibrium, one has 
first to cut loose the short-period problem from its traditional 
long-period moorings (which amounts to a severing of the 
traditional conception of "equilibrium" and "disequilibrium") and 
then to install it into the centre of the picture* This, of 
course, is precisely the point at which the early work of 
Lindahl and Myrdal is so strikingly at variance with that of 
Wicksell. 
Milgate documents the existence of this conception ("so strikingly 
at variance with that of Wicksell") in Hayek's early monetary theory. He 
shows that the idea of dating commodities is present in Prices and 
Production and that the notion of an Intertemporal equilibrium appears 
clearly in Hayek's Pure Theory of Capital (1941). Historically, the 
concept seems to have originated in a 1928 paper by Hayek which has just 
recently been translated as "Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and 
Movements in The Value of Money" (1928). This early paper is 
particularly interesting to our theme since it both explicitly identifies 
Hayek as an early expositor of intertemporal equilibrium theory, and 
contains his earliest views on the place of money in equilibrium value 
theory. 
With regard to the relation of monetary theory and price theory, in 
1928 Hayek is adamant that money should be viewed as falling within the 
purview of equilibrium theory. To this end, he faults the traditional 
static equilibrium theory for neglecting the influence of time on the 
production and consumption of goods. 
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As soon as these assumptions [of static theory], oversimplified and 
all too contradictory of reality as they are, are replaced by ones 
corresponding more to the facts, it becomes evident that the 
customary abstraction from time does a degree of violence to the 
actual state of affairs which casts serious doubt upon the utility 
of the results thereby achieved (pp. 71-72). 
Hayek's view of the value of equilibrium theory at this point is also 
clearly stated. 
Yet the concept of equilibrium is Just as indispensible a tool for 
the analysis of temporal differences in prices as it is for any 
other investigation in economic theory. Strictly speaking, its 
field of application is identical with that of economic theory (p. 
75). 
So if time has been neglected, but equilibrium is indispensible, then an 
extension of static value theory that will adequately account for the 
influence of time and money within the traditional theory of equilibrium 
states is called for: 
From the moment at which the analysis is no longer concerned 
exclusively with prices which are (presumed to be) simultaneously 
set, as in the elementary presentations of pure theory, but goes on 
to a consideration of the monetary economy, with prices which 
necessarily are set at successive points in time, a problem arises 
for whose solution it is vain to seek in the existing corpus of 
economic theory. Instead of needing to explain merely the necessity 
for the existence of a particular structure [Abstufung] of 
simultaneously existing prices and its function, what must now be 
done is to analyze the necessity and significance of relative levels 
of prices at successive points in time. 
It is in pursuit of this goal that Hayek introduces the idea of an 
"intertemporal price system" which would determine intertemporal exchange 
ratios over time between goods, all of which would be equilibrium rates. 
Though the style of this paper, translated from the academic German of 
the 1920s, is tortuously turgid, it provides many historically 
interesting points. These include a discussion of the definition of the 
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elementary time period for which Intertemporal relations will be defined, 
the "data" that are analytically necessary to define such an equilibrium, 
and the meaning of the divergent commodity rates so defined. In 
particular, Hayek's treatment Is very suggestive of the form that Hicks' 
"temporary equilibrium" model would take In 1939 (Hicks dates his 
"personal revolution" In economic theory from his association with Hayek 
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at the L.S.E. In the thirties ). But for our purposes In trying to place 
Hayek's approach to monetary theory In the context of the theoretical 
scene of the 1930s, this flirtation with Intertemporal equilibrium seems 
only to add perplexity to confusion. 
What Is perplexing Is the fact of Hayek's continual shifting of his 
position In the monetary debates of the period—and often to completely 
self-contradictory analytical positions. Of this analytical hopscotch, 
the reply to Sraffa Is just one Jump. Sraffa, recall, had explicitly 
aimed his criticism of the barter-like natural rate toward the 
Wlckselllan framework that Hayek claimed to be utilizing In Prices and 
Production. Having shown that this concept could not be uniquely 
defined, Sraffa implied It mattered little since such an attempt to 
separate value theory from the real concerns of a monetary economy 
invalidated It from the start. In reply to this, then, Hayek Is 
professing to hold onto the traditional long-period separation between 
relative prices and money, and simultaneously embrace an "intertemporal 
equilibrium" that Invalidates the very conception of the Wlckselllan 
natural rate. 
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Hayek seems to have been thrown off balance by Sraffa's critique, 
which is not surprising when we recall the theoretical turmoil of the 
period. In the end, though, Hayek cannot have it both ways. As Sraffa's 
rejoinder makes clear, the choice between an Intertemporal equilibrium 
approach and the natural rate framework is a choice between two mutually 
exclusive theoretical positions: 
Dr. Hayek now acknowledges the multiplicity of the "natural" rates, 
but he has nothing more to say on this specific point than that they 
"all would be equilibrium rates." The only meaning (if it be a 
meaning) I can attach to this point is that his maxim of policy now 
requires that the money rate should be equal to all these divergent 
natural rates (1932b, p. 251). 
In historical terms, Hayek can hardly be faulted for his confusion 
over the precise meanings of theoretical developments that were being 
invented as he wrote. In fact, the distinction about the different 
notions of equilibrium that lie behind various theoretical systems is a 
development of a fairly recent vintage (see Hahn, 1973; Garegnanl, 1976; 
Milgate, 1982)^. Moreover, he was in the good company of Wlcksell, 
Marshall and even Rlcardo in having been shown a subtle and implicit 
assumption of his own system by that piercing gadfly Plero Sraffa. But 
what is perhaps less to Hayek's credit is his practice of freely shifting 
his methodological ground when his theory met with criticism (while 
suspiciously deriving the same policy conclusions from each alternative 
approach). We have seen one Instance of this in the Sraffa-Hayek debate. 
A quick survey of the latter-day development of his methodological views 
and his views on money reveal a disturbing continuance of this pattern. 
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In terms of his methodological position toward equilibrium economic 
theory, Hayek's views have run the gamut from zealous advocacy to 
complete rejection. T. W. Hutchison (1981) has recently surveyed Hayek's 
methodological work in economics and concluded that we need to 
distinguish at least two Hayeks: 
Through the multifarious experiences and upheavals of the middle 
decades of the twentieth century, Hayek's long intellectual career 
has shown much constancy of view. ... But, on some quite 
fundamental and very important points of methodology and philosophy, 
vital and critical changes in Hayek's views can be discerned—as 
also, incidentally, on money and on some issues of employment 
policy—which have not received the attention and appreciation which 
they deserve (pp. 210-211). 
It would be far beyond our present purposes to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the development of Hayek's multifarious views on 
the method of the social sciences (see Hutchison, 1981). What is 
sufficient to our case is to point out that Hayek's ambivalent position 
on these matters is not isolated to the debate with Sraffa and that his 
shifting methodological views parallel a shifting view of the importance 
and place of money in economic theory. 
As we have seen, Hayek in the 1920s and '30s seems to have been 
simultaneously a Wicksellian natural-rate-theorist, looking to monetary 
disequilibriums to define what happens "in the first place" (Wicksell, 
1935, p. 159) when a long-period relative-price equilibrium is upset, and 
also a Walrasian^ "intertemporal" equilibrium theorist trying to define a 
general equilibrium treatment of money as a set of prices over time. 
Neither of these approaches, of course, dealt with any of those 
characteristics of money as a social institution grounded in an uncertain 
199 
environment that were the hallmarks of Keynes' treatment. In fact, 
Hutchinson argues that the early Hayek, following his mentor Mises, held 
a commitment to economic equilibriums so ardent that he considered It a 
stronger conception than the corresponding idea in the natural sciences. 
Hutchinson quotes the following in this context: 
The essential basic facts which we need for the explanation of 
social phenomena are part of common experience, part of the stuff of 
our thinking. In the social sciences it is the elements of the 
complex phenomena which are known beyond the possibility of dispute. 
In the natural sciences they can at best be surmised (Hayek, 1949, 
p. 126, italics added). 
Yet, after the General Theory was published, we see Hayek turning 
away from his previous commitments to mechanistic equilibrium theory and 
castigating economists for trying to ape the "scientistlc" methods of the 
natural sciences (Hayek, 1952, pp. 14-16). This further evolution in 
Hayek's thought, away from either an equilibrium or. disequilibrium 
approach, toward a legalistic, institutional process analysis of social 
phenomena, began with his famous "Economics and Knowledge" in 1937 
(discussed in detail in Essay I, above). Here, we find Hayek critiquing 
the whole idea of formal equilibrium states (which, recall, had been 
"Identical with economic theory" in 1928) as little more than a 
tautologous starting point of analysis. To see the extent to which his 
position had changed from 1932 to 1937, compare the following statement 
with Hayek's rebuke to Sraffa about the "obvious" conclusion of existing 
equilibrium theory (quoted above, pp. 189 and 192). 
I am afraid that I am now getting to a state where it becomes 
exceedingly difficult to say what exactly are the assumptions on the 
basis of which we assert that there will be a tendency toward 
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equilibrium and to claim that our analysis has an application to the 
real world (1937, p. 60). 
It Is from this critique of equilibrium theory that Hutchison dates 
the birth of Hayek II (we might say Hayek III, given our knowledge of the 
Sraffa debate). To Hutchison, this paper 
. . . certainly marks a vital turning-point, or even U-turn, in 
Hayek's methodological Ideas, and ought to be, but has not been, 
recognized as marking £ fundamental shift in Austrian ideas. The 
main insights of this article are quite incompatible—except, 
possibly, at a level of extreme triviality—with the methodological 
ideas of his previous writings (1981, p. 215). 
This "Hayek II" is the Hayek who is concerned with investigating the 
rules by which the free exercise of individual human faculties form a 
"spontaneous" social order. From 1937 onwards, this general 
preoccupation marks all of his work. In "Economics and Knowledge" 
(1937), his critique of the "Pure Logic of Choice" led him to redefine a 
social equilibrium as a compatibility of the individual plans that make 
it up. His later work (Hayek, 1973; 1976; 1979) follows this general 
methodological standpoint in investigating the analytical and moral 
Implications of this "spontaneous order" by which free Individuals 
allegedly construct a set of social rules out of chaos, according to the 
maxim, "The Results of Human Action, But Not of Human Design" (1969). 
Hayek's influential methodological views are well-known to scholars 
of Austrian thought, but what seems to have escaped notice (except by 
Hutchinson) is the fact that his later methodological position implicitly 
rejects all of Hayek's earlier formal contributions to monetary and 
business-cycle theory. Interestingly for us, though, this brings his 
later work more closely in line, in terms of the methodological treatment 
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of money as a social Institution, with Keynes' analysis of monetary 
theory that we have described above. Perhaps Hayek finally took Sraffa's 
criticism to heart after seeing the effective use made of the own-rates 
conception In the General Theory! 
Two examples of the meaning of Hayek's later monetary views for his 
treatment of money illustrate this theme* First, in pursuing his 
critique of equilibrium states as tautologies of logic in 1937, Hayek 
makes note of the fact that the compatibility of individual plans, the 
only meaning he claims to see in the idea of a social equilibrium (1937, 
pp. 53-54), means that the shared mechanisms of society are (at least 
partially) defined by the attitudes individuals take toward them (pp. 62-
67). It is on the basis of this notion that Hayek bases his fundamental 
distinction between subjective data and objective facts (pp. 51-53). 
In the case of money, this idea can be very fruitful, although Hayek 
doesn't seem to have made any use of it in that direction. As Keynes 
showed, it is precisely the subjective attitudes of individuals toward 
the liquidity properties that are attached to the medium of exchange that 
gives money its peculiar force in economic life. But Keynes goes further 
than Hayek in this respect by analyzing the external effects that the 
spontaneous order of a socially defined liquidity standard imply for the 
pace of Investment and employment. 
It is notable that, although this subjectivlst view of money fits 
easily into Keynes' monetary world of uncertainty and convention, this is 
a very different type of money than would have fulfilled the role of 
money in Hayek's Wickselllan business-cycle theory. In that case, the 
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goal was to eliminate, through the "neutrality" approach, any influence 
of monetary factors upon the otherwise smoothly operating equilibrium 
production of goods. But apart from the fact that Hayek has now (as of 
1937) abandoned that view of equilibrium, if his insight into the 
subjective nature of money as a social institution is fully thought out 
(as in the General Theory, chapter 17), it becomes clear that the 
Influence of money is not so easily done away with. This is precisely 
the meaning of Keynes' warning that his theory of shifting equilibrium 
must start from a monetary economy, and that the characteristic problems 
of a monetary economy could not even be escaped by abolishing "gold and 
silver and legal tender Instruments" (1936, pp. 293-294). 
A second concern of Hayek's in "Economics and Knowledge" that is 
very much illuminated by Keynes' shifting equilibrium theory Is the 
concern Hayek expresses to Include the expectations of individuals in the 
definition of equilibrium. Recall that it was exactly this point that 
Keynes stressed in defining his concept ("a system in which changing 
views about the future are capable of influencing the present 
situation"). Again, though, we see Keynes making much more of the notion 
than Hayek ever did. 
Hayek wanted to define his "social equilibrium" as a compatibility 
of plans: 
For a society then we can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point 
of time^-but it means only that compatibility exists between the 
different plans which the individuals composing it have made for 
action in time. And equilibrium will continue, once it exists, so 
long as the external data correspond to the common expectations of 
all the members of society (1937, p. 53). 
203 
But in terms of Keynes' vision of the complex balancing that 
equilibrium at a point in time represents, Hayek has got two things 
confused here. While it is true that it is the interaction of individual 
views about the future that give definition to certain aspects of 
equilibrium today, this is not the same thing as saying that all future 
plans are compatible. In fact, Keynes' analysis of the influence of 
expectations on the asset market showed the vital importance of a variety 
of views of the future—vital if the equilibrium was to be at all stable. 
Moreover, in Keynes' shifting equilibrium, the actual future content of 
the individual (investors', savers', speculators') expectations really 
mattered very little, since their effect would be felt today whether they 
were realized or not. This vital aspect of his view of an uncertain 
future is the basis both of his view of the social disutility of savings 
and the peculiar psychology of liquidity and money. 
In relation to this last point, it is interesting to speculate on 
the extent to which the influence of Bohm-Bawerkian temporal analysis may 
be the crucial point of difference between Keynes and the Austrians. It 
has long been the lament of Austrians that Keynes' major failing as a 
theorist was a lack of understanding of capital theory. Hayek has made 
this criticism of both the Treatise and the General Theory and modern 
Austrians repeat it to this day* Yet, we have seen above that, contrary 
to these assertions, Keynes actually seems to have thought long and hard 
about capital theory problems and in fact to have based his analysis of 
interest and money on his own view of capital theory. Most likely the 
trouble for the Austrians has always been that Keynes (like many others) 
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explicitly did not find the traditionally Austrian emphasis on the time 
structure of production as a fruitful approach to the problems of capital 
theory. He specifically addresses this Issue In Chapter 16 of the 
General Theory» 
Briefly, his approach was to emphasize the reproducibility of 
capital goods and so to seek their value In their relative scarcity as a 
good. His famous barb to the Bohm-Bawerklan conception about "smelly 
processes," etc. was designed to Illustrate the fact that while the 
productivity associated with a lengthening time structure of production 
is (sometimes) one aspect of the demand for capital goods, it is by no 
means the only one. In fact, Keynes seems to have been much ahead of his 
time in this respect since he explicitly noted that there may be 
conditions in which the extra roundaboutedness of production would not 
necessarily Increase the value of the capital so employed. Echoes of the 
Cambridge reswltchlng controversies abound in his treatment of both this 
issue and of aggregate measures of capital. 
But to get back to the definition of expectations-based 
equilibriums, it Is obvious that the tremendous Influence of Bohm-Bawerk 
on both Wlcksell and Mises, and then Hayek, caused a disproportionate 
preoccupation by these authors with the time structure of production. G. 
L. S. Shackle makes this point in relation to Hayek in a synopsis of his 
contribution to economics: 
In reading The Pure Theory of Capital one is likely, I think, to 
conjecture that Hayek very early in his scholar's life gave his 
allegiance to Bohm-Bawerk and to Wlcksell, that his mind was seized 
by an arresting idea, namely, that in investigating the nature of 
capital we are investigating an aspect of the nature of time. Such 
205 
a conviction gives an Immense Impulse to Intellectual effort, for It 
removes at one stroke any fear that the problem in hand may prove 
trivial or peripheral. . . . Some such influence seems needed to 
explain the huge effort which Hayek devoted to refounding the Bohm-
Bawerk-Wicksell theory of capital (1981, p. 249). 
And, of course, this devotion by Austrians (young and old) to such a 
capital concept could explain a lot about their peculiar hostility to a 
book which in fact tries to show that this element of time peripheral 
to capital theory. For where Hayek may have been seized with the majesty 
of time, from Keynes' standpoint he failed to grasp its essence as a one­
way, irreversible continuum. It may be the case that the influence of 
Bohm-Bawerk in this respect was actually to trivialize time by making it 
seem analyzable objectively, forwards or backwards, just like any other 
economic quantity.^ Surely this is what led Hayek to treat the temporal 
aspects of goods as easily subsumed Into an "intertemporal equilibrium" 
in 1928. Likewise, his business-cycle theory, based as it is on the 
"forced" lengthening and consequent crisis-induced shortening of the 
production process, treats the time element as a reversible factor. What 
we are arguing here is that this same point of view towards the nature of 
time pervades even his expectations-based equilibrium of plans in 
"Economics and Knowledge."^ 
If this speculation has any basis, then it goes far in explaining 
why Keynes' "shifting equilibrium" is so much more powerful an approach 
than Hayek's "compatibility of plans" theory. In Keynes' conception the 
fact that plans in the future may not be compatible or that plans made in 
the past are disappointed does not, in and of themselves, affect the 
equilibrium. What matters is the effect on currently held expectations. 
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Whatever their basis may be (and he implied with his analysis of 
conventional judgment, animal spirits, etc., that this basis may be 
fairly flimsy), to the extent that subjective plans Influence current 
decisions (to save, Invest, hold money, etc.) they are operative factors. 
Once time moves on, these expectations surely might be disappointed, but 
new expectations will necessarily be formed and they will be the 
Important operative factor, not the (however Influential) formerly 
disappointed ones. 
One further Insight this discussion yields up Is an explanation of 
Keynes' abandonment (after some flirtation In the early work on the 
O 
General Theory ) of any type of "period analysis" In his search for a new 
framework for employment theory. As evidence of Keynes' views on this 
subject, we have his exchange of letters with Bertll Ohlln and his 
subsequent note In the Economic Journal for December of 1937 on "The 'Ex 
Ante' Theory of The Rate of Interest" (all reprinted In Keynes (1973b), 
pp. 184-201, and 215-223). The relevant point to our discussion from 
these writings Is that Keynes bases his general methodological argument 
against the use of a "periods analysis" on the treatment of time and 
expectations that such a conception Implies. In a letter to Ohlln 
(1973b, p. 185), he clearly expresses this point: 
. . .  w h e n  o n e  c o m e s  t o  p r o v e  s o m e t h i n g  t r u l y  l o g i c a l  a n d  p r o p e r l y  
watertight, then I believe there are advantages In my method and 
that the ex post and ex ante device cannot be precisely stated 
without very cumbrous devices. I used to speak of the period 
between expectation and results as 'funnels of process,' but the 
fact that the funnels are all of different lengths and overlap one 
another meant that at any given time there was no aggregate realized 
result capable of being compared with some aggregate expectation at 
some earlier date. 
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In other words, it is not possible to logically treat current 
expectations as theoretically comparable to past expectations. What is 
relevant to decisions (and effective demand) is only the current period 
expectations. From the standpoint of an uncertain future, there is not 
much hope of all of these subjective plans ever coming into coordination 
or compatibility, as the Âustro-Wicksellians would have it. Instead, 
what we should look for theoretically is a mechanism by which these 
diverse current estimates of the uncertain future are brought into 
equilibrium (however "shifting") today. This is one superiority of the 
own-rates framework when compared with the Swedish and Austrian versions 
of business cycle theory. 
To bring us back to the connection with Bohm-Bawerk, it is important 
to reemphasize that a basic difference here is the theoretical treatment 
of time. In the Bohm-Bawerkian conception, where time takes on a 
physical characteristic that is no different from the other objective 
qualities of goods, it is a logical step to subsume time as one more 
element in the general equilibrium construct: 
For Bohm-Bawerk had drawn the rate of interest into the scheme of 
value-theory and encompassed it into the General Equilibrium system. 
He had bound it into the system of deliberate, voluntary, pre-
reconciled and fully-informed actions by which all conduct can be 
explained as the response of reason to circumstance. Within such a 
system, there can be no involuntary acts, in particular no 
involuntary unemployment (G. L. S. Shackle, 1974, p. 53). 
As with Bohm-Bawerk, this ill-conceived treatment of time, interest, 
and money seems to have continued to haunt Hayek's work. It was most 
clearly evident in his 1928 conception of an intertemporal equilibrium 
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system. It pervaded his Prices and Production, where crises resulted 
from the inequality between a previously expected time-structure of 
production and a currently expected one. And even after having thrown 
over the economic equilibrium construct as sterile, his conception of a 
prior compatibility of plans was still Bohm-Bawerkian in its treatment of 
time. Keynes, on the other hand, starting from the uncertain world of 
his monetary theory, was able to overcome this hurdle. In so doing, he 
was able to preserve those two cardinal starting points of economic 
theory, equilibrium analysis and individual rationality, while creating 
an analytical explanation of involuntary unemployment. 
IV. INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM RECONSIDERED 
Given the tremendous ferment In monetary theory in the 1930s, 
particularly the tremendous attention given by all of the schools we have 
discussed (Austrian, Swedish, Cantabridgian) to the proper methodological 
framework for the analysis of a monetary economy, it is somehow 
surprising that the dominant approach in post-war monetary theory would 
be a reversion to the static Walrasian equilibrium system. Of course, 
from another standpoint, this should not be surprising (as we saw in 
Essay I). Since its reintroduction into the mainstream of Western 
economic thought by Hicks, Value and Capital (1946), the Walrasian 
paradigm, by virtue of its all-encompassing generality and the economic 
profession's demonstrated commitment to this abstract standard of the 
physical sciences, has successively conquered almost every theoretical 
domain of the discipline. One after another, its basic organizing 
principles were applied to value and distribution theory, macroeconomic 
theory, international trade theory and now even to applied policy 
studies. But, from the standpoint of monetary theory, the surprise 
should still linger. By general admission, it is the case that this 
framework has proved substantially useless in accounting for the social 
contrivance of money. 
Incompatibility between the Walrasian paradigm and monetary theory 
reveals itself in a number of unresolved controversies. Way back at its 
inception, it was Walras' own never-fulfilled desire to incorporate the 
functions of money and credit into his system of simultaneous equations. 
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He only got so far as the Incomplete consideration of the problems of 
admitting change into his system in the famous "Coda" to the Pure Theory. 
Ualras' eminent disciple Knut Wicksell was stout enough of heart to 
undertake the formidable task of combining Walras' equilibrium with Bohm-
Bawerk's capital theory, a task whose puzzles still elude us. Yet, when 
Wicksell came to discuss money and credit in volume two of his Lectures. 
the stringent formality of the general equilibrium setting was thrown 
over for a more informal disequilibrium, discussed in terms of an 
unspecified natural rate, a general price level and a cumulative process 
of inflation. More recently we have the example, duly noted in all 
monetary theory texts, of the fundamental incompatibility of Say's Law, 
Walras' Law and the Equation of Exchange when framed together in a 
general equilibrium setting. It was substantially in reaction to this 
incompatibility that the modern school of disequilibrium macroeconomics 
was started by Glower and Leijonhufvud in the late sixties. Thus, from 
the standpoint of the most recent work on monetary theory, we have come 
back full circle to Wicksell's treatment of monetary phenomena as 
disturbances to an otherwise equilibrium barter system. Again, the 
reason is the inability of the Walraslan system to account for money as 
anything other than an ad hoc afterthought. Frank Hahn, a true believer 
of the Walraslan faith, makes this point often. His attitude (1982, p. 
1) succinctly sums up the state of Walraslan monetary theory: 
The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the 
theorists is this: the best developed model of the economy cannot 
find room for it. The best developed model is, of course, the 
Arrow-Debreu version of a Walraslan general equilibrium. A world in 
which all conceivable contingent futures contracts are possible 
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neither needs nor wants Intrinsically worthless money. A first, and 
to a fastidious theorist difficult, task is to find an alternative 
construction without sacrificing the clarity and logical coherence 
that are such outstanding features of Arrow-Debreu. 
One is forced to wonder what is so "well-developed" about a model of the 
capitalist economy that can find no room for money and conversely what it 
is that is seen with such clarity by Arrow and Debreu. Hopefully, we can 
shed at least a glimmer of light on this wonder. 
As we have seen above, one version of the general equilibrium 
approach that has its roots in those controversies of the thirties is the 
concept of an "intertemporal price system." In terms of the historical 
record, we know this is an outgrowth of the Austro-Wicksellian business 
cycle approach which, in turn, was a complicated brew of Bohm-Bawerk's 
capital theory with Walras* price system. In Hayek's original article 
(1928), he notes that then existing theory really had no formal apparatus 
for "assessing different prices of the same goods at different points in 
time." As a preface to his attempt to provide such an apparatus, he 
notes that a "sole exception to this is provided by the well-known works 
of E. von Bohm-Bawerk." But BohmrBawerk, as well as the others mentioned 
in this context (F. A. Fetter, K. Wicksell, I. Fisher and L. Mises), 
"though they are replete with hints of this kind, . . . have little to 
offer in the way of positive conclusions for the problems to be dealt 
with here" (1928, pp. 72-73). 
But even if Hayek started from a Bohm-Bawerkian hint, the major 
influence of this idea on contemporary economic theory has been through 
its use in the Walrasian framework. Milgate (1982, pp. 125-142) offers a 
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good historical sketch of the path the concept took from its inception, 
in the work of Hayek and Lindahl, and then through Hicks (1946) and 
Malinvaud (1953; 1960-61), to the modern general equilibrium literature 
starting with Debreu (1959). For our present purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that the historical record shows the ease with which the 
treatment of "prices over time" fits into the conceptually static system 
of Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Again, the Bohm-Bawerkian 
treatment of time seems to be a factor, as Hayek's work illustrates. 
The question of more pressing interest to our present study than the 
historical evolution of what Milgate calls "the method of intertemporal 
equilibrium" is the extent to which this approach to resource allocation 
over time compares to Keynes' own-rate framework of analysis. On prima 
facie grounds, the two concepts seem to have much in common. Both deal 
with prices of goods over time that define implicit interest rates. 
Thus, the question that arises is whether or not Keynes' own-rate 
framework can be usefully viewed as just a special case of that supremely 
general organizing framework, the Walrasian equilibrium system. If it 
can, there may be some credence to the claims of the Walrasians that 
their system is conterminous with economics, with even the treatment of 
money and interest where it has so far failed. Debreu himself expressed 
such a confidence in the generality of the intertemporal equilibrium 
framework in 1959: 
By focusing attention on change of dates one obtains, as a 
particular case of the general theory of commodities . . ., a theory 
of saving, investment, capital, and interest. Similarly by focusing 
attention on changes of locations one obtains ^  another particular 
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case of the same general theory, a theory of location, 
transportation, international trade and exchange (1959, p. 32). 
Our question will be whether this view represents the justifiably 
supreme confidence of the scientist who, upon climbing to the peak of his 
subject, can now gaze benignly at the lesser heights of the foothills 
below; or, whether, instead, this confidence is of the type engendered by 
a narrow mathematician staring too, too long at a complex, flickering 
image in a dark cave, until finally coming to take its image for the 
reality of the world outside. 
Intertemporal equilibrium builds on and utilizes the sparse 
assumptions and lack of institutional detail of the general solution to 
the allocation of goods implied by the static Walrasian equilibrium. 
What it builds on is an amazingly simple extension for so large a task as 
encompassing the elements of capital-using production, time, and money 
into the basic supply and demand framework. Notably, the extension is to 
allow goods to be characterized not just by quality but also by the time 
and space (which are identical concepts from this viewpoint) in which 
they are available (Debreu, 1959, pp. 29-30). What is utilized from the 
basic case, then, is virtually everything that is analytically important. 
By this we mean that the characterization of production sets, preference 
sets and continuity in behavior that are required for the static 
(atemporal) equilibrium to exist, carry over to the Intertemporal case: 
There is no need at all to rehearse again the definition of 
equilibrium, the question of existence and the question of free 
goods: for it is already done. All that is involved is a new 
interpretation of the old model which, from the formal point of 
view, makes no difference. . . . The extension to the intertemporal 
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model is In a sense no more than a greater license to the 
imagination (Bliss, 1975, p« 46). 
The chimera that this license conjures up in the imagination of the 
general equilibrium theorists is a system of equilibrium prices, one for 
each good, for each time period. For those goods which are not currently 
produced but will be in the future, the assumption is that there exists a 
complete set of futures markets that sell every good, for delivery at 
every future date, from the beginning of our time period today to the 
(necessary for existence) end of the horizon T. So for each good (i = 1, 
..., n), in each time period (t = 1, ..., I), we get a particular 
equilibrium price NT of them in all. By what is a simple formal 
extension, but an enormous conceptual one, the solution for an 
intertemporal price vector, the prices of each good in each period, is 
then assumed to be accomplished in one fell swoop. Firms are assumed to 
operate via intertemporal production plans, consumers draw up 
intertemporal consumption plans, both for the whole time horizon 
simultaneously. The (non-unique) set of prices that prereconciles these 
two sets is the solution to the problem. All prices are determined at 
once (Bliss, 1975, pp. 39-49). We can now show what it means to say that 
in such a system, interest rates are only an ancillary phenomenon, 
implicit in the equilibrium price vector. For it is only after the 
equilibrium solution has been obtained that we go back to construct "own-
rates of Interest" from the already solved-for prices. We will follow 
the excellent discussion by Bliss (1975, pp. 50-60) to which the reader 
is referred for more details. 
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The equilibrium "intertemporal price system" contains one price for 
each good in each period. Since there is only one set of prices, we can 
choose only one numeraire by which to define the set of relative price 
ratios for the whole horizon. Each will be the value of good i in 
period t relative to the numeraire good (a particular good in a 
particular period). In essence, we are defining "real" commodity prices 
in relation to one unchanging anchor for the whole intertemporal price 
system. 
To get at the idea of interest rates, we ask what commodity trading 
ratios will be for different goods over different time periods. In the 
simplest case, let good 1 in period 1 be the numeraire (P^^=l), and all 
other prices be measured relative to how much of each good will trade for 
one unit of good 1 in period 1. Now ask: what does the equilibrium 
price vector tell us concerning the ability of an actor to transform 
(trade) one unit of good 1 in period I for some amount of good i in 
period t? There will be some quantity of this future good, call it 
that will trade for one unit of good 1 in period 1. The unit price of i 
in t will be P^^, and since P^^=l, the equilibrium price vector implies 
that 
(1) 
hence 
P it " xT ° X (2) 
it it 
We can use this formulation to better interpret what these 
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intertemporal prices are. From (2) we can see that each in the 
equilibrium price vector can be interpreted as the inverse of the 
quantity of good i in period t that one unit of the numeraire will 
purchase. Thus, there will be an intertemporal exchange ratio, in 
quantity terms, implied by the relation of the equilibrium ("present 
value") prices to each other. 
The barterlike rates of interest that we can derive from such a set 
of "intertemporal" relative prices are based on the necessary 
interrelationships between these prices. Ask: how much extra good i 
could be obtained by deferring the delivery of good 1 from week t to week 
(t+s)? Denote this intertemporal exchange ratio as P^(t,t+s), the own-
rate of interest on good i for the period t to t+s. Then, if the present 
value prices imply 
^it *i,t+s ^i,t+8 ' 
then the "own-rate" of interest will measure the proportionate gain in 
terms of good i over the period t to t+s; 
p^(t.t+s) . - 1 . 
Since by (1) 
P 
we define these own-rates as, 
P (t,t+8) » p—^ - 1 = . (3) 
i,t+s i,t+s 
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Thus, the own-rate of interest "is measured by the rate of decline of the 
present-value price expressed as a proportion of the price of the later 
period" (Bliss, 1975, p. 52). 
This is the bare-bones of the Intertemporal equilibrium construct. 
Our question is; How does it compare to the own-rates framework 
developed by Sraffa and Keynes? Remembering the clear distinction 
between these two (Sraffa*s and Keynes') uses of own-rates, now that we 
are presented with a third use of the term, it will be convenient to 
adopt a policy to distinguish them. To this end, we will henceforth 
denote Sraffa's conception as "long-period commodity rates" and represent 
them with the term r^. Alternatively, we will call Keynes' most 
elaborate concept (recalling that he recognized and built from Sraffa's 
usage) "money own rates," and represent these as r^ Finally, we will 
retain p^(t,t+8) as our symbol for the own-rates of the Walrasian 
intertemporal equilibrium and call these "short-period commodity rates." 
The reason for choosing these terms will become more evident as we 
proceed. Basically, our comparison will involve the question of the 
conception of equilibrium which underlies these respective uses. The 
analysis starts naturally from a comparison of the different discussions 
of the own-rate of interest, beginning with Sraffa's. 
Sraffa's long-period commodity rates are defined by his conception 
of "equilibrium" (in all of his writings it would seem) as corresponding 
to the long-period classical conception. Since we have already discussed 
this concept, it is only necessary to show that the traditional long-
period equilibrium prices imply Sraffa's long-period equilibrium own-
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rates. In the position of long-period equilibrium, "natural" prices 
reflect a composition of resource allocation such that each price 
reflects an equal return to producers on the value of their means of 
production (see Garegnanl, 1976, pp. 26-29). As Sraffa notes, this 
Implies that all prices equal costs of production and that any deviations 
from this "position" of the economy Imply differential rates In different 
industries. The unchanging nature of this type of equilibrium was 
Illustrated by Joan Robinson's (1953-54, p. 85) famous quip: 
But it is impossible for a system to get into a position of [long-
period] equilibrium, for the very nature of equilibrium is that the 
system is already in it, and has been in it for a certain length of 
past time. 
Without entering into the extended modern debate over the use of the 
long-period conception by "supply and demand" theories versus "classical 
theories" (see Garegnanl, 1976; Mllgate, 1983; Robinson, 1981), it is 
clear that for whatever reason (as a purely analytical distinction, or 
the result of a real process), long-period equilibrium prices would be 
either unchanging or at least absolutely predictable and steadily 
changing. The distinction concerns the more narrow question of. 
whether the long-period need be a static stationary state, or one in 
which capital accumulation proceeds, but at a long-period rate (see 
Robbins, 1930; Schumpeter, 1934; Samuelson, 1943; Mllgate, 1982, pp. 28-
g 
33). To Sraffa's case, though, it makes little difference since he 
defined as "equilibrium" long-period commodity rates a situation in which 
all "spot and future prices coincide," and all "'natural' or commodity 
rates are equal to one another, and to the money rate." That the money 
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rate is even Included in the definition is just a bow to the use of the 
term "money" In such a long-period barter system for the accounting 
numeraire. As Sraffa pointed out, the whole framework precluded any 
discussion of the more realistic aspects of a money economy from the 
start. But in following out such a conception, h' ' nanent criticism of 
the Wickselllan natural rate was on the internally secure grounds of 
accepting Wlcksell's own concern with defining long-period equilibrium 
states (Wlcksell, 1935, vol. I, p. 97, pp. 155-156, p. 166). 
Notable in Sraffa's long-period conception is the fact that 
equilibrium is defined by the distribution of capital resources to each 
industry, as befits the classical long period. Thus, his long-period 
prices are "cost of production prices" where a general rate of profit is 
earned on each: 
It will be noticed that, under free competition, this divergence of 
rates [when out of long-period equilibrium] is as essential to the 
effecting of the transition [between long period positions] as is 
the divergence of prices from costs of production; it is, in fact, 
another aspect of the same thing (Sraffa, 1932a, p. 50). 
It is from this long-period conception of equilibrium that his long-
period "equilibrium" own-rates arise. Since, by definition, long-period 
prices are fixed ("centers of gravitation") positions defined by the 
technical conditions of production, then spot and future prices will 
coincide and all own-rates will equal the money-rate. This seems to be 
the meaning of equilibrium behind Sraffa's use of own-rates of Interest. 
All equal for every good (i = 1, ..., n). 
Before we leave Sraffa, it Is interesting to note that there are 
some conceptual problems skirted by his discussion, and more 
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interestingly that these problems might be addressed by an analytical 
combination of his later work on classical value theory (1960) with 
Keynes' own-rates framework. Notice that Sraffa's definition skirts two 
issues. First, there is no discussion of what might determine the common 
natural-rate or commodity-rate of interest. And secondly, he makes no 
mention of what level this common rate will settle at. These are closely 
linked ideas concerning the definition of the "natural rate" of interest. 
Again, the view of Sraffa's review as Immanent criticism of Wicksell is 
useful in this connection, since these questions in fact remained open as 
part of Wicksell's capital theory legacy. Wicksell thought "real" 
conditions of productivity, operating through an aggregate conception of 
capital in long period conditions, determined the "natural-rate" (see 
Wicksell, 1935, vol. I). Of more relevance to Sraffa's review is that 
Wicksell clearly distinguished between this real, barter-like rate, and 
the money rate established in credit markets. What Sraffa is criticizing 
i» not the underlying conception of an equal long-period rate of return 
(indeed, he spent most of his life's work trying to give this concept a 
better analytical basis), but the separation between real and monetary 
forces based on the distinction between a barter-like real rate and an 
observed money rate. 
Later, though, Sraffa went further by criticizing the whole idea of 
an aggregate concept of capital on which this natural rate would be 
determined (1960). In this later conception, he provides a system by 
which the general long-period rate can be determined without an aggregate 
view of capital. Yet, the further question of what level this rate will 
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be set at is "left open" by Sraffa's (1960) system. And what is more, he 
hints that it may be tied down by a consideration of the money rate. 
This is where Keynes might come in—but first we must return to Walras. 
In the intertemporal price system, proposed by Hayek and developed 
by the modern Walrasians, the whole long-period basis of equilibrium is 
lost. This is clearly reflected in the definition of the short-period 
own-rates such a system defines. Since the Walrasian short-period rates 
are unconnected to any conception of competition as leveling rates of 
return in different sectors, there is no reason to ever expect the 
P^(t,t+s)'s to equalize. Bliss (1975, p. 55) makes explicit note of 
this: 
Notice the special assumptions that are necessary for an 
intertemporal equilibrium to have associated with it a single 
constant rate of interest. In general, all that is known is that in 
any week there is a uniquely defined own-rate of Interest for any 
good, but this may differ from the own-rates of Interest for other 
goods in that week or from the own-rates of interest for that good 
in a different week. 
As we have seen, Sraffa also recognized the existence of commodity 
own-rates which diverge from each other. But he identified them as 
disequilibrium rates in the long-period sense, since they necessarily 
represented differential profit opportunities for different goods. What 
the intertemporal equilibrium theory does is to elevate this short-period 
situation to the definition of a putative "general" case of equilibrium. 
This difference in "vision" of the economic process reveals Itself in two 
other ways than just the divergence of own-rates in equilibrium. The 
very concepts of prices and Interest rates are different in each. 
First, the intertemporal equilibrium abstracts away from 
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descriptions of how the flows of resources to particular Industries might 
be regulated at a social level. In the place of the general rate of 
profit that governs this flow in the long-period conception, the 
Intertemporal equilibrium approach substitutes the individual supply and 
demand decisions in each market in each time period. Accordingly, where 
Sraffa's long-period prices were constant cost of production prices that 
reflected the general rate of profit, in the intertemporal case each 
is just one of the system of market prices between which there is no ^  
priori expected relationship. Thus, the two equilibriums each yield a 
conceptually different set of prices and consequently the own-rates 
derived from these prices in each are conceptually different. In 
Sraffa's long period, divergent own-rates have the function of signaling 
the flow of resources out of low profit sectors and into high profit 
ones. In the intertemporal case, the own-rates have no signaling 
function at all, except to express intertemporal exchange ratios In a 
convenient form after they have already been determined. The conclusion: 
own-rates are of no analytical importance in the intertemporal approach. 
Thus the central point is that Interest rate calculations are 
ancillary to the analysis of prices in a model in which the 
allocation of given resources is viewed over a sequence of time 
periods. ... We therefore conclude that because interest rates in 
a multlperlod model for the theory are implicit in the solution for 
prices, no essentially new insight is gained by restating the price 
constraints in terms of these interest rates (Walsh and Gram, 1980, 
p. 236). 
But the long-period conception of equal commodity rates and the 
Walraslan conception of divergent short-period own-rates share with each 
other a deficient treatment of money. Both are essentially barter 
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frameworks. As we know from Sraffa's review of the Wickselllan natural-
rate framework, he didn't think the approach left any room for the social 
character of money. The Intertemporal equilibrium construct, likewise, 
can perform all of the tasks It Is designed for without money. When a 
market exists for every good, present and future; when a prior 
compatibility of supply and demand In each market Is assured by the 
definition of equilibrium; and when actors make all plans for their whole 
time horizon simultaneously, what Is there left for money to do? 
This compatibility of the two barter conceptions In rejecting money 
as necessary to the formation of equilibrium opens the way to a 
comparison with Keynes' own-rates framework. Keynes' definition of 
equilibrium monetary own-rates of Interest adapts the long-period vision 
of capital flows to the situation of a monetary economy where the 
Walraslan treatment of time makes no sense and the future is incalculably 
uncertain. In Keynes' conception, monetary own-rates forge a connecting 
link between the social contrivance of money as a liquidity standard and 
the effects of competing wealth holders on the flow of resources. The 
end result, as we know, is a theory of unemployment equilibriums. 
In terms of the ability to account for money, the crucial difference 
between Keynes' monetary own-rates and the barter own-rates is the 
recognition of uncertainty about the future that cannot be built into 
another quality of future goods. Since Keynes' actors do not have a 
market for each future good which they can rely on (either 
probabilistically or certainly), they demand liquid wealth holdings. 
Liquidity premiums are paid by Individuals for goods that possess a 
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potential power of disposability over an unspecified period of time. 
Thus, the consideration of time here is an open-ended one, not a fixed 
time horizon as in the intertemporal case. Further, it is when we admit 
the rational response by actors to this view of time that the importance 
of expectations in Keynes' shifting equilibrium comes to the front. In 
the intertemporal case, the conception of time precluded the existence of 
Keynesian expectations by making future markets equivalent to present 
ones. When this fantasy is pulled away, room opens up for the liquidity 
functions of money. 
In terms of the definition of equilibrium own-rates, the monetary 
character of Keynes' vision, and its distinction from the intertemporal 
equilibrium approach, reveals itself in a number of ways. First, Keynes' 
system is completely defined by transactions that take place today in 
expectation of the uncertain future. Thus, not only does his account 
involve expected values of the individual capital and financial assets, 
but the monetary standard in which they are measured is captured by his 
"expected appreciation" terms, the "a's." Note that these "a" terms are 
absent from the intertemporal own-rates since each present value price is 
defined by a single unchanging standard, the numeraire good. Moreover, 
the liquidity premium for money assets is absent from this framework 
because the conception of time as space in the intertemporal approach 
precludes the need for liquidity. Finally, the very conception of how we 
might "get into" equilibrium is given a much more "feet-on-the-ground" 
approach in Keynes' vision than in the Ualrasian one. 
Recall that the equilibrium prices in the Walraslan framework 
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reflect an Idealized prereconcillatlon of every plan, of every 
Individual, for the whole time horizon. This Is the function of the 
fictitious "auctioneer" mechanism by which no trades are allowed until 
this configuration of plans has been achieved. We argued in Essay I that 
this auctioneer process masks a tremendous deficiency of the Ualrasian 
approach; i.e., that there was no description of how a Walraslan 
equilibrium might be achieved. Coming out of the Marshallian tradition, 
Keynes was more alive to grounding even his most abstract discussions in 
some reference to Institutional realism. In the case of the own-rates 
framework, this realism provides him with a treatment of the formation of 
the equilibrium on the asset market that seems much more plausible than 
the Walraslan auctioneer. 
Essentially what ensures the fragile but continuous existence of 
Keynes' equilibrium monetary own-rates is the self-motivated actions of 
wealth owners seeking the highest financial return for their assets. 
With his wide experience in financial markets, it was natural for Keynes 
to utilize the arbitrage process, which works so troplsmatlcally in 
asset markets, as the driving force of his "equilibrium." Of course, as 
he also noted (1936, Ch. 12), the existence of a professional class of 
Investors who provided this equilibrating function might also account for 
the fragile nature of his shifting equilibrium. In any case, Keynes' 
equilibrium own-rates have a practical basis for existence that 
represents a large Improvement over the extraordinary fiction of the 
Walraslan auctioneer (especially in the Intertemporal setting). Not only 
does the arbitrage mechanism provide a social level mechanism by which 
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Individual preferences are reconciled, but it does so by appeal to good 
old Smithian self-interest. 
On the other side of this asset market equilibrium from its 
underlying micro rationale, we find addressed the concern of the long-
period approach with the effect of such self-interested investment on 
resource flows. Again, the innovation of Keynes' approach is to include 
monetary considerations in his vision from the very start. By the 
classical long-period conception that Sraffa's commodity-rates discussion 
moved in, the resource flows and the natural price/market price 
deviations that these flows responded to, were conceived of in strictly 
"real" terms. This is why for Ricardo no less than for Wicksell, despite 
widely different theories of value, monetary effects were seen as 
disturbances, disequilibrium effects and transitory phenomena. In 
Keynes' shifting equilibrium, we alter this view by including the 
influence of money from the start. Thus, the asset market equilibrium 
determines equal monetary own-rates at any particular moment for all 
assets, real and financial. In Keynes' equilibrium, r^ ^  are equal for 
all goods (i = 1, ..., n), but all r^ may differ. The difference between 
the two is accounted for by the expected appreciation terms, the "a's".^^ 
Those assets prices so determined will govern the flow of production of 
new capital goods when compared with costs of production. We can now see 
that the basis of Keynes' treatment of money as both just another asset 
and one with very peculiar capital qualities is his need to bring 
monetary considerations into his theory on equal footing with 
productivity considerations. Further, this equality of financial and 
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capital assets in the eyes of the wealth holders leads him naturally to 
consider a common basis for all assets—hence his capital theory grounded 
in reproducibility and scarcity. Finally, it is the monetary character 
of even this, his most elaborate, model (that of Chapter 17) that allows 
him to define unemployment equilibriums that are the result of persistent 
forces. In an uncertain monetary economy, the private need for a social 
standard of liquidity, as a result of human action but not of human 
design, has the potential to regulate the utilization level of resources 
as a by-product of directing their allocation. 
In bringing these dilatory remarks to an end, it is convenient to 
recall that we began this section with the question of the all-
encompassing generality of the Walrasian paradigm. In the remarks of 
Debreu, we saw a commonly held notion that the sparseness of 
institutional detail and the abstract generality of the full 
intertemporal general equilibrium theory could encompass any particular 
theory ("of savings, investment, capital and interest") as a special 
case. By this reasoning, a single framework is offered for the analysis 
of all economic problems. Now, having reviewed three different 
conceptions of equilibrium as they relate to the idea of own-rates of 
interest, can we agree with this viewpoint? 
In framing our answer, it would seem that the crucial question is 
the grounds on which generality is claimed in each case. On the grounds 
of a theory of the allocation of a given amount of resources by 
decentralized decisions, expressed through idealized markets, in a 
setting of perfect foresight, the Ârrow-Debreu system seems to have a 
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just claim to all-encompassing generality. But Robblns' famous 
definition notwithstanding, one could conceive of other possible 
standards by which to judge a vision of the economy than hypothetical 
allocatlonal efficiency* In fact, this seems to be exactly what Keynes 
did in claiming a generality for his theory over the classical one. In 
other words, he changed the object of his theoretical enquiry to include 
the two things that the Walrasian theory seems incapable of admitting, 
short of an ad hoc afterthought or restriction: the use and effects of a 
socially defined medium of exchange and the existence of unemployment 
equilibriums. Are these a foothill seen far below from the abstract 
heights of the Arrow-Debreu economy? Perhaps the general equilibrium 
theorist, having ground his nose to rock and having finally achieved his 
summit, will now turn around to find a never-before-glimpsed range off in 
the distance. Which is higher? 
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V. ENDNOTES 
1. In fleshing out his conception of divergent own-rates of 
Interest as being a corollary phenomenon to divergences between market 
prices and long-period "natural" prices, Sraffa makes the long-period 
context of his argument quite clear. See Sraffa (1932a, p. 50). 
2. The distinction involves the more narrow question of whether the 
long-period definition of prices and (equal) profit rates necessarily 
implies a "stationary state" condition. Many authors have noticed that 
the neoclassical use of the long-period (e.g., by Wicksell, Clark, and 
Marshall), Is usually conceived of as a theoretical state in which 
accumulation is still going forward—In other words, a nonstationary 
long-period. Since the actual defining point of the long-period approach 
concerns the leveling of rates of return, it is obvious that such a 
dynamic long-period as Marshall proposed must be a form of what modern 
economists call a steady state. Mllgate (1982, pp. 28-33) covers this 
topic exhaustively and contains all of the relevant references. It is 
reported that much Is made of this idea by someone working in Montreal, 
Canada. 
3. "I can date my own personal 'revolution' rather exactly to May 
or June 1933. ... It began (rather oddly, as it turned out) with 
Hayek" (Hicks, 1963, p. 307). See also Hicks (1973, p. 190) where he 
traces this influence of Hayek to his Value and Capital. 
4. Although for a much earlier recognition of the different 
conceptions of equilibrium Implicit in various approaches to economics, 
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see Robblns (1930). 
5. That Hayek is in fact identifying his approach to "equilibrium" 
with the Walrasian approach is clear as Hutchison (1981, p. 212) shows 
with the following quote from Hayek (1949, p. 42n). Hayek claims that by 
"equilibrium theory"; 
We have primarily understood the modern theory of the general 
interdependence of all economic quantities, which has been most 
perfectly expressed by the Lausanne School of theoretical economics. 
Hayek's early self-identification with the static Walrasian equilibrium 
approach would seem to present a severe difficulty for the attempt by the 
modern Austrian school to interpret all of his work as part of "a school 
apart" which concentrates on subjective process analysis as opposed to 
the specification of equilibrium states. For instance, one of Hayek's 
most cogent modern supporters makes the following claim in this regard: 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek was a major critic of the 
emerging professional consensus on economic research. In 
particular, he tried to separate the theoretical from the empirical 
(as he phrased it) in economics and delimit the tautological 
propositions of economic analysis [i.e., General Equilibrium 
Systems] from the potentially empirical elements. He argued that 
the tendency to limit economic theory to the development of static 
analysis would make it impossible to deal with disequilibrium 
conditions. His arguments often anticipated current criticisms of 
the cavalier treatment of disequilibrium states by economists 
(O'Drlscoll, 1977, p. 18). 
As our study will show, while it is true that sometimes Hayek criticized 
"tautologous equilibrium states" in the 1930s and 1940s, he also embraced 
just the opposite methodological stance in the same period. Given that 
there is no unity in his methodological views, some other basis seems 
called for to connect his multifarious works. 
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6. This distinction between treating time as a physical 
characteristic ("time as space") versus treating time as a subjective 
life process has roots In the literature of phenomenologlcal philosophy. 
More recently, much has been made of the same conceptual distinction 
(between "Newtonian" and "Historical" time) by the Post Keynesian 
theorists. See Kregel (1973, pp. 31-32) and Robinson (1981, pp. 86-95). 
7. It is interesting to note in this context that in the most 
recent theoretical treatise of the modern Austrian school (O'Drlscoll and 
Rizzo, 1985), an attempt is made to purge Austrian subjectlvist views of 
the inadequate treatment of time Involved in Hayek's "coordination of 
plans" equilibrium: 
Hayek's avowed Intention in developing his concept of 
equilibrium as the consistency of individual plans was to marry time 
and equilibrium (Hayek, 1937, p. 37). Since plans are forward-
looking, he reasoned that plan coordination must entail time. 
Unfortunately, he did not fully understand the distinction between 
the Newtonian and real-time constructs. Hayeklan equilibrium 
incorporated only Newtonian time (p. 81). 
8. 
As regards the ex post and the ex ante method, I shall certainly 
give further thought to its advantages. This is in fact almost 
precisely on the lines that I was thinking and lecturing somewhere 
about 1931 and 1932, and subsequently abandoned. My reason for 
giving it up was owing to m^ failure to establish any definite unit 
of time, and I found that that made very artificial any attempt to 
state the theory precisely. So, after writing out many chapters 
along what were evidently the Swedish lines, I scrapped the lot and 
felt that my new treatment was much safer and sounder from a logical 
point of view (Keynes to Ohlln, Jan. 1937; reprinted in Keynes, 
1973b, p. 184). 
9. See note above. 
10. See Essay II above, pp. 124-135. 
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A CONCLUDING WORD 
In the Introduction to these Essays, an attempt was made to bring 
some coherence to the various themes, motivations and subjects treated In 
each. One claim made at that time for unity In these works was a common 
concern with the usefulness of historical Interpretations of economic 
theory for modern understanding. Accordingly, we propose to conclude 
these Essays, not with a summing up of accomplished tasks, but with some 
brief remarks on the future avenues of research that these topics suggest 
to one student—viz., the author. 
In the case of the own-rates theory of Interest, there are a 
(painfully) large number of areas in which the above coverage, being 
merely suggestive, could be extended. We will touch on a few of them. 
Fisher's real rate was mentioned briefly in Essay II. Given the enormous 
practical and theoretical Influence this concept has exercised from 
Fisher's day down to our own, it warrants closer attention if the own-
rates might shed any light on its puzzles. As noted, Adarkar seemed to 
think that it did, and Keynes also makes some short comments on it. 
Utilizing the Sraffian conception of barter-rates, it seems likely that a 
ready empirical estimate of a number of actual "real-rates" could be 
found. These would include those for commodities which are traded on 
organized futures markets. These could then be usefully compared to a 
concurrently existing money rate to get a new angle on Fisher's effect. 
Along the same lines, the own-rates theory suggests that a term-
structure argument would be implicit in a comparison of the expected 
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rates of appreciation (the "a's") which go into the calculation of 
commodity own-rates, for different periods of time. This might be an 
interesting way to frame the traditional expectatlonal theory of the term 
structure that has a more operational set of data points than the usual 
lagged expectations terms. A comparison of the term structure of 
different real own-rates and money rates would be interesting from this 
standpoint as well. Is there actually such a distinction in expectation? 
More ambitious students of mathematics have an Interesting subject 
in the possible specifications of the micro-structure of Keynes' asset-
market equilibrium. Game theoretical account might be appropriate in 
this context since there seems to be room for discussing Identifiable 
groups facing different objectives and constraints. Moreover, the 
second- (or third-, etc.) order guessing implied by the "beauty contest 
example" seems to be potentially amenable to this type of specification. 
On the other side of the asset market from the micro-structure, the 
stock-flow relationship of asset prices and Investment activity that 
Keynes makes so much of has also not ever been successfully addressed. 
Although many authors have attempted to write the last word on the limits 
of the stock-flow relationship over the years, until recently (Foley, 
1975) none have made much sense of the interaction of the two. This is 
not surprising since the mathematicians report this co be one of the most 
vexing problems from a formal standpoint. 
Finally, the most ambitious of all avenues of research suggested by 
the own-rates theory concerns the further specification of an alternative 
framework for value theory* Recalling Townshend's remarks, it seems that 
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one aspect of such an effort would have to accord the liquidity/ 
uncertainty nexus of Keynes' monetary views an equal standing with the 
traditional focus on quantity relations. In other words, a theory of 
shifting equilibrium would have to build up to market prices that are 
only determined to the degree of stability that attaches to the money 
that measures them. An obvious avenue of distinction here would be the 
classification of goods by the degree to which they participate in a 
socially defined liquidity premium. How are such goods different and how 
do they arise and recede? 
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